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H – 1235

International Court of Justice

Document Book "GG" Filed Jan. 16, 1946.
"Martin Bormann"

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. D-75
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of letter signed BIERKAMP on
Subject of Secret Decree of BORMANN regarding
Relationship of National Socialism to Christianity

Inspector of the Security Police
and Security Service

Dusseldorf. 12 December 1941

IV 3. 2 - Eichholz 2 -

SECRET

To the Supreme Reich Security Dept.
- Dept IV -
To hand of SS Gruppenführer Müller.
" " " SS Sturmbannführer Hartl.

Berlin

Reference: Secret decree of the Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the relationship of National Socialism to Christendom.

HERE: Protestant Priest Wilhelm Eichholz, Aix-la-Chapelle.

Sub-Reference: Report from the Leading State Police Department, Aix-la-Chapelle dated 3.12.41 II B 2 No. 7472/41 -.

Enclosures: 1 copy
1 photostat copy

A copy of a letter on the subject of "Relationship of National Socialsim to Christendom" is amongst the written material found with the Protestant Priest Eichholz at Aix-la Chapelle. This is supposed to originate from Reichsleiter Bormann, (Paragraph (12) of the report of the leading State Police Department Aix-la-Chappelle.)

As far as this document is concerned it does, in fact, as I have ascertained, represent a secret decree of the Party Chancellery signed by Reichsleiter Bormann, in which Reichsleiter Bormann clearly points out that National Socialism and Christendom are incompatible and that the influence of the Churches in Germany, including the Protestant Church, must be eliminated. The decree was addressed to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer at Münster on 6.6.41 under the file reference III D - Es.3320/2/F - 5050 g. in which connection a letter from Gauleiter Dr. Meyer dated 7.4.41 - Dr. M./Bo/I was referred to. I have ascertained that on the 7.6.41 the decree was also sent to the remaining Gauleiters, in this case without reference to the correspondence with Gauleiter Dr. Meyer. (Circular letter 8/41 - Secret). The circular letter, however, in its first paragraph, the text of which is not yet available, contains a brief pointer to the events which have led to the basic decision of Reichsleiter Bormann. As far as is known to me this concerns a proposal on the part of the German Christians regarding the setting-up of a Protestant Reichs Church. To this, Gauleiter Dr. Meyer has stated his attitude in a letter dated 7.4.41. Since this first paragraph of the circular decree addressed to all Gauleiters is missing from the document in possession of Priest Eichholz, it appears not unlikely that the original secret decree, addressed solely to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer, was already known to the Church departments.

A copy of the decree addressed to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer is attached herewith. Further, attached herewith is a photostat copy of the document found with the Priest Eichholz. It can be gathered from this that the text of both letters tallies exactly; the document found with Priest Eichholz is devoid of its letterhead and has no address. It is, of course, furthermore, not marked "Secret". A copy of the secret decree was obviously made by a source not yet known and, by means of this, multiplication was carried out by Protestant Church sources in the same form as that found in possession of Priest Eichholz. On the

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On the strength of experiences in this district, the possibility must be taken into consideration that the representations of Reichsleiter Bormann, now that they are in the hands of confessional church circles, may be made known to hostile foreign countries since, through the numerous connections, they may also have reached Catholic sources. In my opinion, the affair confirms clearly the dangerous nature, expressed in the decree, of the Protestant Church and such ties of personalities within the Party.

I have arranged for Priest Eichholz to be arrested for the time being. His present explanation that all documents found on him had been sent to him anonymously is not creditable. It is to be assumed that he is aware of the source of such information or can at least guess, even if they should have been sent anonymously. It will therefore be attempted with all energy to ascertain whence Priest Eichholz has received this document. Further report will take place, for the time being, through State Police Department, Aix-la-Chappelle.

Sgd B i e r k a m p.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. D-75
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

RELATIONSHIP OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND CHRISTIANITY

National Socialist and Christian concepts are irreconcilable. Christian churches build on uncertainty of human beings and attempt to preserve the uncertainty of as wide segments of the population as possible, for only in this way can Christian churches keep their power. As opposed to that, National Socialism is based on scientific fundamentals. Christianity has invariable tenets, which were set up almost 2000 years ago and have crystallized in dogmas incompatible with reality. National Socialism on the other hand must, if it is to fulfill its job in the future, always be organized according to the latest knowledge of scientific research.

Christian churches have always recognized the dangers which threaten their existence on account of exact scientific knowledge and therefore attempt by means of pseudo-science, such as theology is, to suppress or falsify scientific research by means of their dogma. Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the concepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have been taken over from Jewry. For this reason also we do not need Christianity.

No human being would know anything of Christianity if it had not been drilled into him in his childhood by pastors. The so-called dear God in no wise gives knowledge of his existence to young people in advance, but in an astonishing manner in spite of his onmipotence leaves this to the efforts of the pastors. If therefore in the future our youth learns nothing more of this Christianity, whose doctrines are far below ours, Christianity will disappear by itself.

It is also strange that before the beginning of today's calculation time (calendar) nothing was known of this Christian God and that also since this moment most inhabitants of the earth never learned anything of this Christianity and therefore according to the standard Christian concept were damned from the beginning.

When we National Socialists speak of a belief in God, we do not understand by God, like naive Christians and their spiritual opportunists, a human-type being, who sits around somewhere in the sphere. We must rather open people's eyes to the fact that beside our small universe, highly important in the great universe there are an inconceivably large number of other bodies in the universe, innumerable additional bodies, which like the sun are surrounded by planets, and these in turn by smaller bodies, the moons. The force of natural law, with which all these innumerable planets move in the universe, we call the Almighty or God. The claim that this world force is concerned about the fate of every single being, of every smallest earth bacillus, can be influenced by so-called prayers or other astonishing things, is based on a proper dose of naivete or (however) on a business shamelessness.

As opposed to that, we National Socialists impose on ourselves the demand to live naturally as much as possible, i.e., biologically. The more accurately we recognize and observe the laws of nature and of life, the more we adhere to them, so much the more do we conform to the will of the Almighty. The more insight we have into the will of the Almighty, the greater will be our successes.

It follows from the irreconcilability of National Socialist and Christian concepts, that a strengthening of existing confessions and every demand of originating Christian confessions is to be rejected by us. A differentiation between the various Christian confessions is not to be made here. For this reason also the thought of an erection of an evangelical National Church by merger of the various evangelical churches has been definitively given up, because the evangelical church is just as inimical to us as the Catholic Church. Any strengthening of the evangelical church would merely react against us.

It was a historical mistake of the German Emperors in the Middle Ages, that they repeatedly created order at the Vatican in Rome. It is always an

error into which we Germans unfortunately fall too often, that we attempt to create order where we would needs have an interest in disunion and separation. The Hohenstaufens would needs have had the greatest interest in the disintegration of circumstances of Ecclesiastical power. From the standpoint of the Reich it would have been most favorable if not one pope but at least two, if possible even more popes had existed and mutually fought. Instead of this the German emperors and especially the Hohenstaufens repeatedly looked after order in the church, helped one pope to power over all other rivals, with the success that the emperors, as soon as the pope was again strong enough for it immediately received the first blows from "their" pope. The church however in strengthening its own position of power repeatedly used the particularism of the princes and later of parties and tied it up with all its strength.

In former generations leadership of the people lay exclusively in the hands of the church. The state limited itself to issuing laws and orders and primarily to administering. The real leadership of the people lay not with the state but with the church. The latter exerted via the priest the strongest influence on the life of the individual human being, of families and on the totality (of things). Everything which did not suit the churches was suppressed with unprecedented ruthlessness. For centuries the state by the most various turns granted to the church the possibility of influence. It depended on the church, whether it would help the state or oppose it. The State was reduced to the aid of the church, it was dependent on it. The struggle of the German Emperors against the pope had to fail in the Middle Ages and repeatedly in modern times, because not the emperor, but the church had the leadership of the people in its hand.

This ideological dependence of the state on the church, the yielding of leadership of the people to the church, had become a matter of course, so that nobody dared to oppose seriously here. To consider this not as an incontrovertible fact from the beginning, passed as absurd stupidity until just before the Machtübernahme (Hitler's rise to power, 1933).

For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consciously and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand. With the party, its components and attached units the Fuehrer has created for himself and thereby the German Reich leadership an instrument which makes him independent of the church. All influences which might impair or damage the leadership of the people exercised by the Fuehrer with help of the NSDAP, must be eliminated. More and more the people must be separated from the churches and their organs, the pastors. Of course the churches must and will, seen from their viewpoint, defend themselves against this loss of power. But never again must an influence on leadership of the people be yielded to the churches. This (influence) must be broken completely and finally.

Only the Reich government and by its direction the party, its components and attached units have a right to leadership of the people. Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the state, so must the possibility of church influence also be totally removed. Not until this has happened, does the state leadership have influence on the individual citizens. Not until then are people and Reich secure in their existence for all the future.

We would repeat the mistakes which in past centuries were fatal to the Reich, if we according to the knowledge of our ideological opponents of the Christian confessions were to contribute in any way to the strengthening of one of the various churches. The interest of the Reich lies not in conquering but in preserving and strengthening ecclesiastical particularism.

(signed) M. BORMANN
Reichsleiter

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. D-7[illegible]
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0006

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. D-75-[illegible]

31 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. D-75.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

H1235 - 0007

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-138
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation in full of decree signed by HITLER, dated 27 July 1934, giving powers to HESS on law-giving.

TRANSLATION

COPY

Beyreuth, 27 July 1934

The Reich Chancellor,

Rk. 6798

To the Reich Ministers,

I decree that the Deputy of the Führer, Reich Minister HESS, will have the capacity of a participating Reich Minister in connection with the preparation of drafts for laws in all Reich administrative spheres.[1] All legislative work is to be sent to him when it is received by the other Reich Minister concerned. This also applies in cases where no one else participates except the Reich Minister making the draft. Reich Minister HESS will be given the opportunity to comment on drafts suggested by experts. (lit. "REFERENTENENTWURFEN").

This order will apply in the same sense to legislative ordinances. The Deputy of the Führer in his capacity of Reich Minister can send as representative an expert on his staff. These experts are entitled to make statements to the Reich Ministers on his behalf.

(Sgd) Adolf HITLER.

Translator's note: - 1. Lit. "Reichsressorts"

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. D-138

I, PAUL W. FREEDMAN, S/Sgt, 33799122, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. D-138.

PAUL W. FREEDMAN
S/Sgt
33799122

Exhibit USA 694
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-163
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKER'S PARTY

Circular letter No. 141/41.

Fuehrer's H.Q. 5 Nov 41.

Reference: Burial of Bodies of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War by the Municipalities

The Reich Minister of the Interior has addressed the following express letter in this matter to the Reichs Town Governors and Presidents, which is attached as an enclosure. Please note.

Heil Hitler!
(S) M. Bormann.

1 enclosure
F.d.R:
Signed: DIFFGARDE (?)

Distribution:
Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Kreisleiter

Copy of a copy. REICHS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR.

IV e 10336/41

EXPRESS LETTER

3991.

To the Reichs Town Governors in the Reich Districts (County Governors).
The Government Presidents and Vice Presidents.
President of the Police in Berlin.
The Mayor of the Reich Capital, BERLIN.

Not suitable for publication (not even in extract by the press).
Reference: Burial of Bodies of Soviet Prisoners of War by Municipalities.

Whereas the Army Service Departments request the burial of Soviet Russian Prisoners of War is is the duty of the Municipalities to carry our burials immediately after death certificates have been signed by a doctor. It is left to the Municipalities either to make use of already existing grave yards or other suitable places.

The choice of a burial ground outside an existing grave-yard is subject to approval by the Health Department concerned and must be in keeping with the law and all applicable regulations, particularly health regulations (as outlined by the circular decree of the Reichs and Prussian Minister of the Interior, etc. 18 Jan 37 - I a I 31/37 (RMBliV. S.113), and by the resolutions of the Scientific Deputation for the Medical matters of 1 Nov 1890, regarding projects for the establishment and enlarging of burial grounds, and by the order regarding places for burial, (viz Gutt, The Public Health Service, volumn I, second edition, page 259). Preparations will be started immediately to conform with these regulations. To establish death, medical officers of the army are to be called in whenever they can be reached. To save costs, Service Departments of the army will generally be contacted regarding transport of corpses (furnishing of vehicles) whenever possible. No coffins will be indented.

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for the transfer and burial. The body will be completely enveloped with strong paper (if possible, oil - tar- asphalte paper) or other suitable material. Transfer and burial is to be carried out unobtrusively. If a number of corpses have to be disposed of the burial will be carried out in a communal grave. In this case, the bodies will be buried side by side (but not on top of each other) and in accordance with the local custom regarding depth of graves. Where a grave yard is the place of burial a distant part will be chosen. No burial ceremony or decorations of graves will be allowed. Where new graves are dug, the customary distance from existing graves will be observed. If the deceased Soviet prisoner of war suffered from a contagious disease, transfer and burial will be carried out in agreement with the local health department concerned. Rooms in which corpses were stored (railway sheds, mortuaries), and vehicles used for the transport of corpses are to be disinfected each time. Persons who have been ordered to lay out, transport and bury corpses must be instructed on the necessary hygenic measures - particularly disinfection after contact with corpses. Costs will be kept as low as possible. They will be collected quarterly by the Municipality from the Army Command Administration in whose district the Municipality is situated. Accounts will be enclosed. Furthermore, whenever a demand is submitted, it will be stated when and through which military service department the corpse was handed over to the Municipal authorities. I request immediate information of the service departments concerned. Spare copies attached.

(signed) Unterschrifts.

F.d.R.d.A.
Signed: LEITL (?)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT D-163

17 December 1945

I, WALTER E. BRILL, Civilian, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document D-163.

WALTER E. BRILL
Civilian

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H1235-0010

Exhibit USA 679
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-226
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

A Decree Signed by HIMMLER dated 25 Sep 44 on the ensuring of the discipline, and output of foreign workers.

REICHS MINISTER FOR ARMAMENT
AND WAR PRODUCTION
RÜ A-Artb O. I - Hd'/An
Nr. 1980 / 44

BERLIN, SO 16
10 Nov 44
Tel.No. 676141

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To:
1) The Chairman of the Armament Commission, with copies to: RÜIN (RÜKdo), WKB and Rü -Representatives.
2) DAF-Department SSV
3) DAF-Department for Employment.
4) Local Distribution A.l. plus Armaments Department Labour E.

Reference: Ensuring the Discipline and output of Foreign Workers.

The Reichs minister for the Interior, in agreement with all Departments concerned, has issued an order for ensuring the discipline and output of the foreign workers, dated 25 Sep 44, attached herewith. This order is brought to the notice of all armament departments.

It is not essential to notify factories, but it may be advisable to inquire at factories whether this order is known to the factory managers.

By order.

(sgd) Dr HUPFAUER.

Encls.

Certified: LANGNER

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-226
(cont'd)

COPY

REICHS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
File Ref Nol. S IV B - 310/44 dated 25 Sept 44.

Decree for Ensuring the Discipline and Output of Foreign Workers.

Several million foreign workers are employed in the territory of the greater Reich. Up to the present, on account of just and correct treatment, and sufficient feeding, accommodation and welfare, they have made a considerable contribution to the total German working and output capacity. The present developments at this time, when the most serious decisive battle is being waged, demand the ensuring of the order and discipline amongst the foreign workers under all circumstances, together with the prevention of acts of sabotage, forming of resistance groups and revolutionary gatherings, etc.

It is of particular importance that not only the present good output should be secured, but also that further working reserves should be freed, which, without doubt, can still be obtained from these millions of foreign workers. Care must be taken, furthermore, that no intellectuals or other dangerous elements amongst the foreigners can begin to influence German works members in a defeatist or even pacifist sense. In agreement with the departments concerned, I therefore decree:

1. It is the duty of works managers and foremen to observe any developments of the frame of mind amongst foreign workers with particular care. Close co-operation between departments of the Party, the State and Industry, with departments of the Secret Police, is absolutely necessary for this purpose.

2. All men and women of the NSDAP, its subsidiaries and affiliated bodies in the works, will, in accordance with instructions from the Kreisleiters be warned by their local group leaders, and be put under obligation:

   a) to play their part in keeping foreigners under the most careful observation. They will report the least suspicion to the works foreman, which he will pass on to the Defence Deputy, or, where such a deputy has not been appointed, to the Police Department concerned, whilst at the same time, reportin to the works manager and local group leader.
   b) to exert untiringly and continuously their influence on the foreigners, both in word and deed in regard to the certainty of German victory and the German will to resist, thus producing a further increase of output in the works. Party members, both men and women, and members of Party organization and affiliated bodies must be expected more than ever before, to conduct themselves in an exemplary manner.

3. Propaganda within the works is to be increased. Foreign workers must be particularly influenced by means of camp newspapers, posters, leaflets and loudspeakers in the spirit of the German fight for existance so that a final stop is put to the increasing number of rumors which are circulating amongst them. The Gau Trustee of the DAF will issue detailed instructions in co-operation with the Gau Propaganda leader and the leader of the Gau Dept. for Social Questions.

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4. The Defence Deputies appointed by the Secret State Police after investigation by the Party, are responsible for defence questions within the works and will have both the principal and the auxiliary professional work protection squad under their command. Wherever it appears necessary in the interest of a co-ordinated political policy in the Defense Deputies will be called together by the Kreisleiters after consultation with the leader of the Secret State Police, and will be informed of the political situation. In the case of larger and particularly important works, the Secret State Police in collaboration with the Party, where necessary will arrange a strengthening of the work protection squad by suitable forces of the Party and the Army (war,wounded, convalescents etc.).

5. In order that the tasks of the Defense Deputies may be fulfilled and in accordance with the instructions issued by the Reichs Leader SS and Leader of the Reichs Organization, works, personnel will be subordinate to the Defense Deputies in the event of danger. Organization and the power to issue orders within the works are not affected by this. So as to avoid any dissension amongst those members of the works (compare figure 2) who are members of the NSDAP every effort must be made to organize collectively all the forces concerned and they must place themselves actively at the disposal of both propaganda and security. The Gau Trustee of the DAF will take the necessary steps.

6. If outside help becomes necessary, this will be called for by the Defense Deputy through the nearest police department. Arrangements made in that respect must be made known to the works foreman. To avoid delay in calling such outside help, provisions must be made for the event of a breakdown of the Signals Service.
The Party executive concerned must be informed by the works foreman by the quickest possible means whenever the work protection squad is brought into action or outside help is called for.

7. The works manager, together with his Defense Deputy and works foreman is responsible that the works are held during disturbances by the use of his own forces until outside help arrives. In no circumstances is it perissible to accept any demands, nor the least signs of yielding be shown.

8. Appropriate measures to meet similar conditions, if necessary, and wherever conditions demand, are to be taken in agriculture, public transport etc.

(shd) Heinrich HIMMLER.

Certified copy: (sgd) Kerl
Chancellery Employee.

H1235 - 0013

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-226
(cont'd)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT D-226

20 October 1945

I, J/Comd N. J. LEONARD , British Army, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document D-226.

N. J. LEONARD
J/Comd

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

13182

CONFIDENTIAL

THE STRATEGIC POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 5th YEAR OF WAR

A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (West) on the 7th November, 1943 at MUNICH to the Reich- and Gau- Leaders.

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Introduction

I. Review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. The Italian betrayal, how it was parried, and its consequences.

General Outcome:

III. The present situation

Consideration of the individual theatres of war and their characteristic features.

Finland

Norway

Denmark — Keystone of communications with Norway.

France with the Netherlands and Belgium — the battlefield of the year '44.

Italy — a narrow front with deep flanks.

The Balkans — Guerilla warfare - Supply

TheEAST — Comparison with the Western front 1917/18

IV. The enemy - his resources and their grouping.

His further strategic intentions.

V. The morale of the confederates and Neutrals.

VI. The problems of the German Command in this situation of the struggle along the inner line.

(a) The distribution of forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole.

(b) The formation of operative reserves.

(c) Comparison between requirements in soldiers and munitions-workers.

(d) Exhaustion of man-power reserves in the territories under our domination.

The problem of the Confederates and of alien soldiers.

(e) Mastering the enemy terror raids from the air.

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(f) The renewal of effective U-boat warfare.

VII. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

(a) The German people and its leadership.

(b) The German armed forces.

(c) The ethical and moral foundation of our struggle.

(d) The unified political and military aim of the Confederates ("VERBUNDETEN"), protection from Bolshevism.

(e) Unified political and military Command.

(f) The diverging political, military, social and economic tendencies of our opponents, the moral inferiority of our opponents in the WEST and the purely materialistic foundations of their struggle.

(g) The genius at the head of the Command.

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page 1
of original

The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

Lecture
by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces (West)
to the Reichs- and Gau- leaders,
delivered in MUNICH on 7 Nov.
1943.

Introduction

ReichsLeiter BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I undertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for his own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all

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in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these slogans are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people, that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front

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but at home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

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I

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The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one

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of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts:

I. A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II. Consideration of the present situation.

III. The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer, I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere ofaction, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way begiving expression only to one side of events.

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I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realize what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"); in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope with this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed, what the Führer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

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2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being laid on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position. Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victim to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

page 8.

This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which, in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover for an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

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5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this question is all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in himself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possib lities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by

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the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

page 10 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the two-front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim ofwhich could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e., in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

page 11 8. In the meantime, however, we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of war which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes. Secondly, it was realization of our own maritime necessities which made it imperative for us to secure for ourselves freeaccess to the ATLANTIC by a number of air and naval support points on the Norwegian coast. Here too, therefore, defensive and offensive requirements combined to form an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main in was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May, 1940.

page 12 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us importantservice in the further course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points. Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war into England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on which in the meantime the enemy had laid

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page 13 his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment could not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41 provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which in its turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

In the measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more and more manifest, North Africa became more
page 14 and more a German theatre of war. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space" (LEBENSRAUM).

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the unnecessary expedition of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our partwhich - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that country.

page 15 12. Parallel with all these developments realization was steadily growing of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position madeit at all possible.

13. Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE; this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

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page 16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If today, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for as long as possible, there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of alltasks, and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much
page 17 that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the face of this danger and, sooner or later, have been overrun by it.

15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

page 19 In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autum of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defense of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, providedthe premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting

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value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed, and our superiority in the air was able to make good, at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England,
page 20 prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shatter the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach us with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which still lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however, the natural catastrophe of the winter of 1941 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Following paragraph struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side, and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SORANO SUNJER.

page 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships*.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inadequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilize

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* For - says CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defense.

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the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops of our Allies. The 6th Army,
page 22 consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehold of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifice.

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss of the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four armies of our allies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the East would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would no longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations. Gone
page 23 was the great mobility of the Army and, excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of man-power, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all demains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to passover to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: In the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOUTH against the Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and the Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

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page 25 It was at this stage of the war that the Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press. Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely clear to the FUHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our cooperation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i. e. on SICILY.

page 26. That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further EST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distribution of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in order not to let the base of the enemy air forces come near to the Alps. If the enemy is successful in a landing in Northern Italy then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a moral pretext for their betrayal, or
page 27 by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of our officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of the betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were simply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of <u>open</u> betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword 'Axis' would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering GAU's - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of Italian machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparations
page 28 is known to you all. However, somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

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In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and on the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew through the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible to gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome: Appendix

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(Unnumbered)

WFST/ORG/1st STAFFEL
Armed Forces Operation Staff/Organization/1st Section

List of Italian Booty

1. Arms:

Rifles	1255606
Pistols	17703
M.P.	13627
A.T. rifles	167
MG	38383
Mortars	8606
A.T. guns	961
A.A. guns	3679
Army guns	5346
Ammunition (tons)	287502
Motor cycles	2295
Armoured cars	1938
Lorries	12708
Motor busses (KOM)	90
Trailers	471
Tractors	293
Tanks and assault guns	970
M.T. fuel	123114
Horses, mules	67600

2. Aircraft

Fighters	1379	Front line aircraft
Bombers	886	
Reconnaissance	512	
Transports	363	
Seaplanes	90	2nd line aircraft
Passenger planes	125	
Training craft	1198	
Aircraft engines	499	

3. Ships

Torpedo boats	8	10
Destroyers	2	
Corvettes	2	51
S-boats	14	
Anti-submarine boats	6	
Mine-layers	4	
Mine-detectors	7	
Escort vessels	7	
R-boats	13	
Other small war vessels	11	
Merchant ships	34	

4. Clothing

Overcoats	551000
Capes	408000
Tunics	524000
Pullovers	552000
Trousers, prs	494000
Shirts	1139000
Pants, prs	4243000
Shoes, prs	3286000
Caps	486000
Tent squares	509000
Cloth, metres	352000
Linen (in m^2)	3036000
Blankets	2522000

5. Raw materials. (Note in ink: "In far larger quantities than might have been expected)

Iron and steel	196,200 tons
" " " scrap	16,900 "
Non-ferrous metals	78,780 "
Minerals	500 "
Coal	41,000 "
Timber	90,000 cbm.
Mercury	3,400 tons
Asbestos	100 "
Buna	462 "
Chem. Products (Chloric acid, hydrochloric acid)	1,900 "
Industrial oils and fats	240 "
Tanning materials	515 "
Alcohol	400 "
Hides and tallow	21,925 pieces
Leather	200 tons
Tyres (cars and cycles)	21,000 pieces
Raw material for textiles	493 tons
Quinine	13 tons
Raw Tobacco	8,800 tons

6. Prisoners of war or military internees:

Italians	547,531 of whom	24,744 officers
British	34,160 of whom	2,615 officers
Americans	1,427 of whom	201 officers

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(Unnumbered)

Italian Booty

Arms		
Rifles		1,255,660
Machine guns		38,383
Guns		9,986
M. T. vehicles		15,500
Tanks and assault guns		970
MT Fuel (cubic metres)		123,114
Horses, mules		67,600
Aircraft		
Front line aircraft		2,867
Other aircraft		1,686
Ships		
Torpedo-boats and destroyers		10
Other small vessels of war		51
Clothing for		500,000 men
Rawmaterials in far larger quantities than might have been expected in view of the constant economic demands.		
PWs or military internees:		
Italians	547,531 of whom	24,744 officers
British	34,160 of whom	2,615 officers
Americans	1,427 of whom	201 officers

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Unnumbered

Disarmed Italian Divisions

Definitely disarmed	51 divisions
Probably disarmed	29 divisions
Not disarmed	3 divisions

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South-East

Disarmed:

Rhodes	:	REGINA Division	1
Crete	:	SIENA Division	1
Greece	:	CAGLIARI, PIEMONTE, FORLI, PINEROLO, CASALE, MODENA, AQUI Divisions	7
ALBANIA	:	BRENNERO, AREZZO, PARMA, FIRENZE, PUGLIE, EMILIE Divisions	6
MONTENEGRO	:	PERUGIA, VENEZIA, FERRARA, TAURINENSE divisions	4
CROATIA	:	MURGE, MARCHE, MESSINA, BERGAMO, ZARO, LOMBARDIA Divisions	6
			25

NOT yet disarmed up to the present;

Main part of CUNEO Division

(SAMOS) and RE Division and

MACERATA division (North-West Croatia)

(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

South

Disarmed:

Area of Army Group C:

a) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

JULIA, TRIDENTINA, CUNEENSE, ROVIGO, ALPI GRAIE, 201st Coastal Division, ERSATZ BRENNERO Division, ERSATZ FIRENZE Division, ERSATZ PISTOIA Division, ERSATZ RAVENNA Division — 10

b) Main portion of divisions probably disarmed:

206th Coastal Division, PRINCIPE AMEDEO DUCA d'AOSTA division, COSSERIA, TRENTO, ASSIETA, LIVORNO, and TORINO divisions — 7

c) Some parts of the divisions probably disarmed:

VENETO, VICENZA, NAPOLI and AOSTA divisions — 4

21

In addition a considerable number of special units not forming part of a divisional formation were disarmed.

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Area of Supreme Command South ("OB. SUD")

a. Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

221st Coastal divisions, PIAVE, GRENATIERI DI SARDEGNA, SASSARI, PIACENZA, CENTAURO, ARIETE divisions, 220th Coastal divisions, 215th Coastal Division, RAVENNA

10

b. Parts of the divisions definitely disarmed:

211th Coastal, MANTUA, 212th Coastal, 227th Coastal, 214th Coastal, PICINO, 210th Coastal, 200th Coastal, 222nd Coastal, PASUBIO, LEGNANO

11

c. Parts of divisions probably disarmed:

PRIULI, CREMONA, CALABRIA, 204th Coastal, BARI, 200th Coastal, SABAUDA, (on Corsica and SARDINIA)

7

28

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(Unnumbered)

Disarmed Italian Divisions

West:

Disarmed:

Main portion of divisions definitely disarmed:

EM. FILIBERTO, PUSTERIA, TARO,
LUPI DI TOSCANA, 223rd Coastal division,
224th Coastal division

In all 6 divisions

III

I should like briefly to set out the characteristic features of the individual theatres of war.

See Appendices:

(Note in pencil: "Delivered extempore with the help of maps")

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To III

Finland

The Finnish front, the Northern abutment of the European defence system. The outermost wing of the East Front, and at the same time the rear cover of the Norwegian front.

Total length of front approx 1400 km (= 2/3 of the total length of the East front), occupied along wide stretches only by means of support points.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North-East: treeless partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Very various over the terrain as a whole. (Temperatures on 1. 11. from + 8 to - 18 degrees). In the North long polar night, mud period not materially important.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETJAMO (32% of the total European output).

Total population: 3.8 millions.

Operational possibilities:

No operations on a grand scale possible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for supplying own offensive do not exist (only one railway in North - South direction as far as ROVANIEMI, branch line Eastwards (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk road running North - South HELSINKI - PETJAMO). As against this, on the Russian side, high-capacity MURMANSK line.

Conduct of war: Consequently, in the main, confined to assault unit activities and enterprises by JAGER detachments, action along the flanks and for roads of special importance. Nevertheless because of the great length of front a strong own (German) force of 176,800 is tied to this front, consisting of the best troops capable of withstanding the nature of the country. Own divisions in good fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peacetime, good body of officers.

For air activity on the whole very unfavourable Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields.

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Norway

Protection of the North-Western flank of Europe. Total front length 2,800 km (about equal to East front). Part of the front occupied only by support points, islands not all occupied.

Terrain: Medium-mountain and alpine in nature deeply indented by fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transportation of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of total European output). Emphasis in supply lies on communications by sea. Several good big and small ports suitable for distribution traffic.

Coastal district suitable for enemy landings with limited objective.

Operations - on land only possible with limited forces. Railway and road systems very widely meshed, of low capacity, easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). For these reasons the British operations 1940 (plus absence of bigger harbours) were greatly hampered.

Own forces in Norway are 380,000 men.

The greater portion of the 13 divisions are employed in coastal defence, partly permanently posted.

(In Norway about 1,000 guns of over 10 cm. cal. are employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf. Div. in Central Norway, 1st Infantry and 1 Armoured Divisions in South Norway.

Opportunities of action of own air arms dependent to a very high degree on weather, particularly in North Norway.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, berths for heavy naval combat forces. Supply for the AOK (Army Command) depends on the security of sea communications. Mean supply efficiency per month by sea = 190,140 BRT.

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Denmark

Key position at entrance to the Baltic the possession of which would make possible far-reaching enemy operations both in the direction of Scandinavia and in that of Germany and extend their influence into the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx. 700 km.

Terrain: For landings from the sea on a large scale the Western coast is little suited (storms, surf); East Jutland and the islands are better suited (but owing to long approach routes and good defensive possibilities unlikely).

Especially open to the danger of a landing: ESBJERG (West Jutland) and AALBORG (North-West Jutland).

For tanks - possible almost everywhere. Landings from the air possible in the open as well as on the well-developed airfields.

Coastal defence - by support points. Coastal defence forces - 3 divisions, of limited fighting value. In addition, counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements have been ordered.

Total formations of the WEHRMACHT employed - 106,500 men.

West

1. Terrain:

In all 2,100 Km. of coastal front on the Channel and Atlantic and 500 Km on the Mediterranean all of which - in contra-distinction to the coast in Norway - with a few inconsiderable exceptions admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country offers no obstacles to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western campaign).

A good well-developed communications system both by rail and road enables our resources to be moved rapidly but will also benefit the enemy once he has gained a footing.

Weather conditions do not completely exclude landing operations with modern equipment at any time of the year. In the autumn and winter however storms may make a landing on the grand scale a difficult matter.

2. Own possibilities:

The position as described makes it necessary to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the ATLANTIC Wall. This construction has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible along a front of 2,600 Km to reinforce the coastal front with a system of fortifications in depth at all points. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than in any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line.

2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 cm. up the the heaviest long-range batteries, not including the AA guns and the artillery of the divisions employes. 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, without counting the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,500 (8,449) positions of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. In all over 5.3 million cubic metres of concrete have been used on the constructions.

A belt of fortifications of this kind has the effect however of tieing down considerable forces of one's own. For this purpose we have put in fortress divisions of whom however, needless to say, only a small section in every case can be effective against the enemy. For this reason it is essential to have strong, mobile and especially well equipped reserves in the West for the purpose of forming points of gravity. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and acutely endangering the general situation.

Strength in the West: In all 1,370,000 men.

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Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front:- mountains some of which are Alpine in nature. Less steep country only along the West and above all the East coast. As a result it is possible in part to cut out some sectors of the Alpine regions; on the other hand infantry must be employed in strength to prevent infiltration. Transverse movements behind the front are very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads for a long time.

In addition to these conditions along the front (Length app. 150 km.), the factor determining the employment of own troops is the double coast-line (on both sides), total length approx. 1,600 km. In addition to landings directly behind our front, the sectors especially threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome, and the whole of the East coast south of RAVENNA.

2. The point of next importance to the terrain in determining tactical conditions in Italy is the superiority of the enemy on land, in the air, and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by a number of smaller and greater landings directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery action.

Absolute supremacy in the air. In addition to direct and heavy effect on the troops this air superiority also means constant interference with traffic (especially on the railroads) in the rear areas. Troop movements and supply are affected right far back into the Hinterland.

The enemy's rearward communications across the sea are practically unhampered as our own sea and air forces are nothing like strong enough.

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with an immense task.

In spite of the fact that our forces are hampered at the coast and in the back areas (total ration strength of all branches of the Armed Forces and auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down our own losses in men and equipment to a minimum since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, since, apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper, the enemy has not up to the present gained any decisive tactical success. However, it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy as he is in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war - must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from the employment of a few U-boats and speed-boats, possesses few possibilities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-172 CONTD
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235 - 0041

(Unnumbered) III

Finland: Total length of front about 1,400 km.
(= 2/3 of total length of Eastern front.
Important: Nickel mines KOLOSJOKI
near PETSAMO (32% of total European output)
Total number of inhabitants 3.8 millions.

Own strength: 176,800 men

NORWAY: Total length of front 2,000 km (equal to length of Eastern Front).

NARVIK: Clearing port for Swedish ore (22% of total European output).

Own strength: 315,000 men

Approx 1,000 guns over 10 cm.

DENMARK: Total length of front: approx 700 km.
Own strength 106,500 men.

WEST: In all 2,100 km of coastal front along the channel and the Atlantic and 500 km. along Mediterranean.

Atlantic Wall: 2,692 guns of cal. 7.5 up to the heaviest long range batteries
2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons
8,500 positions, constantly being extended.

Over 5.3 million cbm of concrete laid.

Own strength: 1,370,000 men.

ITALY: Length of front: spprox. 150 km.
Both coasts : in all approx, 1,600 Km.
Own strength : 329,000 men.

South-East: Balkans 50% of European output in mineral oil.

100% of European output in chromium ore.

60% of European output in bauxite.

29% of European output in antimony.

21% of European output in copper.

Length of coast-line (incl. CRETE and RHODES):

approx. 4,200 km., or twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea.

Own strength: 612,000 men.

EAST: Length of front: 2,100 km.

In view of the length of front our own strength is inadequate for a continuous line of positions as in the last world war.

H1235-0042

Artillery: Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Tanks : At the outbreak of the war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out of date.

Russian losses in tanks from June 1941 to October 1943:

52,000.

Railway sabotage: July 1560, August 2,121, September 2,000 line demolitions with great effect on operations and on evacuation transport.

Reinforcement of the Red Army (lowest point) 1.12.1941:

2.3 millions

Today highest point up to date

5.5 millions

Own strength: 3,900,000

H1235 - 0043

South-East

1. Importance of the South-East

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans provide:

50% of the total European output in mineral oil
100% " " " " " in chromium ore
60% " " " " " in bauxite
29% " " " " " in antimony
21% " " " " " in copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of the coast length (including Crete and Rhodes) of approx 4,200 Km, i.e. twice the distance from LENINGRAD to the Black Sea, in the event of an attack by the enemy our own troops would have the following advantages and disadvantages:-

Advantages

For coastal defence in general all that is necessary is to occupy the harbours and river-mouths on the point of gravity principle.

Should the operations move inland, the hill offer good opportunities for blocking and defence.

Disadvantages

A sparse rail and road system involves difficulties in the matter of supply and the movement of reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track railway line with an efficiency of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands of the AEGEAN (Low own tonnage, shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on Crete 47,000, on Rhodes 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

3. Present position

Army:

In the parts of the Balkans occupied by us guerilla warfare is now being waged against guerilla bands - some of them well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons to a total strength of approx 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are allanti-German, but disunited amongst themselves. A distinction should be made:

H1235 - 0044

a. In Croatia and Serbia between:

aa. Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of approx 90,000 men.

bb. CHETNIKS under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVIC, to a strength of 30,000 men.

b. In Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS to a strength of 10,000 and approx 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against ANGLO-SAXON attack and for putting down the guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of 612,000 men.

Landings of any size in the winter time are unlikely so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after defeating and destroying the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the forces of the confederates stationed in the South-East - with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are requested to defend Bulgaria - no material assistance may be expected.

Air arm:

At present, in view of the great distance to their jumping-off bases, the numerical superiority of the ANGLO-SAXON air arm has not made itself felt excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that Southern Italy is occupied by the enemy has become noticeable.

East

Length of front: 2,100 Km. (distance from frontier to Reich to Moscow 900 km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat plateau, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. In view of the great length of the front the ratio of our own strength is not sufficiently high to admit of a continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by a system of support points and mobile warfare in which threats to the flanks and rear must be accepted. Our line of fefence is therefore rather thin and there is difficulty in forming larger gravity points. Where we are opposed by enemy concentrations our forces are always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value has sunk to a still lower level although their training is noticeably better; on the other hand their equipment is rapidly improving (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). The Russian artillery is being built up on a grand scale. Monthly output 1,200 guns.

Armoured troops: On the outbreak of war 21,000 tanks, mainly light and out-of-date.

Strength on 1.10.43: 9,000 heavy tanks of the most modern types. Monthly production 1,700.

Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical tank formations for extensive tasks (thrust into the depth of the enemy's terrain and destruction by envelopment) employment in the form of points of gravity.

Formations of special units on a large scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Railway sabotage:

July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with far-reaching effect on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: The purpose of this is to impede German supply, to make it impossible to use the land, to subvert the territorial formations, organise an armed popular rising, reconstruct the Party organisation in occupied territory. Although losses in personnel have been high, remorseless exploitation of all the provisions re. fitness for service and extreme restrictions have brought about a gradual reinforcemtnt of the Red Army (Lowest level on 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions to-day highest level as yet known 5.5 millions), in addition to this, continuous calling-up of replacements (ERSATZGESTELLUNGEN) and the creation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions).

Total strength of Russian formations:

327 rifle divisions
51 armoured divisions
Own strength in the EAST: 200 German,
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian divisions -
4,183,000 men

H1235 - 0046

EAST

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (H)/North

No 006650/43 TOP SECRET

FUHRER's GHQ
31.10.1943

3 copies

Subject: Leature by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff - copy

EAST

Length of Front: 2,100 km (Distance of frontier of Reich to Moscow 900 Km., to Urals 2,300 Km.)

Terrain: Flat table land, swamp and forest in the North, deeply indented (steppe ravines) in the South. Owing to the length of the front ratio of own strength does not admit of continuous line of positions as in the World War and makes it necessary to occupy by means of support points and mobile warfare, in which threats of defense therefore rather thin. Great difficulty in forming larger points of gravity. Where opposed by enemy concentrations own forces always locally inferior.

Russian infantry's fighting value sunk to still lower level although their training noticeably improved; on the other hand their equipment with weapons is rapidly rising (automatic and heavy infantry weapons). Large-scale building up of Russian artillery. Monthly production 1,200 guns.

Principles of employment: Fire concentration on narrow sector on the German pattern. For this, fresh formation of artillery brigades and artillery corps. Maximum employment of ammunition.

Armoured troops: At the outbreak of war 21,000, mostly light and out-of-date tanks. Strength on 1.10.43 9,000 heavy tanks of the latest types. Monthly production 1,700. Russian tank losses from June 1941 to October 1943: 52,000. Creation of tactical armoured formations for extensive tasks. (Thrust in depth and destruction by envelopment). Employment by points of gravity.

Formation of special units on grand scale (A.T. regiments, mortar regiments).

Own Air Arm: Length of front in comparison with available forces makes it necessary to concentrate own air arm at the focal points. As a result it is unavoidable that on many sectors of our own land front own troops see little of the activities of their own air arm. However the air arm is there, in spite of this, and cintributes very materially to the successes of the defence.

H1235-0047

The Russian air arm: remains as before far inferior to or own, but it must be admitted that its command, organization and equipment have greatly improved. The command is manoeuvreable and strict, organization admits of rapid displacement or follow-on of the formations. Specially unpleasant for our own troops on land is the new Russian battle aeroplane now appearing in large numbers. The Russian air arm is being employed almost exclusively in support of the army; so far operational employment has been quite secondary. Since 1941 the Soviet Russian Command has adapted itself to the principles of the German command. As against the principle "Not a step back!" of the year 1941, since the summer of 1942 tactical withdrawal movements have been the rule. The command has become more mobile, quickly seizes any moment of weakness and makes good use of initial successes. The situation with respect to communications is very bad (wide-meshed low efficiency rail and road system, during the mud season the roads cannot be used at all) so that it is difficult for us to move our reserves. Add to this steadily increasing sabotage on the railways: July 1560, August 2121, September 2000 line demolitions with great repercussions on operations and evacuation transport.

Guerilla warfare: Purpose is to impede German supply, prevent use of the land, the organization of armed popular risings, reconstruction of the Party organizations in occupied territory.

In spite of high losses in personnel, remorseless exploitation of all provisions re fitness for service and extreme restriction have made it possible gradually to reinforce the Red Army (lowest level 1.12.1941: 2.3 millions, present day highest level so far 5.5 millions); in addition continuous calling up of recruits and the formation of tactical winter reserves (approx. 50 divisions). Own strength in East *) 4,183,000.

Munitions industry: Evacuation (methodically prepared for beforehand) made it possible by the summer of 1942 to return again to the production level of the previous period.

At the present time the Russian food situation cannot be regarded as likely to decide the fate of the war.

Economic losses due to the withdrawal of the front:

Pig iron products	338,000 tons
Loss in coal production	460,000 tons
Loss in grain and oil crops	1,854,000 tons
Production of raw timber	6.2 fm (million fathoms?)
Loss of steel products	10,000 tons
Potatoes approx.	1,000,000 tons
Meats and fats	50,000 tons
Men fit for service	677,000

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*) Div: 200 German
10 Roumanian
6 Hungarian

H1235 - 0048

Finland

The Finnish front is the Northern abutment of the European system of defence. Outer wing of the East front and at the same time rear corner of the Norwegian front. Total length of front approx 1,400 Km (2/3 of the total length of the Easy front), wide stretches of the front occupied by means of support points only.

Terrain: South-East: forest and swamp; North East: treeless and partly rocky TUNDRA.

Weather: Varies greatly over the area as a whole (Temperatures 1.11 from + 8 to - 18 degrees!), in the North long polar night, mud period is in considerable.

War Supply: Important nickel mines at KOLOSJOKI near PETSAMO (32% of the European production).

Total number of inhabitants: 3.8 millions.

Tactical possibilities: Operations on a large scale impossible owing to absence of roads. High capacity lines of communication for feeding an offensive are lacking (only one in North-South direction as far as ROVANIEMI branch line Eastward (KANDALAKSHA) still under construction. Only one high capacity trunk North-South road HELSINKI - PETSAMO). As against this on the Russian side the high capacity MURMANSK railway.

Conduct of war therefore limited in the main to activities of assault troops and enterprises by JAGER detachments. Fighting on the flanks and for roads of special importance. In spite of this owing to the length of the front strong own forces (Mountain Army Command 20 : 212,000 men) formed of the best human material capable of standing up the the nature of the terrain are tied down to it. Own division in excellent fighting trim, fully equipped, trained as in peace time, good body of officers.

With respect to air activity, on the whole very unfavourable conditions. Terrain affords few possibilities for laying out airfields. In winter time, owing to the short hours of daylight flying activities are very restricted. Supply in the purview of the air arm very difficult.

Our own air arm is highly superior in value to the Russian, as is regularly proved in all air battles fought in the course of Russian attacks on German convoys by the specially high numbers of aircraft brought down.

Coastal defence is equal to the Russian forces. Combined Anglo-American-Russian landing operations in the area of the VARANGER fjord - PORSANGERFJORD unlikely for political reasons. Collaboration with Finns (trained in forest and winter fighting) good, as before.

H1235 - 0049

Norway

Protection of the North-West flank of Europe. Total length of front 2,500 km (about the same length as the East front). In part occupied only by support points. Some of the island unoccupied.

Terrain: Medium mountains and Alpine in nature, deeply indented by Fjords and valleys.

War Supply: Transport of Swedish ore via NARVIK (22% of the total European output).

The points of gravity of supply rests on communications by sea. Several good big ports and many small ones suitable for distribution traffic. Coastal areas suitable for enemy landings with limited objectives.

Operations: On land possible only with limited forces. Rails and road system very widely meshed, of low capacity and easily blocked (bridges, tunnels). These factors (plus the lack of larger harbours) greatly impeded British operations in 1940. Own forces in Norway number 380,000. The main body of the 13 divisions occupied in coastal defence, partly permanently employed. (In Norway approx. 1,000 guns over 10 cm. caliber employed in coastal defence).

Counter-attack reserves: 1 Inf Div in Central Norway, 1 Inf and 1 Armoured divisions in South Norway.

Possibilities of action of our own air arm greatly dependent on the weather, especially in North Norway. Tactical activities directed in the first place above the sea against enemy ships. Possibilities with regard to laying out airfields limited owing to the nature of the terrain, supply difficult. Possibilities of action on the part of the enemy equally restricted owing to the great distance to their flying bases. In central and North Norway fighters can be employed only from aircraft carriers.

Navy: Important U-boat support points, births for heavy naval fighting forces. Supplies for the Army Command depend on sea communications (illegible note in German script).

H1235-0050

DENMARK

Key-position at entrance to Baltic, the possession of which would make possible extensive operations in the direction of Scandinavia as also in the direction of Germany and make it possible to influence the area of the Baltic.

Total length of front: approx 700 km.

Terrain: West coast little suited to landing operations on a grand scale (storms, surf), East Jutland and the Islands vetter adapted (but improbable, owing to long approach routes and possibilities of defence.) Specially threatened by landings EBSJERG (West Jutland) and Aalborg (North-West Jutland). Passable by armour almost everywhere. Air landings also possible off the air-fields which are very well laid out: Coast protected by support points. Coastal defence forces 3 divisions of very limited fighting value. In addition counter-attack reserves. Reinforcements ordered. Conditions for the employment of own air forces are good. Communications good. Supply secured. Total strength of all formations of all branches of arms: 110,000.

The defence of Denmark is largely determed by the attitude of Sweden.

Distribution:

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Op/H)	3rd copy

H1235-0051

Very Secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/ Op. H/South
No 006652/43 Very Secret

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
2nd November, 1943

3 Draft copies

-- draft copy

Material for the Lecture by the Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.43

Position in Italy

1. Ground conditions

Along the front mountains, partly Alpine in character, only on the West and above all on the East coast rather less steep terrain. This makes it possible in places to cut out sectors in the Alpine area but also makes it necessary to employ strong Infantry forces in order to avoid infiltration. Troops movement along the front line very difficult. Good possibilities of blocking roads durably. - Opponents, mainly Canadians, clever at making use of terrain.

In addition to the above conditions at the front (length approx. 150 Km.) the employment of own forces is also determined by the long coast lines on both sides (Total length approx. 1600 Km.). Besides landings directly behind our front the sectors mainly threatened are GENOA, LA SPEZIA, Rome and the whole of the East coast South of RAVENNA.

2. Next to ground configuration the factor determining tactical conditions in Italy is the tremendous* superiority of the opponent on land, in the air and on the sea. This enables him to advance methodically, taking no undue risks, supported by repeated landings small and great directly behind our front. Strong enemy artillery active.

Absolute superiority in the air. In addition to heavy direct action on the troops, continued interference with communications, especially by rail, in the back areas. Troop movements and supply affected to a great depth in the HINTERLAND. River communications of enemy overseas practically undisturbed, as our own naval and air tactical forces are far too small.

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* "GEWALTIG" - struck out in pencil

H1235 - 0052

3. In view of these conditions our own troops are confronted with immense task. In spite of the fact of our troops being hampered at the coast and in the back areas (Total ration strength of all branches of arms with auxiliaries rather over 400,000), we have so far contrived to delay the enemy advance very considerably and to keep down to a minimum our own losses in men and material since the islands were evacuated. This may be regarded as a success, as -apart from his having gained a foothold in Europe proper up to the present the enemy has not gained any decisive tactical success. However it will not be possible in the near future to wrest the initiative from the enemy, he being in a position to supply and reinforce his formations in practically unlimited measure.

Own air arm - in a difficult position owing to the multivariousness of its duties and the vast extent of the tactical theatres of war -- must confine itself to forming points of gravity.

Navy: Apart from employing a few U-boats and speed-boats, no great opportunities of becoming effective against the enemy.

4. Along the coasts - preparations for defence.

5.* In the Hinterland mopping up operations on considerable scale have been in progress for some time past in the guerilla-infested areas of Slovenia and Istria influenced from the Balkans. When these operations have been concluded it will still be necessary to keep forces here to maintain pacification. The guerilla activities which break out again from time to time in several other areas are of no great importance. The Italians are not in a position to maintain law and order with their own forces.

6. Disarmament of the Italians after some short and in some cases sharp fighting in spite of our being outnumbered (51 Italian divisions disarmed by 17 German divisions and 2 German brigades) also represents a thwarting of enemy plans which aimed at cutting off the German forces.

7. The enrollment of Italian forces for service at present in progress in collaboration with the Italian Government is made more difficult by indifference and war-weariness.

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* This point and the two following struck out in pencil.

H1235-0053

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op(H) South-East

No. 006651/43 Very Secret.

FÜHRER's GHQ
1.11.1943

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Material South-East for Lecture by Chief of

Armed Forces Operations Staff on 7.11.1943

1. Importance of the South-East:

Domination of the Balkans as an integral part of the Fortress of Europe is decisive from the point of view of winning the war for tactical, military-political and economic reasons.

The Balkans furnish:

50%	of	the	total	European	production	of	mineral oil
100%	"	"	"	"	"	"	chromium ore
60%	"	"	"	"	"	"	bauxite
29%	"	"	"	"	"	"	antimony
21%	"	"	"	"	"	"	copper

2. Tactical possibilities

In view of a length of coast (with CRETE and RHODES) of approximately 4,200 km, equal to two times the distance from LENINGRAD to the BLACK SEA, the enemy, in the event of an attack on their own troops is confronted by two main directions of attack:

(a) Making use of South Italy as jumping-off place for a landing on the Dalmatian coast.

(b) After breaking through the island belt position in the AEGEAN, to advance on SALONIKI and the Thracian coast.

This would afford the following advantages and disadvantage:

(a) For the enemy:

Advantages: Support by the guerilla bands.

Disadvantages: The coast with the exception of the ports and river mouths is generally unsuitable for a landing (steep coast, lagoons). After landing the terrain is generally speaking mountainous and short

/ or ...

H1235 - 0054

of water, with a sparse system of roads and railways.

Troops who presumably will be unused to fighting in the hills.

(b) For own troops:

Advantages: The coast can be defended, generally speaking, merely by occupying the ports and river mouths.

In the event of operations advancing, good opportunities for blocking and defence in the hills.

Disadvantages: Only a sparse road and rail system. Supply difficulties and poor conditions for moving reserves.

Grave danger from the air on all the few roads and mountain railway lines all of which possess many artificial constructions. (To Greece only one single-track line with capacity of 12 trains per day).

Difficulties in supplying the many islands in the AEGEAN (Own tonnage is low - shortage of naval tactical forces - only a few Italian torpedo-boats - very few security vessels. Ration strength on CRETE 47,000, on RHODES 8,000 and 30,000 Italian military internees).

Further possible enemy operations from the European bridge-head of Turkey and operations against the Bulgarian-Roumanian BLACK SEA litteral would have to be taken into account should Turkey change the attitude of neutrality she has maintained up till now, or if the unfavourable position in the EAST should develop still further.

3. Present position

Army: In the part of the Balkans occupied by ourselves, guerilla warfare is rife against bands of whom some are well-armed - supported by the Anglo-Saxons - to a total strength of 140 - 150,000 men. The bands are all anti-German, but not in agreement among themselves. A distinction should be made between:

(a) Croatia and Serbia:

(aa) Communist bands under the command of TITO to a strength of about 90,000.

(bb) CHETNIK's under the command of DRAZA MIHAILOVICH to a strength of 30,000.

(b) Greece:

Nationalist bands under the command of ZERVAS

/ to ...

to a strength of 10,000 men and approximately 15,000 Communists.

For the defence against Anglo-Saxon attack and for putting down the Guerilla bands we have at our disposal at the present time own forces to the strength of in all of 24 divisions *with a total strength of 408,000 men.

Landings in any strength during the winter are unlikely, so that the main task of these forces is to put down the guerillas in order to be able in the spring of 1944, after having defeated and destroyed the larger bands, to employ the largest possible forces in coastal defence.

From the confederate forces stationed in the South-East area, with the exception of the Bulgarian formations who however are required for the defence of Bulgaria, no material assistance may be expected.

Air Arm:

At the present time, in view of the great distance to their starting bases, the numerical superiority of the Anglo-Saxon Air Arm has not yet become effective excepting in the Western Balkans where the fact that South Italy is occupied by the enemy is beginning to make itself felt.

4. In September units of twelve German divisions, in spite of some sharp resistance on the part of the Italian formations and great difficulties connected with the terrain, continued to disarm 25 Italian divisions, including Corps and Army units.

Up to the present in all 304,098 Italians (including 12,575 officers and 291,519 men) have been evacuated from the area High Command South-East.

Distribution:

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Op (H) South East (army)	3rd copy
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KTb (?)	6th copy

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* The words "24 divisions" struck out; pencil note in margin '612,000 men'.

H1235-0056

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very Secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op Army/WEST

FUHRER's GHQ
2nd November, 1943

2 Draft copies

- draft copy

Western Theatre of War including the

Netherlands and Belgium

Subject: Lecture by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

1. Terrain:

In all 2100 km of coastal front on the Channel and the Atlantic and 500 km on the Mediterranean, which - in contradistinction to the coast in Norway - admit of landings with modern resources.

The interior of the country presents no difficulties to the employment of all formations including tactical armoured formations (Western Campaign).

Good system of communications, road and rail, highly-developed, enables own reserves to be moved quickly but will also aid the enemy should he continue to gain a footing.

Weather: does not exclude landing with modern resources at any time of the year. However in the autumn and winter storms may make a landing on the grand scale difficult since this requires continuous good weather at sea for some days. The possibilities of employing the air arm are sometimes restricted in the autumn and winter owing to presence of extensive fields of fog, particularly over England.

2. The enemy:

The enemy possesses possible starting bases along an almost continuous circle from Eastern England via the USA, North Africa to CORSICA and SARDINIA with at some points shortest possible approach routes to the Continent. In all areas the opponent has at his disposal locally superior forces. The enemy formations are fresh and have gained experience in the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. He has developed his landing technique and tactics to a high level, so that we must now reckon at all times - with the afore-mentioned reservations - with a landing on the grand scale.

Enemy Air Arm: Numerically greatly superior. Will enable the enemy both to defend his own forces and their supply and to effect the employment of air landing forces on a big scale.

/ Possibilities ...

H1235-0057

Possibilities for the enemy:

A demand on the part of Russians for the establishment of a Second Front in the West and the endeavour on the part of the Anglo-Americans to acquire more weight in opposition to the Russian political demands by gaining a thorough military success are the leading features of the position in the West. Successful penetration of the Western defences would very soon break through to the Belgian, North -French and West-German industrial areas and so prove fatal. At the same time this operation would also cut off the U-boat support points in the Atlantic.

Even a minor enemy success involving the creation of a bridgehead would spell danger, since in view of the enemy's superiority in equipment and personnel he would have no difficulty in extending this bridgehead into a breach of our defences.

3. Our possibilities: The position as described makes it essential to repel and destroy the enemy before he can reach the coast. For this reason - construction of the Atlantic Wall. The work has been in hand for a long time; it is however impossible to provide a coastal front of 2,600 km. at all points with a system of fortifications in depth. Nevertheless the number of positions and built-in weapons is greater than any other construction as yet known, including the West Wall and the MAGINOT Line, for instance 2,692 guns of 7.5-cm-cal. up to the heaviest long range batteries, not counting the AA guns and the artillery of the employed divisions. * 2,354 medium and heavy A.P. weapons alone, not reckoning the equipment of the employed divisions. 8,449 installations of the permanent construction type have been handed over to the troops. (In pencil: In all ..... cbm concrete have been used in the construction).

A belt of fortifications of this type however has the effect of tying down considerable forces of one's own. We have put in for this purpose fortress divisions, of which however, naturally, only a small proportion in each case can be effective against the enemy. Because of this it will be essential to have strong, mobile and particularly well-equipped reserves in the West. Any weakening of these tactical reserves required in the West is a risk and will acutely endanger the situation as a whole.

X However in the event of an attack in force in the West, even if the said tactical reserves are there, the forces at our disposal will not be adequate. It will be necessary in this event which will decide the war to employ every German man able to bear arms, laying the home country largely bare.

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* Illegible scribbled question in margin and note - '5.3 millions'.

X Pencilled note "370,000 men".

H1235 - 0058

4. Internal security

The British are continually trying to form organizations intended to engage in sabotaging the French industries working for the German munition industry and the lines of communication. They are supplied by air. The Army units employed in security duties, the SD (Security Service), and the French police as well have been able to keep these organizations under control. In the period from the 20th to the 30th October alone these terrorists lost 12 dead and 380 prisoners.

Strong forces of the ERSATZ Army have been transferred to France for the pacification of the country.

5.* Disarmament of the 6 Italian divisions numbering approximately 50,000 men employed along the coast of the Mediterranean is proceeding smoothly. The employment of units of 2 divisions proved sufficient to nip all will-to-resistance in the bud.

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* Illegible marginal note.

H1235-0059

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Very secret

Armed Forces Operations Staff/Op (Army) West

FUHRER's G.H.Q.
3rd November 1943

4 copies
1 copy

Strength of Army Command West

(to date 1.11.43)

1. Employed in coastal defence: 27 divisions & 2 Rgt.

2. Employed in 2nd line :
   1 Inf Div
   2 Inf div being formed
   3 Tactical groups (I.D.)
   1 Armoured div
   3 SS armoured divisions) being
   4 Armoured grenadier divisions) formed
   3 Reserve armoured divisions

3. In addition : 5 Reserve divisions

   46 Divisions / 2 Regts.

4. New formations ordered (no formations HQs and cadres available as yet) :
   5 Inf divisions
   3 Parachute Jäger divisions
   1 SS armoured grenadier division

   7 divisions

5. Ration strength (without armed forces auxiliaries and PWs)
   1,370,708

   Ration strength including armed forces auxiliaries and PW's
   1,708,990

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H1235-0060

IV

How are the resources of our opponents distributed at the present time, and what are his strategic and tactical intentions likely to be?

England)
America) separate appendices
Mediterranean)
Far East)

It was doubtful for a time whether the enemy would not transfer his point of gravity to the Far East. This assumption proved wrong. The main mass of the British-American formations capable of employment is undoubtedly in the Mediterranean. Consequently we must reckon in every event with the continuation of the operations there. The only questions remaining open are: in what direction and on what scale? The supplies observed passing through the straits of Gibraltar per month amount to approx.1.8 million tons, of which approx. 300,000 tons go through the SUEZ Canal to the Far East. This leaves approx. 1.5 million tons for the Mediterranean to be divided between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. That is not much more than is required for normal supply. Presumably therefore it is not proposed to send any new and stronger forces to the Mediterranean.

H1235 - 0061

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Distribution of the American Army

Europe:	16 Inf divisions
	3 armoured divisions
	3 armoured brigades
	3 air-borne divisions
	7 mixed brigades
U.S.A.:	29 Inf divisions
	10 armoured divisions
	1 air-borne division
Pacific:	14 Inf divisions
	2 Marine infantry divisions
	1 armoured brigade
	2 mixed birgades

H1235 - 0062

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Strength of the forces in Great Britain suitable for employment in attacking operations

40 - 41 Infantry divisions (of whom 4 - 5 American)
4 independent Inf brigades
9 armoured divisions
11 armoured brigades (of whom 1 American)
2 air-borne divisions
7 paratroop battalions (of whom 3 American)

Of these employed in South-East and South England only, in direct proximity to the starting ports:-

18 Infantry divisions
2 Infantry brigades
1 airborne division
8 armoured divisions
4 Army armoured brigades

In addition about 1,000 2-4 engined transport aircraft are able to put in approx. 20,000 air-borne troops.

It is also possible to reckon with the employment of approx. 20,000 paratroops.

Troop transport and landing boat tonnage is available for at least 11-12 Infantry divisions and 1-2 armoured divisions.

The forces and resources at the disposal of the enemy are already sufficient for a large scale operation intended to force the issue on the Continent. These forces and resources will presumably be reinforced still further in the course of the next few months.

H1235 - 0063

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Distribution of British Forces

Italy:

10 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
3 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division
5 commandos.

Western Mediterranean:

(Gibraltar: garrison approx.20,000)

3 Infantry divisions
2 armoured divisions
2 armoured brigades
1 air-borne division

Middle East and Near East:

15 Infantry divisions
and 4 Polish Infantry divisions
in all : 19

4 Inf brigades &

2 Greek
1 Czech
1 Yugoslav brigades
in all : 8

5 armoured divisions
5 armoured brigades
1 paratroop division

H1235-0064

(unnumbered)

V

According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point, of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden. In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12-14 Infantry divisions, 3-4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognize this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for political or military reasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy: Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, and the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She

H1235-0065

is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

Page 32 Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.*) We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognized than in BUDAPEST . In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strata is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contradistinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognized the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan: There a heroic people is fighting decisively for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the siren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as it can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

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*) Translator's note: JODL says literally: "stands on 2 eyes".

H1235-0066

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172 (Cont'd)
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

VI

page 34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command today and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. Today this tactical advantage of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time, however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to

page 35 distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong at those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or other to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

page 36. It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN once put this into words as follows: "In war there is always the same conflict: the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities, its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstance, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has a jumping-off base in the
page 37 Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary

H1235-0067

minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war: the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure: it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good
page 38 side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take steps with
page 39 remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idle ones (Nichtstuer) to carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered *) only by Russians". Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. Today only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one TURKMEN division are at the moment
page 40 undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichsführer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

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*) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favor of 'conquered'.

H1235-0068

However, what weighs most heavily today on the home front, and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - have had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no
page 41 consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the JUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnings and first fruits are there. We shall counter the heavy and powerful armament of the 4-engined bombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute certainty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.

Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right, since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded
page 42 as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for
page 43 this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and

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page 43 new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation
page 44 and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the utmost resolution, with a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

H1235 - 0070

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In process of formation at the present

time as a tactical reserve.

20 Infantry divisions

4 Italian divisions
1 Croatian mountain div, 1 Croatian Legionary div.
1 Galician infantry division
1 Macedonian infantry division.

2 Armoured divisions

5 Armoured Grenadier divisions

2 Northern Armoured Grenadier divisions
2 Assault brigades

2-3 Parachutist Jäger divisions

H1235 - 0071

To V

BULGARIA

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1.	Home area	10 Inf Div (of which 1 in process of formation)
		1 Cav div.
		1 Cav brigade
		1 Armoured brigade
2.	Coastal defence	2 Inf divisions
		1 Cav brigade
3.	Serbian Occupied territory:	
		7 Inf divs
	In all:	19 Inf divs
		1 armoured brigade
		1 Cav division
		2 Cav brigades

B. Air force: (only home area)

9 fighter squadrons (JAGDSTAFFELN)
3 combat squadrons (KAMPFSTAFFELN)
11 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

C. Air-borne and parachutist squadrons: None

H1235 - 0072

Roumania
To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces

1. Home area (including Transaistria)

a) fully fit for service — 3 Inf Div

b) conditionally fit for service — 5 Inf Div
1 Mountain Div

c) replenished or re-constituted — 8 Inf Div
1 Cav div
2 Cav div (mot)
1 Armoured Div

2. Russia: — 3 Inf divisions
4 Mountain divisions
2 Cav divisions

In all: 19 Inf Div (of which 5 conditionally fit for service)

5 Mountain divisions (of which 1 conditionally fit for service)

5 Cav div of which 2 (mot)
1 Armoured division

3. Air forces

1. Home area — 7 fighter squadrons (modern equipment)
1 night fighter squadron
8 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
19 reconnaissance and transport squadrons

2. Russia (employed with 4th Air Fleet) — 5 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons ("KAMPFSTAFFELN")
6 Battle squadrons ("SCHLACHTSTAFFELN")
4 reconnaissance squadrons

In all — 12 fighter squadrons
1 night fighter squadron
12 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
6 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadron
23 reconnaissance squadrons

C. Air-borne and Parachutist formations: None

H1235 - 0073

Hungary

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

1. Home area (all formations conditionally fit for employment, equipment incomplete).

8 Inf div
1 light division
1 cavalry division
2 mountain brigades
1 armoured division

2. Russia (Occupation troops)

9 light divisions (security divisions)

In all
8 inf divisions
1 cavalry division
10 light divisions
2 mountain divisions
1 armoured division

B. Air Force:

1. Home area
4 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 transport squadron

2. Russia (employed with Air Fleet 4)

2 fighter squadrons
2 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
1 battle ("SCHLACHT") squadrons
2 reconnaissance squadrons

In all:
6 fighter squadrons
4 combat squadrons
1 battle squadron
2 reconnaissance squadrons
1 transport squadron

C. Air-borne and parachutist formations: NONE

SWEDEN

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

12 - 14 Inf divisions
6 - 8 cyclist brigades
3 - 4 armoured brigades
1 mot brigade

Corps and army units and frontier and coast guard formations.

At the moment it may be assumed that the number of men under arms is 400,000.

B. Air Force

In all:

700 front line aircraft
76 reconnaissance aircraft

225 fighters
12 torpedo aircraft

of which approx 482 modern types

H1235 - 0074

Finland

To date 1.11.43

A. Land Forces:

(all formations in the area of operations)

14 Inf div (of which 3 inf divisions as reserve behind the front)
2 Inf brigades
1 armoured division
1 cavalry brigade
3 coastal defence brigades

Corps and army units, in addition, navy, air arm, ERSATZ (replacements) army, Home Air Defence, and building units to a total strength of approx 450,000.

According to report, it is proposed to form 1 new infantry divisions and 2 infantry brigades.

B. Air forces:

7 fighter squadrons
4 combat ("KAMPF") squadrons
4 other (reconnaissance and transport) squadrons

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To page 37 - 11c V B

Position with respect to Personnel

on 1.10.1943

1. In the Armed Forces (WEHRMACHT) 9,860,000
on 1.8.

of whom:	Waffen SS	402,000
	Navy	711,000
	Air Arm	2,007,000
	Replacements Army	2,185,000
	Field Army 1)	4,555,000

1) Field Army as per strength on 1.8.43; no newer reports available.

2. UK (subject to occupational deferment) and temporarily rejected: 5,726,000

Year-classes 1894 - 1926.
(note in pencil: including 18 - 50 year olds

of whom 348,000 year class 1914 - 45

3. Unfit for service: 2,931,000

Year classes 1894 - 1926

4. Available replacements 2):

year-class	1894 - 1899	18000
	1900 - 1922	6000
	1923	1000
	1924	3000
	1925	45000
	1926 3)	468000
		541,000

---

2) Year class 1884 - 1893 ("LANDSTURM") at present still being called up

3) Year class 1926 at the moment in the RAD (Reichs Labour Service)

5. Aliens working in Reich territory (to date 15,8.43)

men	3,586,000
women	1,678,000
	5,264,000

6.....

H1235 - 0076

H1235 - 0077

6. Persons fit for work 1877 - 1927

57,500,000

This figure represents the sum total of these year-classes (population acc. to the Census figures for 1939). According to the Balance-Sheet of forces of the Reichs Statistical Office the number of occupied German nationals (i.e. without the Armed Forces, P.O.W. and aliens) on the 31.5.43:

men	15,462,000
women	14,274,000
	29,736,000

(no page 3)

H1235 - 0078

To II

Armed Forces Operations Staff/ORG (II

FUHRER'S G.H.Q.
Nov. 3rd 1943

3 copies
-- copy

Men fit for service in the war supply industries (munitions industry).

Men liable for military service suitable and fit for service are to be found now in any number (excepting on the Reich railways and to some extent in agriculture) only in the war supply industries (including mining and building) and in particular in the munitions industry. The view continually being put forward by the munitions industry that any deduction of these young men liable for service would be bound to prejudice production is not shared by G.H.Q. Armed Forces in view of German labour which has flowed into the munitions industry since the beginning of the year of the basis of the Duty to Report and close down order throughout industry, of the Russian POW allocated by G.H.Q. Armed Forces (especially for mining), and the appreciable allocation being made at the present moment of Italian internees and free Italian labour, as well as other measures by the GBA (?) and the Minister for munitions aimed at supplying supplementary labour.

The war supply industries (including mining and building) according to the figures for 1.10.43 included in all 2,950,000 men liable for service temporarily deferred. Of these

year classes	06 - 13	783,000
" "	14 & later	203,000

According to the report of the GBA the total number of workers which it was found possible to allocate for the production of munitions from the 1.1. - 30.9.43 was 2,200,000 workers
including 770,000 metal workers.

These allocations replaced 300,000 men called up from munitions for service with the colours and wastage and in addition reinforced the personnel of the most important munitions concerns by

650,000 workers

The FÜHRER has now ordered that

210,000 men liable for military service
of the year-classes 01 - 22. be transferred from industrial war supply (including mining and building) in three monthly contingents of 70,000 men as from November '43.

However whereas the transfers to the Armed Forces effected up to the present could be more than compensated,

H1235 - 0079

the transfers now ordered will be covered, in addition to the current allocations of the G.B.A. by

approx. 500,000 Italian military internees who have now become available and in addition by free Italian labour to be recruited by the G.B.A. and estimated by this body as numbering

Approx. 3,000,000 workers.

So that no decline in production need to anticipated.

The early and complete call-up of all young men liable for military service in the front line still employed in industrial war supply should be demanded for psychological reasons as well. A large number of letters from official bodies, and in particular from the mass of the people, show clearly that the forthcoming call-up of the LANDSTURM (young-classes 84-93) is not understood while there are still so many young men liable for military service, working at home under temporary deferment.

H1235-0080

To VI

FÜHRER'S GHQ
4.11.1943

4 copies

- copy

Contribution by Op M (Operations NAVY) to lecture

by Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff.

Position of the Navy in the beginning of November 1943.

Submarine War:

The U-boat weapon is being employed in force in all the seas. Conditions much more difficult than before owing to comprehensive air reconnaissance (extension of range of reconnaissance as a result of theoccupation of the AZORES), excellent enemy detector apparatus, and exceptionally strong escort of convoys. The aircraft is to-day the chief enemy of the U-boat.

In spite of this by sticking stubbornly to the task and making fullest use of the U-boat weapon further successes have been gained. Increasing successes also recently in the fight against enemy aircraft and destroyers. Sinkages figures correspond to the difficulty of the position. Since 1.1.1943 sunk by U-boats only after careful counting far above 3,000,000 BRT plus a large number of destroyers, cruisers and escort vessels. To this figure may be added in the merchant fleet and tonnage war as a whole the successes gained by the surface tactical forces, the air arm and mines. This gives us since 1.1.1943 a total figure of almost 5,000,000 BRT British-American merchant tonnage sunk (without Russia).

In the war at sea the main task of the Navy in all the seas under our control: protection of own communications by sea, injury to enemy fleets, supply shipping, military transport and supply formations, defence against landing operations. All these tasks set extraordinarily high demands on the tactical and security formations of the Navy.

H1235-0081

Position in the individual theatres of war.

BALTIC

Naval supremacy completely in our hands. - Importance of BALTIC for ore-traffic from Sweden. - Lively own supply traffic to Finland, Finnish Gulf via BALTIC entrances. Interference by British air mine warfare especially in the KATTEGAT, the Sound and the Belts and in the Western BALTIC. Own loss up to the present very low thanks to active mine-clearing. Russians confined to inner part of Finnish Gulf by dense minefields. Attempts to break out so far always thwarted. In the inner Finnish Gulf recently several affrays with Russian trawler formations, all in our favour.

Importance of BALTIC as training arm for the naval tactical forces and the submarine weapon.

NORTH SEA

DEUTSCHE BUCHT (German Bight) and SKAGERRAK blocked by strong mine-wall. Own task: protection of lively coastal traffic, continuous patrol of shipping lanes, intensive mine detection, trawling and outpost activities. By means of continuous energetic air activity combined with mine-laying and raids by enemy speed-boats the enemy is endeavouring to stop our communications by sea. Up to the present we have always succeeded in maintaining communications without undue loss on our side. Good results in particular against enemy speedboats.

Norway:

Very busy own rations and supply traffic along the long stretch of coast under the protection of screening forces and numerous strong coastal batteries. Routes in the skerries protected by their natural position and mine-blocks. Our own escort movements interfered with by enemy air arms and speed-boats which hide in the skerries. Successes obtained by the enemy in attack so far very slight. In the Polar region attacks by Russian aircraft and submarines. Our own losses slight but enemy losses high.

Arctic

The presence of our own combat group of battleships and destroyers in Northern Waters is of considerable strategic influence. Since January of this year large-scale enemy supplies going to Russia via the Arctic have not been observed (Supply diverted to the far longer and more difficult route to the Persian Gulf and via IRAN). U-boats employed against individual enemy movements in the ARCTIC. We have now to see whether the despatch of supplies to Russia by the Arctic route begin again in the period of darkness now setting in.

Channel

In spiteof strong enemy superiority in the air and the lively activity of his light naval tactical forces combined with intensified mine-laying, German supplying and rationing traffic continues to be carried on practically to schedule. At the same time full employment of our own screening tactical units (mine detector, outpost, trawling and escort boats). Lively and successful offensive employment of our own speed-boats against British convoyed traffic and for mine-laying.

H1235-0082

Conditions difficult owing to British superiority on sea and in the air. Warfare in the Channel area shows increasing signs of enemy threat of landing operation. Strong coastal defence on one side.

BISCAY/ATLANTIC coast

Air raids on our own ports have left U-boat defence unaffected. Main task for Navy:

> Keeping the seaways open and maintenance of escort for U-boats coming in and going out. In addition, counter-measures against British mine laying, against strong British air observation and the appearance of light enemy naval tactical forces.

MEDITERRANEAN

A very strong enemy naval fighting force (3 British, 1 French, 5 Italian battleships, 13 cruisers, 55 destroyers) is unopposed on our side by any fighting forces with the exception of U-boats and S-boats. A few Italian destroyers and torpedo boats are being commissioned. Our own U-boats are being employed against very busy British supply traffic. Numerous successes. For the rest, the task of the Navy is to carry out and protect our own supply traffic for the combatant troops in the LIGURIAN and TYRRHENIA Seas and in the ADRIATIC. Increasing activity on the part of the enemy tactical air and light naval forces. Transfer of our own supply to small ships and coastal traffic. The necessary freight tonnage and screening forces are being made ready.

AEGEAN

Support of the island garrisons by protective formations of the German Navy. Carrying out supply and rationing overseas. Strong enemy activity with submarines, cruisers, destroyers and tactical air forces.

BLACK SEA

All suitable fighting forces (U-boats, S- and R-boats, "MFP") employed to defend the CRIMEA. Own slight forces fully employed. Good success. So far activity of the Russian BLACK SEA Fleet slight. Up to the present rationing and supply traffic maintained in accordance with plan in spite of enemy air and submarine activity.

DISTRIBUTION:

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Op.M. (Navy)	4th copy

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III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE:

"Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

Page 46 In particular however our confidence is built up on a series of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which givesits impress to the general attitude of the German people and makes our Armed Forces a definitely reliable instrument in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also enables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according tp plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopie any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

As against this themoral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery
page 47 of our Italian ally. Where they have met German forces in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents - whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

page 48 My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here

testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his thought animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FUHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

page 49 What matters ultimately is constant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now, I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true: "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faintheartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

page 50 How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed, and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight for through the history of the world there run, like an bronze law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- that our trust and faith in the FUHRER is boundless.

- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

page 51 - that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute,

- that we do not cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall,

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- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

The Operations and Tactical Plans ranged in the order of their happening.

1. Campaign against Poland; defence in the WEST.

2. Plan of attack against the WEST; attempt to realise this during the winter.

3. Spring campaign against Norway.

4. Summer campaign against the WEST.

5. Intention to land in England.

6. Attempt to win the Spanish position and take GIBRALTAR.

7. Decision to intervene in North Africa. ROMMEL's counter-attack up to the Egyptian frontier.

8. Realisation of the necessity of a campaign against Soviet Russia. (Discussion with MOLOTOV in BERLIN).

9. Italy's surprise campaign against Greece.

10. The German campaign planned against Greece.

11. The overthrow in Yugoslavia and the campaign in the Balkans and its consequences; delay of the campaign in the EAST.

12. ROMMEL's retreat to CYRENAICA.

13. The Eastern campaign 1941 and the winter position 1941/42. Finland's entry into the war. The culminating point of the attack.

14. Japan's entry into the war.

15. The idea of occupying Iceland and the AZORES.

16. The Russian Spring offensive; the German counter-attack.

17. The German summer offensive: The CRIMEA - the DON - the VOLGA - the CAUCASUS.
The intention of taking LENINGRAD is not realised.

18. ROMMEL's offensive up to EL ALAMEIN.

19. Counter-stroke by Western Powers. Landing in North Africa.

20. The German counter-stroke in France. Occupation of the whole country. Occupation of the Mediterranean littoral, occupation of TUNISIA.

21. The winter battle in Russia. The collapse of the confederates.

22. The loss of Tripolitania, attempt to hold TUNISIA.

23. The loss of the entire African position.

24. The beginning of the landing in Europe (Sicily).

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25. The summer offensive of the Soviet Army.

26. The treachery of Italy.

27. The landing of the Continent.

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	Available	Short
c. Tanks	4,252	2,995
d. Assault guns	2,409	338

12) Front line aircraft with the formations:

Fighters	1646
Night fighters	574
Combat ("KAMPF") aircraft	1676
Reconnaissance	613
STUKAS	441
Other aircraft	1127
in all	6077

18 Nov. 1945

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. L-172

I, Willard E. Skidmore, Lt. (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. L-172.

Willard E. Skidmore,
Lt (jg) USNR
391590

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Fuehrer's Headquarters, 16.7.1941
Bo/Fu

Top SECRET
(Pencil note) 17.VII 41

M e m o r a n d u m for the record.

By order he held today at 15 hours in his quarters a conference attended by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, Reich Minister Lammers, Field Marshal Keitel, the Reich Marshal and myself. The conference began at 15 hours and, including a break for doffee, lasted until about 20 hours.

By may of introduction the Fuehrer pointed out, he desired first of all to make some fundamental statements. Several measures had to be taken without delay; this was confirmed, among other events, by an assertion made in an impudent Vichy newspaper that the war against the Soviet Union was a war waged by Europe, and that, therefore, it had to be conducted for the benefit of Europe as a whole. Obviously the Vichy paper meant to may by these hints that it ought not to be the Germans alone who benfitted from this war, but that all European states ought to profit by it.

How it was essential that we did not publicise our aims before the world; also there was no need for that, but the main thing was the we ourselves knew what we wanted. By no means should we render our task more difficult by making superluous declarations Such declarations were superfluous because we could do everythin wherever we had the power, and what was beyond our power we would not be able to do anyway.

(Original Page 2)

What we told the world about the motives for our measures ought to be conditioned, therefore, by tactical reasons. We ought to actact here in exactly the same way as we did in the cases of Norway, Denmark, Holland, and Belgium. In these cases too we did not publish our aime, and it was only sensible to continue in the same way.

Therefore we shall emphasize again that we were forced to occupy, administer, and secure a certain area; it was in the interes of the inhabitants that we provided order, food, traffic etc., hence our measures. Nobody shall be able to recognize that it initiates a final settlement. This need not prevent us taking al necessary measures - shooting, de-settling, etc. - and we shall take them.

But we do not want to make any people into enemies prematurely and unnecessarily. Therefore we shall act as thought we wanted to exercise a mandate only. At the same time we must know clearly that we shall never leave those countries.
Our conduct therefore ought to be:

1) To do nothing which might obstruct the final settlement, but to prepare for it only in secret;
2) To emphasize that we are liberators

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

In particular:

The Crimes has to be evacuated by all foreigners and to be settled by German only.
In the same way the former Sustrian part of Galicia will become Reich territory.
Our present relations with Roumania are good, but nobody knows what they will be at any future time. This we have to consider, and we have to draw our frontiers accordingly. One ought not to be dependent on the good will of other people; we have to plan our relations with Roumania in accordance with this principle.

Original page 3

On principle we have now to face the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able:

first, to dominate it,
second, to administer it, and
third, to exploit it.

The Russians have now ordered partisan warfare behind our front. This partisan war again has some advantage for us; it enables us to eradicate everyone who opposes us.

Principles:

Never again must it be possible to create a military power west of the Urals, even if we have to wage war for a hundred years in order to attain this goal. Every successer of the Fuehrer should know : security for the Reich exists only if there are no foreign military forces west of the Urals; it is Germay who undertakes the protection of this area against all possible dangers. Our iron principle is and has to remain:
We must never permit anybody but the Germans to carry arms:

This is especially important; even when it seems easier at first to enlist the armed support of foreign subjugated nations, it is wrong to do no. In the end this eill prove to be to our disadvantage unconditionally and unavoidably. Only the German may carry arms, not the Slav, not the Czech, not the Coszack nor the Ukrainian:

On no account should we apply a wavering policy such as was done in Alsace before 1918. What distinguishes the Englishman is that he pursues constantly one line and one aim. In this respect surely we have to learn from the Englishman. Therefore we ought never to base our actions on single contemporary personalities: here again the conduct of the British in India towards the Indian princes etc. ought to be an example:
it is always the soldier who has to consolidate the regime.

Original page 4

We have to create a Garden of Eden in the newly occupied eastern territories; they are vitally important to us; as compared with them colonies play only an entirely subordinate part.

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Even if we divide up certain areas at once, we shall always proceed in the role of protectors of the Right and of the people. The terms which are necessary at this time should be selected in accordance with this principle, we shall not speak of new Reich territory only, but of the task which became necessary because of the war.

In particular:

In the Baltic territory the country up to the Duna now will have to be administered in agreement with Field Marshal Keitel. Reichsleiter Rosenberg emphasizes that in his opinion a different treatment of the population is desirable in every district ("Kommissariat"). In the Ukraine we should start with a cultural administration, there we ought to awake the historical consciousness of the Ukrainians, establish a university at Kiev, and the like.

The Reich Marshal makes the counterstatement that we had to think first of securing our food situation, everything else could come later.
(Incidental question: In there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine, or are upper class Ukrainians rather to be found only as emigrante outside present day Russia.)

Rosenberg continues, there were certain independence movements in the Ukraine which deserved furtherance.

Original page 5

The Reich Marshal asks the Fuehrer to indicate what areas had been promised to other states.

The Fuehrer replies, Antonescu desired Bessarabia and Odessa with a strip (of land) leading west-northwest from Odessa.

Upon objections made by the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, the Fuehrer replies that the new frontiers desired by Antonescu contained little outside the old Roumanian frontiers.

The Fuehrer states furthermore that nothing definite had been promised to the Hungarians, Turks and Slovaks.

Then the Fuehrer submits for consideration whether the former Austrian part of Galicia ought to be added at once to the government; upon objections having been voiced the Fuehrer decides that this part shall not be added to the government but should only be subordinated likewise to Reichminister Frank (Iwow).

The Reich Marshal thinks it war right to incorporate into East Prussia several parts of the Baltic country, e.g.the Forest of Bialystok.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the entire Baltic country will have to be incorporated into Germany.

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At the same time the Crimea, including a considerable hinterland (situated north of the Crimea) should become Reich territory; the hinterland should be as large as possible.

Rosenberg objects to this because of the Ukrainians living there.
(Incidental question: It occurred to me several times that Rosenberg has a soft spot for the Ukrainians; thus he desires to aggrandize the former Ukraine to a considerable extent.)

The Fuehrer emphasizes furthermore that the Volga Colony too will have to become Reich territory, also the district around Baku; the latter will have to become a German concession (military colony).

Original page 6

The Finns wanted East Carelia, but the Kola Peninsula will be taken by Germany because of the large nickel mines there.

The annexation of Finland as a federated state should be prepared with caution. The area around Leningrad is wanted by the Finns; the Fuehrer will raze Leningrad to the ground and then hand it over to the Finns.

There ensues a rather long discussion as to the qualifications of Gau Leader (Gauleiter) L o h s e , who has been proposed by Rosenberg as Governer of the Baltic Country. Rosenberg reiterates that having approached Lohse already he would be in a difficult situation in case Lohse were not appointed; for the western part of the Baltic Country K u b e was to be appointed, but subordinated to Lohse; for the Ukraine Rosenberg proposes S a u c k e l.

The Reich Marshal, however, emphasized the most important points of view on which we ought to base those appointments:
Securing of food supplies, and as far as necessary, of trade: securing of communications, etc.
The Reich Marshal emphasizes, either Koch should be appointed for the Baltic country because he knew this country very well, or Koch should receive the Ukraine because Koch was the person with the greatest initiative and with the best eduction.

The Fuehrer asked whether K u b e could not be appointed as commissioner for the district of Moscow; Rosenberg and the Reich Marshal both think that Kube was too old for this position.

Upon further representations Rosenberg replied he was afraid that Koch might soon refuse to obey his (Rosenberg's) instructions; by the way, Koch had predicted such conduct on his part.

Original page 7

The Reich Marshal replied it was indeed not desirable that Rosenberg guide every step of the appointees, rather these people had the duty of working quite independently.

For the Caucasus area Rosenberg proposed his Chief of Staff S c h i c k e d a n z ; he reiterated that Schickedanz certainly would fulfil his task very well, a statement which is doubted by the Reich Marshal.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Rosenberg then stated Lutze had proposed to him to appoint several SA Leaders, namely S c h e p p m a n n for Kiev. - M a n t h e y - Dr B e n n e c k e -, L i t z m a n n for Estonia, and Burgomaster Dr. D r e x l e r for Latvia. The Fuehrer has no objections to the use of SA Leaders.

Rosenberg then states he had received a letter from Ribbentrop who desired the participation of the Foreign Office; but he (Rosenberg) asked the Fuehrer to determine that the internal formation of the newly acquired areas was no concern of the Foreign Office. The Fuehrer agrees with this conception. Until further notice it will be sufficient for the Foreign Office to appoint a liaison officer to Reichsleiter Rosenberg.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that the Ukraine would undoubtedly be the most important district for the next three years. Therefore it would be best to appoint K o c h there; if S a u c k e l were to be used, then it would be better to appoint him for the Baltic country.

Original page 8

Rosenberg continues, he intended to appoint S c h m e e r, S e l z n e r and M a n d e r b a c h as Commissioners for the Moscow area. The Fuehrer desires that Holz be used too, and that the former Gauleiter F r a u e n f e l d should be placed in charge of administering the Crimea.

Rosenberg states he intended to use also Captain von Petersdorff, owing to his special morits; general consternation, general rejection. The Fuehrer and the Reich Marshal both emphasize there was no soubt that von Petersdorf was insane.

Rosenberg states furthermore that the appointment of the Burgomaster of Stuttgart, S t r o e l i n has been proposed to him. There were no objections.

Since K u b e is considered too old for the Moscow District by both the Reich Marshal and Rosenberg, K a s c h e is to take over this district.

(Memor for Party Comrade Klopfer:
Please ask Dr. Mayer at once for the files concerning the plans for the future organization and the intended appointments.)

The Reich Marshal emphasizes he intended to appoint Gauleiter T e r b o v e n for the exploitation of the Kola Peninaula; the Fuehrer agrees.

The Fuehrer emphasizes that L o h s e , provided he thinks himself equal to this task, should take over the Baltic country K a s c h e Moskow, K o c h the Ukraine, F r a u e n f e l the Crimea, T e r b o v e n Kola, and S c h i c k e d a n z the Caucasus.

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Original page 9

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then broached the question of securing the administration of the Eastern areas.

The Fuehrer tells the Reich Marshal and the Field Marshal he had always urged that Police Regiments should be provided with armored cars; this has proved to be quite necessary for police operations within the newly occupied eastern territories, because a Police Regiment equipped with the appropriate number of armored cars of course could perform many services. Otherwise though, the Fuehrer pointed out the protection was very slight. However, the Reich Marshal was going to transfer all his training fields to the new territories, and if necessary even Junkers 52 could throwbombs in case of riots. Naturally this giant area would have to be pacified as quickly as possible; the best solution was to shoot anybody who looked sideways.

Field Marshal Keitel emphasizes the inhabitants themselves ought to be made responsible for their things because it was of course impossible to put a sentry in front of every shed or railway station. The inhabitants had to understand that anybody who did not perform their duties properly would be shot, and that they would be held responsible for each offense.

Upon a question of Reichsleiter Rosenberg the Fuehrer replied newspapers also - e.g. for the Ukraine would have to be re-established, in order to obtain means of influencing the inhabitants.

After the interval the Fuehrer emphasized we had to understand that the Europe of today was nothing but a geographical term; in reality Asia extended up to our previous frontiers.

Original page 10

Reichsleiter Rosenberg then described the organizational arrangement he intended to establish; he did not intend to appoint a Permanent Deputy of the Reich Commissioner ahead of time, but always the most efficient of the General Commissioners would be called upon to deputize for the Reich Commissioner.

Rosenberg will set up four departments in the office of the Reich Commissioner: first for the general administration,
second for politics,
third for economics,
fourth for engineering and architecture.

(Incidental remark: The Fuehrer emphasizes that activities on the part of the churches are out of the question. Papen had sent him through the Foreign Office a long memorandum in which it was asserted now was the right moment to reintroduce the churches; but this was completely out of the question.)

The Reich Marshal will detail to the Rosenberg Office Assistant Secretaries (Ministerialdirektoren) S c h l o t t e r e r and K i e c k e .

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-221
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Reichsleiter Rosenberg applies for appropriate promises to house his administration; he applies for the promises of the Commercial Mission of the Soviet Union in Lietzenberger Street; the Foreign Office, though, were of the opinion that these promises were extraterritorial. The Fuehrer replies that this was nonsense; Reich Minister Lammers was charged to inform the Foreign Office they were to hand over these promisses to Rosenberg at once and without any negociations.

Rosenberg then proposes to detail a liaison officer to the Fuehrer; his adjutant K o e p p e n was to be appointed; the Fuehrer agrees and adds that Koeppen would become the opposite number to Hewel.

Original page 10(should be 11)

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers reads the drafts prepared by him (see enclosure).

A longer discussion takes place concerning the jurisdiction of Reich SS Fuehrer; obviously at the same time the participants have in mind the jurisdiction of the Reich Marshal.

The Fuehrer, the Reich Marshal and others reiterate that Himmler was to have no greater jurisdiction than he had in Germany proper; but this (much) was absolutely necessary.

The Fuehrer repeats emphatically this quarrel would soon subside in practice; he recalls the excellent collaboration between Army and Air Force at the front.

In conclusion it is decied to call the Baltic country "Ostland".

Enclosures.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO L-221

23 November 1945

I, WALTER ROTHSCHILD, 1st Lieutenant, ASN 0886354, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document L-221.

WALTER ROTHSCHILD
1st Lt. ASN
0886354

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Exhibit USA 698
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 025-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

I H (ZO)
I/752/42

Copy

for the files on hand I 3
(handwritten)

Secret!

Berlin NW 7, 4 Sept. 42

Subject: The importation of domestic workers from the East into the Reich.
Here: Conference with the General Deputy for Labor mobilization on 3 Sept. 1942.

1.) Notice

On 3 September 1942 a conference, under the presidency of the General Deputy for Labor Mobilization, of the representatives of the highest Reich authorities, the Party Chancellory, as well as of the German Labor front (DAF) was held at the Thuringenhaus, Berlin W. S, for the discussion of the pending importation of domestic workers from the East from the Ukraine into the Reich. To this Gauleiter Sauckel declared the following:

It is the definite wish of the Fuehrer that the law over the duty year (Pflichtjahr) for women be not over extended, that all German girls must work one additional year in housekeeping. This position of the Fuehrer is motivated by the positive experiences which have been made so far with the women's Reich's labor service; this service has proved itself to be an instrument of political breeding through which the German girls are made politically more reliable than through one additional year of private housekeeping. Therefore, and this is also the opinion of the Reichsmarshcall and of Reichsleiter Bormann, the housekeeping problem must be solved through a different way than the above-mentioned one.

Therefore, the Fuehrer has ordered the immediate importation of 400,000 to 500,000 female domestic Eastern workers from the Ukraine between the ages of 15 and 35, and has charged the General Deputy for labor mobilization with the execution of this action which is to end in about 3 months. In connection with this -- this is also approved by Reichsleiter Bormann, the illegal bringing of female housekeepers into the Reich by members of the Armed Forces, or various other agencies, is to be allowed subsequently, and furthermore, irrespective of the official recruiting, is not to be prevented. The determining factor for the recruiting of Ukrainian female domestic worker is this: not according to the specific wish of the Fuehrer only such girls ar to be recruited against whose permanent stay in Germany, to be determined by their conduct and their physical appearance, there will be no scruples; it i in accordance with a specific desire of the Fuehrer that the greatest number of these girls be germanized through the recruitment. To this, the Fuehrer declared that we have to review our school knowledge about people migrations, to the extent that the Lebensraum of the Germanic

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peoples is not only to be considered from a point of view of the newly gained territories at that time, but also from the point of view of the region of origin of those peoples. The Germans have spread "like beer". Only the young people have left whereas the old ones remained at home. This is the reason why there are, especially in the Ukraine and in the northerly part of the Black Sea, such a great number of blond haired and blue eyed people who have neither Tatar nor Caucasian appearances. This can only be the case of peasants, descendents of settled Germanic tribes; to regermanize them can only be a question of time. It is the Fuehrer's desire that in 100 years from now 250 million German speaking people will live in Europe.

If, therefore, the recruitment of Ukrainian domestic workers is not only under a labor mobilization consideration but also a racial one, it ensues forcibly that a special treatment of this labor mobilization measure is necessary, which does not exclude the fact that the domestic Ukrainian workers are to be considered in the first place as workers from the East and are to be provided with the sign "OST". They are to be employed in city households as well as in country households, preferably in families with many children and essential constructive families (Aufbau Familien) so that 200,000 of them will be furnished to city households and 200,000 to country households. In order to prevent a better position of the Eastern domestic workers employed in country households as compared to the ones employed in cities, the domestic workers from the Ukraine are to receive basically the same food as the German civilian population. Because these regulations necessitate a revision of the feeding precepts of Prisoners of War and soviet civilian laborers as stated in a communication of the Reich's nutrition ministry of April 4, 1942, the Reich's minister for nutrition and agriculture has asked the General Deputy for labor mobilization to refrain from the execution of the measures at least until the food situation of the German people permits the importation of more foreign labor forces and a better food situation for the workers from the East can be assured. Gauleiter Sauckel spoke in harshest terms against this stand of the Reich's minister for nutrition stating that he refuses to discuss an order of the Fuehrer. He added furthermore that irrespective of the importation of domestic workers, the mobilization of one more million workers from the East is being planned, this being the only way to realize in the years to come the Fuehrer's Armament and Steel production program for the execution of the great plans in the West and for the annihilation of the greatest war economy of the world, the North American one. For the feeding of this million men labor force which number furthermore is equilibrated by the fact that approximately 7 million German soldiers are in greater part supplied with food from the foreign countries, party member Backe has only to solve the organizational problem in order to take advantage of the first rate harvest throughout Europe. Never before did a minister for nutrition start his functions under such favorable conditions as State Secretary Backe. The reference to the difficult transportation conditions to bring the foreign harvests into the Reich does not impress Gauleiter Sauckel in the least; he would find ways and means to utilize the harvest and the cattle from the Ukraine even if he has to draft the whole Jewry of Europe to use them as

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a human road for the handling of boxes to the Ukraine. "If the food rations both for the Germans and the foreign workers are not increased shortly, then a scandal of the greatest proportion will take place". The decreased resistance of the bodies - especially with the shortage of doctors - will give rise to great epidemics (see Diptheria Epidemy). It is to be requested from Party member Backe that the proposed increase of bread and meat ration be not done with the start of the winter time only but at the end of the present allotment period, so that the weakened bodies can build up a reserve of strength which will getthem well through the winter. The Fuehrer cannot understand the fact that it has to be in the country which carries the greatest weight in the fight for the future of Europe that most people go hungry while this is not the case with France, Holland, Hungary, and the Ukraine and everywhere else; he desires that this be the contrary in the future. As far as the foreign workers in Germany are concerned (with the exception of the workers from the East) a slow reduction of food on the basis of performance has to be carried out; it cannot be tolerated that lazy Dutchmen or Italians receive better food than a diligent worker from the East. As far as the nutrition is concerned, here too the principle of performance has to be applied. Since the new nutrition regulation is seen as being feasible by Gauleiter Sauckel in the above mentioned way of thinking, therefore, the special action of the General Deputy for labor mobilization (GBA) for the importation of domestic workers from the East must be coupled with the current recruiting commission in the Ukraine. The delegation from October to April of 200,000 to 300,000 male and female workers from the East already employed in the German agriculture to industry factories is not affected by this; these forces (incl. the female ones) will be returned in the spring to their original peasant organizations, and there just as before, they will not be employed at home but for agricultural work. A lawful ground for the special domestic action, a decree is being prepared, the text of which was read at the conference by Councellor in the Ministry Dr. Letsch. The recruiting which in the case of the female domestic workers will be based especially on voluntariness will be executed in connection with the office of the Reich's fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police who intend to step in for the pre-examination with regard to a possible worthiness of becoming a German. Those female workers from the East found to be apt for housekeeping will be marked in a special way by the labor and social offices so that they can be recognized as such on the transport lists of the collective shipments. Independent of these special shipments of domestic female workers are to be considered since Gauleiter Sauckel plans on having brought into the Reich 6,000 labor forces a day. In reference to the treatment of the female domestic workers from the East in the Reich, this question has been talked over with the Reich's fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, the Reichswomen office, the Party Chancellory, the General Deputy for labor mobilization, the result being a plan for a notice for the German housewomen. The wages of the female domestic workers are to be paid according to a remuneration table for workers from the East; however, this has to be deviated through the fixation of special tariffs by the labor trustees. In reference to the Easternworker's tax for management directors, it was decided to ask the Reich's finance minister to higher the Easternworkers tax by helf for the families of up to three children and to cut it out completely for families of 4 children and more.

H1235 - 0099

At the end of the conference, the Councellor to the Ministry Letsch - as he had done previously with new notices - tried to get the proposed notice for the German housewomen ratified by those who took part; however, the undersigned protested against that by demanding a copy to determine his position. The representatives of the party chancellory, the nutrition ministry and other offices joined in this demand so that Gauleiter Sauckel promised to make available the draft of the text for September 4, 1942 with the request that final positions be taken by 1400 o'clock.

Generally one gathered from this conference that the questions concerning the recruitment and mobilization as well as the treatment of the female domestic workers from the East are being handled by the General Deputy for labor mobilization, the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police and the party chancellory and that the Reich's ministry for the occupied territories of the East is not considered as competent or only as half competent. In reference to this the undersigned established specifically that the Reich's ministry for the occupied territories for the East has not until now participated in the drafting of the notice. He declared furthermore that the Reich's ministry for the occupied territories of the East is greatly interested in the Propaganda for the mobilization of domestic workers, and that it be carried out in a favored way considering the necessity to have only volunteer forces at the disposition for housekeeping.

Gauleiter Sauckel took knowledge of this with satisfaction.

Signed Gutkelch

- -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 025-PS

31 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 025-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 057-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

NATIONAL SOCIALISTIC GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

Party-Chancellory

The Leader of the Party-Chancellory

Fuhrer headquarters, the 30.5.1944
(Fuhrerhauptquartier)
SECRET

(Receipt Stamp)

CHANCELLORY ROSENBERG
Dated 7 June 1944 Nr. 041 K.

(Marked) Shown to RL 7/6

Circular Letter 125/44 Secret

(not for publication)

Concerns: Justice exercised by the people against Anglo-American murderers.

In the la st few weeks low-flying English and American flyers have repeatedly shot children playing in squares, women and children at work in the fields, peasants plowing, vehicles on the highways, trains, etc. from a low altitude with their aircraft guns (Bordwaffen), and have thus murdered defenseless civilians--particularly women and children--in the vilest manner.

Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of such aircraft who have bailed out or have made forced landings were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by the populace which was incensed to the highest degree.

No police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the German civilians who participated in these incidents.

signed M. Bormann.

Distributed List: Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP (Reichsleiter)
Regional leaders (Gauleiter)
Leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the Party (Verbandefuhrer)
District leaders (Kreisleiter)

STAMPED
For Cognizance to
1) Staff Leader (Stableiter)
2) Central Office

Authenticated:
Friedrichs

H1235-0100

30.5.1944



To all Province and District Leaders:

Concerns: Circular letter 125/44 Secret.

The leader of the Party-Chancellory requests that the local group leaders (Ortagruppenleiter) be instructed concerning the content of this circular letter orally only.

signed: Friedrichs

Authenticated:

Karms

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 057-PS.

23 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 057-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 058-PS
Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

H1235-0102

Letterhead of the NSDAP
Party Chancellery

The Director of the Party-Chancellery

Fuehrer Headquarters
30 Sept 1944

Circular letter 288/44g

Rubber stamped:
Chancellery Rosenberg
Received 3 Oct 1944 Nr 09640
Shown to Reichsleiter 3/10
Filed circular letter secret

SECRET

Subject: Reorganization of the concerns of prisoners of war.

1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944:

The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as well as prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are transferred to the commander of the Reserve Army from October 1, 1944.

For all questions which have to do with the fulfilling of the agreement of 1939, as well as affairs of the Police and aid societies, and for the affairs of the German prisoners of war in the enemies hands, the High Command of the Military Forces will give particulars of the transfer and the delineation of the twofold duties in direct consultation with the Commander of the Reserve Army and the Divisions of the Military Forces.

2. The Reichsfuehrer SS has commanded:

a) In my capacity as Commander of the Reserve Army, I transfer the affairs of prisoners of war to Gottlob BERGER, SS-Lieut. General (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen-SS) Chief of Staff of the Volkstums.

b) The commanders of prisoners of war with the individual military commands are subject to the command of the senior SS officer effective as of 1 October 1944.

(Rubber stamp: For cognizance to
1) Chief of Staff
2) Central Office
Back to chancellery

c) The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint action between SS-Lieut. General BERGER (SS-Obergruppenfuehrer) and SS-Lieut. General POHL.

The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war affairs is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General BERGER and the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr. KALTENBRUNNER.

d) Particulars of the transfer will be determined in joint action between SS-Lieut. Gen. BERGER and the Chief of the General Office of the Military Forces, General REINECK.

3. The Reichsfuehrer SS has also commanded:

All camp and labor commands are immediately to investigate with respect to security and suppression of any attempt at uprising, and to take all the proper measures. In this connection I order that from now on, all canned goods which the prisoners receive in

packages are to be cut open and must be given to the prisoners opened (auf - und durchgeschnitten) because of the notes and tools which are often hidden in the cans. This treatment is to be accorded to any canned goods of prisoners which have been saved, unopened, up to now.

4. I am passing this new order on for information. As soon as further details of the transfer, future treatment of the affairs of prisoners of war, and the exact delineation of the tasks of the Reichsfuehrer SS and of the High Command are established, I shall forward them.

I request you work in closest collaboration with the offices to whom the responsibility of the affairs of the prisoners of war was transferred.

signed: M. BORMANN

Distribution: Reichs Directorate
Gauleiter
Chiefs of the organizations affiliated with NSDAP
(Verbaendefuehrer)

Authenticated: Suergart (?)

- -

File word: Prisoners of War

- -

Order number 8810

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 058-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 058-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1235-0103

H1235-0104

Exhibit USA 692
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 061 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

N S D A P

Party Chancellory

Leader of Party Chancellory — Leader's Headquarters — 11 January 1944
(Illegible notations)
Announcement 9/44 secret — SECRET

Re: Supply of Bombed Districts

Since the supply of textiles and household goods for the bombed populations is becoming increasingly difficult, the proposition was made repeatedly to affect purchases in the occupied territories in greater proportions. Various district leaders (Gauleiter) proposed to let these purchases be handled by suitable private merchants who know these districts and have corresponding connections.

I have brought these proposals to the attention of the National Economic Minister and am quoting his reply of 16 December 1943 on account of its fundamental importance: "I consider it a specially important task to make use of the economic power of the occupied territories for the nation (Reich). You are aware of the fact that since the occupation of the Western territories the buying out of these countries has been affected in the greatest proportion. Raw materials, semi-furnish products and stocks of finished goods have been rolling to Germany for months, valuable machines were sent to our armaments industry. Everything was done at that time to increase our armament potentialities. Later on the shipments of these important economic goods were replaced by the so-called distribution of orders from industry to industry. These measures are running smoothly and with good success for a long time. They were again strengthened these last few months because werwere more than ever before forced by the shutting-down of the consumer goods industry in favor of armament to use the economic powers of the Western occupied territories for these German needs.

With the growing volume of the distribution of orders the black-market also lost more ground and the termination of products as to kind,,quality and price was taken into our hands much more effectively. In the spring of this year, therefore, the "Reichsmarschall was able to decide to prohibit all black-market pruchases through German agencies. Since, besides the industrial fabrication from old stocks and from uncontrolable production in the Western occupied territories, certain supplies always exist which are not covered by the industrial displacement, the proper German agencies have received the order from me to get also these free stocks of finished goods besides securing production for the displacement. In doing so, one must not form a wrong idea of the amount of these stocks. They usually are not as big as they might appear to be in the display window of some cities of the Western territories. These pruchases are being made under the control of central purchase agencies and according to the regulations of the national agencies. Moreover, these purchases have already been in the hands of German companies proven foreign business. Since, in addition to these firms, buyers have recently acted who used to be active in the black-market and are not sufficiently competent nor always reliable, I have formed recently for France and Belgium each a common buying office for the companies permitted for certain businesses. It is the task of these offices to purchase the finished goods without disturbing the distribution of orders especially for the supply for air attack losses. These offices represent a coordination of the especially experience German companies in Belgium and France. Among them are, for instance, also a number of respectable Hamburg firms. The offices are getting general directions from the Reich offices as to which goods are urgently needed for the provision for bombed out people. Besides, it is up to their private economical initiative to develop fully these possibilities, on which I am also putting the greatest importance.

Accordingly, I may assume that your proposals have already been carried out. Difficulties in the delivery of the goods to the Reich are solely due to the present especially strained transport situation. Frequently during the last few weeks it was not possible to bring in even the most important goods destined for the bombed out civilians from the Western occupied territories. Upon an improvement of the transport situation,the provision with these goods will also improve. Special actions, therefore, can also not change this situation. They would only disturb the order of the practice established after many troubles.

Signed M. Bormann

Distribution: Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbaendefuehrer

Correct (signed) Goerz

Subject index: Household goods - Airwar measures - Textiles - Supplies

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 061 PS

7 November 1945

I, PFC Ernst W. Cohn, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 061 PS.

PFC Ernst W. Cohn
33925738

H1235-0106

Exhibit USA 696
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 062-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

(Receipt Stamp:
Chancellery Rosenberg
No. 941, dated 1 April 1940)

Munich 33, 13 March 1940
Browm House

TOP SECRET!

(Initialled): R

DIRECTIVE A 5/40 g-

SUBJECT: Instructions to the civiliam population regarding appropriate behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists in German territory (Reichsgebiet)

The Frence civilian population was directed officially and by radio how to behave in case of landings of German planes.

On account of this fact the Commander in Chief of the Air Force has requested me to instruct the civilian population correspondingly by means of party channels.

The attached directions as to procedure are to be disseminated only orally via district leaders (Kreisleiter), local municipal leaders(Ortsgruppenleiter), cell leaders (Zellenleiter), block leaders (Blockleiter), leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the party. Transmittal by official orders, posters, press or radio is prohibited.

1 inclosure
Authenticated:
(F.d.R.)
FRIEDRICHS

signed: R. HESS

OFFICIAL STAMP: TOP SECRET
(gives the exact routine instructions how to handle state secrets)

1. This is a state secret in the sense of par. 88 Reich Criminal Code in the wording of the law of 24. April 1934. German Laws of 1934 Vol. 1 p. 341 ff

2. To be passed on only personally or upon personal written request in two envelopes against receipt certificate.

3. Transmission if possible through courier or trusted personality; in case of postal transmission as money-letter(value 1050 mark

4. Multiplication of any kind as well as making of excerpts is prohibited.

5. Recipient responsible for safe keeping. Violation of this results in severest punishment.

DISTRIBUTION
Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP(Reichsleiter)
Regional Leaders (Gauleiter)
Adjutant's Office of the Fuehrer
Liaison Staff of the NSDAP
Reich Organization Directorate
Reich Propaganda Directorate
Reich Student Leadership
SS Gruppenfuehrer (equivalent U.S. Army Maj. Gen.) HEYDRICH.

H1235-0107

INCLOSURE TO DIRECTIVE A 5/40 g

DIRECTION

about behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists

1. Each enemy plane landing on German soil is to be put under effective protection immediately.

2. The airmen are to be arrested at once, and, first of all, a restarting as well as the destruction or burning of the plane or its contents are to be prevented.

3. It is to be kept especially in mind that each part of the plane, even the smallest, or of the equipment of the airmen is important and of the utmost significance to the competent service office. The retaining of any objects-possibly as souvenirs- is detrimental to the country's defense, and will be punished as looting according to law. This category includes also, i.e. notebooks, letters, postal cards, either in the plane or in the clothing of killed or wounded airmen. Any attempt by enemy airmen to destroy such objects is to be prevented by all means.

4. Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or liquidated. (Unschadlich Gemacht).

5. The nearest military or constubulary post is to be informed at once.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.062-PS
Nov. 27, 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no. 062-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

Exh. 5, Tr. 689
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 066-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich 24 June 1940
The Brown House
III/Dr Kl - Eg

Reichsleiter
Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr 17

Chancellory Rosenberg
Receipt Nr 1799 M.
1 July 40
H
Copy to III
for comment - 2 July

Enclosed please find the draft of a decree about the juridicial status of religious organizations and congregations in the Reich district (Reichsgau) Danzig-West Prussia, with a request for your comment.

The draft in its present form has been approved by District Leader (Gauleiter) FORSTER.

Heil Hitler!

Signed: M BORMANN

1 enclosure

H1235-0108

H1235-0109

C O P Y

DECREE

About the Juridical Status of Religious Organizations and Congregations in the Reich district (Reichsgau) Danzig-West Prussia

The following decree is issued under authority of par. 3 of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the organization and administration of the Eastern territories, dated October 8, 1939 - Reich Law Publication (Reichsgesetzblatt) I page 2042 - and of par. 4 of law of April 14, 1939 - Reich Law Publ. I page 780 - with the approval of the Reich Minister of the Interior and the competent Reich Ministers. This shall not be binding for a subsequent general Reich decree.

Par. 1

Because of the peculiar folkloristic conditions in the Reich District (Reichsgau) Danzig-West Prussia, all religious organizations and congregations need the approval of the Reich Deputy, to assure legal competence.

Par. 2

The Reich Deputy may, with the consent of the Reich Minister of the Treasury, grant subsidies to certain religious organizations and congregations within his own judgement. The subsidies are subject to cancellation at any time.

Par. 3

All claims of the existing religious organizations and congregations to a state or municipal subsidy are suspended. The religious organizations and congregations have no claim to Church dues.

Religious organizations and congregations may not exercise their rights of collecting dues without approval of the Reich Deputy. This also relates to the issuance of regulations concerning dues.

The organization of collections as well as the acceptance of voluntary contributions by the religious organizations and congregations is subject to the approval of the Reich Deputy.

Par. 4

Yearly, and prior to each fiscal year, the religious organizations and congregations will submit a budget plan about the intended expenditures of their receipts, to the government inspector. Further, and upon demand, they must substantiate their expenditures at the end of the fiscal year.

The Government inspector is entitled to inspect the property administration of the Church and to demand any explanations deemed necessary about items in the budget. He may object to certain items in the budget in which case such items are to be eliminated.

Par. 5

Acquisition of property, in particular of real estate by religious organizations and congregations is subject to the approval of the Reich Deputy. This regulation applies to acquisitions through deeds of living persons as well as to testamentary dispositions.

Obligations of money, work or material contributions to religious organizations or congregations, their institutions and affiliations, must be ratified by the Reich Deputy to become lawful, insofar as these obligations have been contracted prior to January 1, 1940.

Par. 6

With view to the peculiar conditions existing in the Eastern territories organized under the Reich District (Reichsgau) Danzig-West Prussia, the public administration of real estate which was owned or possessed by the religious organizations and congregations prior to 1 Sept. 1939, will remain in effect in this territory until further notice. This does not apply to tracts with no buildings other than those intended for worship.

Par. 7

Unless otherwise indicated this decree is effective for the entire Reich District (Reichsgau) of Danzig-West Prussia.

Par. 8

All regulations conflicting with this decree are void.

The Reich Deputy issues the necessary decrees for the execution and amplification of this law. He designates the agency which will execute the powers invested in the State by this law.

Par. 9

This decree is effective as of .....

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 066-PS

18 December 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, 01335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 066-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
01335567

H1235-0110

H1235-0111

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 069-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Director

Munich 33, January 17, 1939
Brown House

S E C R E T

Regulation No 1/39 g

Subject: Jews

After a report of General Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer has made some basic decisions regarding the Jewish question. The decisions are brought to your attention in the enclosure. Strict compliance with these directives is requested.

signed: M BORMANN

1 inclosure
Distribution: III b

Official:

signed

Office Rosenberg
Rec'd Nr 5827 Jan 19, 39
filed Feb 2
Submitted to RL Jan 19
Urban Jan 20
Schickedanz Feb 13

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 069-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

COPY

Minister President General Field Marshal Goering
Commissioner for the Four Year Plan

Berlin, Dec 28, 1938

SECRET

Pursuant to my report the Fuehrer has made the following decisions on the Jewish question.

A.

I. Housing of Jews

1. a) Protective regulations for tenants will not be generally reveked in the case of Jews. It is desirable, however, to proceed in individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in one house, as much as feasible under rental conditions.

b) For this reason the arianization of real estate will be the last step of the total arianization, that means that at present real estate is only to be arianized in individual cases where there are compelling reasons. An immediate concern is the arianization of plants and business enterprises, farm property, forests, etc.

2. The use of sleepers and dining cars is to be prohibited for Jews. Apart from that no separate Jew-compartements must be arranged for. Neither should any bans be pronounced regarding the use of railways, streetcars, subways, buses and ships.

3. The ban for Jews is to be pronounced only for certain public establishments etc. This includes such hotels and restaurants which are mainly visited by Party members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof, Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof, Nuernberg, Hotel Drei Mohren, Augsburg, etc.) The ban can further be pronounced for swimming pools, certain public squares, resort towns, etc. Mineral baths may, in individual cases and if prescribed by a doctor, be used by Jews, but only in a manner not causing offense.

II. Pensions are not to be denied to Jews who have been civil servants and who have been pensioned. It is to be investigated, however, whether those Jews can manage on a smaller pension.

III. Jewish social care is not to be arianized or to be abolished, so that Jews will not become a public burden but can be cared for by Jewish institutions.

IV. Jewish patents are property values and therefore to be arianized too. (A similar procedure was used during the World War by America and other states pertaining to German citizens.)

B.

Mixed Marriages:

I. 1. with children (half-Aryans 1 class)

a) If the father is German and the mother Jewish the family is permitted to remain in their present apartment. No ban for Jews regarding housing is to be pronounced against these families.

The property of the Jewish mother may be transferred in such cases to the German husband respectively the half-Aryan children.

b) If the father is Jewish and the mother German these families are neither to be housed in Jewish quarters for the time being. This because the children (half-Aryan 1st class) are not to be exposed

H1235-0113

to the Jewish agitation as they will have to serve later in the labor service and the armed forces.

The property may for the time being be transferred partly or entirely to the children.

2. without children

a) If the husband is German and the wife Jewish par. 1 a) holds true accordingly.

b) If the husband is Jewish and the wife German these childless couples are to be treated as pure Jews.

Property values of the husband cannot be transferred to the wife. Both can be lodged in Jewish houses or quarters. Especially in the case of emigration both spouses are to be treated like Jews as soon as the augmented emigration has been set into nation.

II. If the German wife diverces the Jewish husband she returns to the German blood-kinship. All disadvantages for her are dropped in this case.

signed: GOERING

Authenticated copy:

signed: JAHN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 069-PS

November 23, 1945

I FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt.Inf., 01335567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 069-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
01335567.

H1235-0114

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 070 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff

Munich 33, April 25, 1941
The Brown House
III D - Schw
1180/0

Chancellory Rosenberg
Receipt No 4746 Urg 5 May 4
Submitted to the RL on
May 6

H

To the
Fuehrer's Commissioner for the
Supervision of the entire mental
and world-philosophical training
and education of the NSDAP

Berling W 35
Margaretenstrasse 17

Subject: Nationsl Socialist School Services

Copy to
Party member
Scheller
5 April 41
complied

Dr. Stell-
brecht
stang
complied
6 April

We are inducing schools more and more to reduce and abolish religious morning services. Similarly, the confessional and general prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been replaced by national socialist mottos. I would be grateful to know your opinion on a future national socialist morning service instead of the present confessional morning services which are usually conducted once per week.
Should those services be held at designated times, that is once per week or once every other week, or should they only be held at special occasions? I would further appreciate your advice on whether you have prepared concrete suggestions for the arrangement of such national socialist school services. If so I would be grateful to receive them.

Heil Hitler!

signed: KRUEGER (?)?

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 070 PS

12 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a ture and correct translation of Document No. 070 PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1335567

H1235-0115

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 071-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHEIF OF COUNSEL

---

23 April 1941
4609/R/Na

To
Reich Director (Reichsleiter) Bormann
at present at Fuehrer's Headquarters

Dear party member Bormann !

I cannot agree with your letter of the 19th inst.,since some misunderstandings occurred therein.

1 - The clause concerning confiscations to be undertaken in Reich territory is doubtless a regulation which has not yet been introduced, and directly because of this I have asked you to propose such a regulation to the Fuehrer.The proposal originated in a decree of the Fuehrer relative to the work of the higher institutes of learning whereby the question of research institutes and library were given priority and the official bureaus of the Party and the state were instructed to support me in this work.Now it is clear that the philisophical opponents of the regime (this is especially true in the case of the recently confiscated religious archives) are concealing a quantity of the things which are of priceless,perhaps of irreplaceable, value for the later research of the higher institutes of learning. Because an actual necessity seems to be present, I wish to make the already cited proposal.It is understood that the confiscations are not executed by the regional authorities (Gauleitungen) but that this is conducted by the Security Service (SD) as well as by the police.Scientific work can only be done of course after the confiscation by the police, but here- and this is decesive - all must decide what is necessary for police compilations (actual correspondence with philosophical opponents and other material) and what does not fall under the competency of the police, but under the research work done by seminary, that is the Reich direction (Reichsleiter) of the Nazi Party.The taking of an office by Gruppenfuehrer (US Army equivalent Major General) HEYDRICH is only to be considered as much, not as a binding engagement.I therefore have decided on the proposal besause it has been communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter,that the chief office of the Reich Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) of the SS has claimed the following from the library of a monastery: The Catholic Handbook,Albertus Magnus; Edition of the Church Fathers; History of the Papacy by L.v.Pastor and other works. That means that already historical sources and works are being claimed for the Police from the monastery libraries of the districts (Gaue) which must remain reserved uniquely for the work of the Reich direction (Reichsleitung) of the Nazi Party respectively the state research places.These aspects have already been discussed thoroughly in the question of confiscated property in occupied areas.I have transmitted to you a photocopy of my convention with the Security Service (SD) which was reached with the express approval of Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH. I would like also to mention that this work has been executed in accordance with the agreement and always in a loyal fashion (with the exception of a case in Holland which I hope will be likewise solved in the same way). Photocopies and written copies should be made available to me of all material which the police has rightly confiscated for their political police purposes, but which, according to,its nature,must also be appropriated for a later research value.In my view there exists in itself no fundamental difficulty if both sides adopt the viewpoint of being loyal on their own and to the missions of the Partner.I request once more special effort to prevent that valuable writings are arbitrarily extracted from the libraries in various districts by the Chief Office of Reich Security (Reichssicherheitshauptamt) or other police service offices.On this

H1235-0116

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 071-PS
CONT'D

account I propose the regulation that all confiscations remain under the full powers (Oberhoheit) of the district leader (Gauleiter) and be examined by my deputies in case later research value in the respective district itself appears possible.

2 - There is a great misunderstanding with respect to what is involved in the question of the south-east and the employment of my administrative staff: art objects have always been treated as a second line problem. In the first line an order of the chief of the high command of the Armed Forces (OKW) on the instance of the Fuehrer has gone twice to the occupied territories of the west to place all scientific and archive materials of world philosophy opponents of the regime (Weltanschaulicher Gegner) at my disposal for research purposes. That has resulted also in close cooperation on the widest scale with the Security Service (SD) and the military commanders, and I believe that I have secured priceless research pieces for the Reich direction (Reichsleitung) of the Nazi party and its higher institutes of learning. I wish to inform you especially that as many as 7000 crates have been brought to Germany up to the present moment. In the course of these confiscations we have found according to the nature of the case other valuable cultural objects including very valuable works of art. And in order that these things should not be dispersed and that they be secured for the Fuehrer, the Chief of the high command of the armed forces (OKW) on my request and on the instance of the Fuehrer has ordered that these art objects should be catalogued by me. I ask you that if necessary it should be established for the benefit of the Reich Marshal that my working staff has executed these tasks in a correct fashion and in an objective blameless form. Art objects generally do not come into question as far as the Balkans are concerned although there are Free-Masonry archives and Jewish libraries and other relevant research objects. In my opinion only the same attitude as that prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and what I requested, was really only an expansion of an already existing regulation. For with General Field Marshal List, and likewise with the General Quartermaster of the Army the work has already been begun and my men are already at work with these circles in Belgrade. And on command of General Field Marshal List as well as of his deputy general, these men will also be employed in closest relationship with Security Service (SD) in Salonika. As you know, Salonika is one of the largest Jewish centers.

I should like to remark in this connection that this affair has already been executed on our side with Security Service (SD) in the most loyal fashion. One of our collaborators who also belongs to the Security Service (SD), had his duty-obligation countermanded by the Security Service, whereupon it was impressed upon him that the Security Service cooperates with my administrative staff in a most loyal fashion. The things are thus clarified in a practical fashion and the work has taken its course. What I asked was only a confirmation that the already pronounced decisions for the West should also have validity under the given circumstances for other occupied or to be occupied areas. Finally the representative of the Fuehrer has expressly ordered that the appropriate party members in this question should be placed so as not to permit this unique opportunity for inquiry in the Jewish and Masonic lodge question to pass away. The agreement on this matter is thus general.

H1235-0117

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT o71- PS
CONT'D

I trust that this letter has cleared up the resulting misunderstandings.

Heil Hitler !

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO o71-PS

16 August 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, o-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages;and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. o71- PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0 - 1335567.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 072-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Führer
Staff Commander

Führer Headquarters 19 April 1941
Führer Bureau (Bo/Fu)

Chancellory Rosenberg
No 4609 H, 21 April 41
Shown to the Reichsleiter
on the 22. 4
(rubber stamp)

To Mr.
Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg

Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr.17

Copy to
Utikal

Dear party member Rosenberg!

In connection with the received draft of the decree I attended, as ordered, a speech made by SS Brig Gen HEYDRICH. The latter called attention to the fact that the sentence. "In the confiscations undertaken, or to be undertaken in the Reich area, of the property of edeological opponents, the same rules apply", anticipates a regulation which has so far not been introduced and would for the first time set a precedent through this decree-draft. Moreover, the regional governments (Gauleitungen) are never allowed to carry out confiscations.

Gruppenführer HEYDRICH further pointed out that he could under no circumstances recognize the attempted regulation in the final sentence of your decree-draft, since there existed some objections to it. The scientific treatment of the ideological opposition could only be done in conjunction with the political police work. Only the material should be handed over to you, and the seminar respectively. If a speedier treatment through your office is necessary, duplicates and photocopies should be put at your disposal.

The Führer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your experts would not be necessary, since there were no art-objects to be confiscated. In Belgrade only the collection of Prince Paul existed, which would be returned to him completely. The remaining material of the lodges, etc. would be seized by the organs of Gruppenführer HEYDRICH.

The libraries and art objects of the monasteries, confiscated in the Reich, were to remain for the time being in these monasteries, insofar as the Gauleiters had not determined otherwise. After the war, a careful examination of the stock could be undertaken. Under no circumstances, however, should a centralization of all the libraries be undertaken; the Führer has repeatedly rejected this suggestion.

signed: M.BORMANN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 072-PS

12 November 1945

I FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt.Inf., 01335567, hereby certify that I am thorougly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 072-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt.Inf.
01335567

H1235-0118

H1235-0119

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 089-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich 33
Brown House
at present Berlin w8
March 8, 1940
Wilhelmstr. 64
III-Dr Kl/Gf

Chancellory Rosenberg
Receipt Nr 765. 14 Mar 40

Personal

To Mr.
Reichsleiter Rosenberg
Berlin w 35
Margaretenstr. 17

Concerns: Confessional writing

In the enclosure I am sending you a carbon copy of my letter of today to Reichsleiter AMANN for recognition.

signed: M BORMANN

Enclosure

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

the Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich 33
Brown House
at present Berlinw8
March 8,1940
Wilhelmstr. 64
III-Dr Kl/Gf

Personal

to Mr.
Reichsleiter Amann
Munich
Thierschstr. 11

Concerns: Confessional writing.

I am referring to the discussion of my expert, party member Dr. KLOPFER, with party member Dr. RIENHARDT, and inform you once more of the fact that according to a report I have received, only 10% of the over 3000 protestant periodicals in Germany, such as Sunday papers etc. have ceased publication for reason of paper saving. Party member Dr. RIENHARDT has already informed my expert that at present the distribution of any paper whatsoever for such periodicals was barred.

I urge you to see to it in any redistribution of paper to be considered later that the confessional writing, which according to experiences so far gathered possesses very doubtful value for strengthening the power of resistance of the people toward the external foe, receives still sharper restrictions in favor of literature, politically and ideologically more valuable.

Without doubt the draft of an order "for fulfillment of the organizational duty by the production of writings", presented upon your request, will be a suitable means for this purpose.

signed: M BORMANN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF EXCERPT FROM 089-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 089-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL 2nd Lt Inf 0-1335567

H1235-0120

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT -098-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY

Munich, 33,
Brown house
at present Berlin, 22 Feb 40

Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Leader

Mr. Reich leader Alfred Rosenberg

Berlin W 35
Margareten Str. 17

Chancellory Rosenberg
rec.No. 555 24 Feb 40
copy AR
and Urban St.

Subject: Directions for the administration of classes in religion

Dear party member Rosenberg:

The deputy of the Fuehrer has heard from different sources, that Reich Bishop Mueller tells everywhere, that he received a commission from you to work out directions for formulating the teaching of religion for the schools.

I have not been able to examine the statements of Reich Bishop Mueller as to their correctness. The question, having come up for discussion again by the statements of Reich Bishop Mueller, is however in my mind of such fundamental importance for the future ideological position of the party, that I find it necessary, already now to point out to you the serious objections I have in regard to such a commission.

The ministry for education of the Reich has repeatedly indicated its desire in the course of the past few years for new directions for formulating the teaching of religion , which would also be acceptable to the NSDAP.

With your agreement, this request has repeatedly been refused by the Fuehrer's deputy. Just as your ministry did, so the deputy of the Fuehrer took the position based on the assumption, that it could not be the task of the party to give directions for the instruction of the teachings of Christian religions.

Christianity and National Socialism are phenomena which originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ fundamentally so strongly, that it will not be possible to construct a Christian teaching which would be completely compatible with the point of view of the national socialist ideology; just as the communities of Christian faith would never be able to stand by the ideology of national socialism in its entirety. The issuing of national socialist directions for the teaching of religious classes would however be based on a synthesis of national socialism and Christianity which I find impossible.

If the directions should really be permeated by the spirit of national socialism, some very fundamental articles of faith of the Christian teachings could not be recognized. I am referring here only to the position of the Christian churches to the race question, to the question of hindrance or destruction of life not valuable, its position to marriage, which speaks for the celibacy of priests and the toleration and furtherance of orders for monks and nuns, the teaching, contradictory to German feeling, of the immaculate conception of mary, etc.

H1235-0121

No matter how these direction may be formulated, in no case will they ever simultaneously find the approval of the church and the party.

In addition to this, the religions themselves cannot agree on the contents of the christian teachings; as far as the Protestantsthemselves are concerned, there are not only the followers of the confessional church in the Reich and the German Christians, but also the adherents of a teaching, which is endeavoring to create a new Lutheran Christendom of a particular kind approximately in the shape which seems desirable to the Reich Minister of churches, party member Kerrl. The party thus would have to decide first which of these directions of faith it would give preference, or if it should even decide for a fourth. I do not think it entirely impossible that the Reich Bishop may take this latter road, since according to his last publication he himself has already turned sharply away from conceptions which up to now have been part of the faith of the German Christians.

But if directions for the instruction of religion should ever be worked out, it will not be enough, to my mind, to make them for Protestants only; respective directions should also be worked out for Catholics. To work out directions for instructions of Catholic faith, the Reich Bishop is hardly the suitable person, and one would probably have to choose a Catholic. Of course the directions for both faiths would differ in fundamental questions, each, however would lay claim to the fact that it really contained the truly authentic interpretation of article 24 of the party program.

By issuing directions nothing would therefore be improved in the present situation in the field of the churches. The fight between the faiths would be carried on in the old form and spread into the lines of the party. Yes, all faiths and Christian groups would attack state and party, because they had assumed to encroach up on their own territory, that of teaching the Christian faith and to try to reform it.

The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between national socialism and Christian teachings, but only through a new ideology, whose coming you yourself have announced in your writings. Because of this conviction we have always been careful, not to exert a reforming influence on the Christian dogma in any shape nor to exert anyinfluence on the church directives for religion teachings. In complete mutual agreement we have rejected the intention of the Reich Minister for churches who, against the objection of the party, always tried anew to renew the church life in the frame of national socialist spirit, in searching for a compromise between Christian teachings and the ideology of national socialism.

Should, however, anyone personality emanating from the life of the church, be charged now to work out directions for the teaching of the Christian religion, the party would thereby basically approve and accept for itself the position of the Reich Minister for the churches previously opposed by itas there is no basic difference between a position which wants to reform and reorganize the church life in its entirety, and one which aims at this goal solely in the realm of the education of youth.

H1235-0122

So far we have always been in accord, that by taking such a step the party would leave the soil on which it is firmly planted and would step on the swaying ground of the controversial Christian doctrines. It would enter into the domain of the interpretation of the teachings of Jesus, and there would doubtless be subordinate to those who for centuries have done nothing but interpret and rewrite the words and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth as written in the old books about the actual wording of which the scientists fight even today. When in later decades and centuries the German people's soul liberated by national socialism should once again be choked and crippled by Christian doctrines, it could be possible that it may have been caused by today's attempt to effect a synthesis between national socialism and Christianity.

On the other hand, of course I am also of the opinion that it is not possible to eliminate the religious instruction in schools without replacing it with something better for the moral education of youth.

Religious instruction as given in schools today does not only comprise the instruction in the Christian doctrines of faith, the teachings of the creation of the world and of the life thereafter; besides, the children receive also instructions in the ten commandments, which for most comrades of the people to this day still are the only directives for their moral behavior and for an orderly collective life in the people's community. If this instruction is taken from the children without replacing it with something better, the objection can be made - in my estimation not without reason , that, as many contend, the present degradation of youth is in part caused by the lack of religious instruction in schools.

What, in my opinion, is therefore necessary is the preparation of a short directive about a national socialist life formulation. We need for the work of education in the party, especially also in the Hitler Youth a short resume in which the ethical principles are documented, to respect which each German boy and girl, who at one time will be representatives of the national socialistic Germany, must be educated. In such a directive for instance belongs the law of bravery, the law against cowardess, the commandment of love for the soulfull nature in which God makes himself apparent also in the animal and the plant, a commandment to keep the blood pure; many principles also belong here which are for instance also contained in the decalogue of the Old Testament, as far as they can be regarded as moral principles of all people's life.

The publication of such a directive can and must only come out of our national socialist conduct of life. Its commandments of customs need to be explained by reference to any doctrines of faith about the creation of life and about life of the soul after death.

They can and must originate beyond any confessional discussions.

I take the publication of such a directive to be of utmost importance, because the German boys and girls must once be told what they can and must do, and what is forbidden for them to do. I don't even think it necessary to introduce this directive immediately into the schools as a text; it would be sufficient if for the time being it would be introduced into the party and its

H1235-0123

affiliations. Later it could also be taken over by the schools just as the little Catechism also was not created by the school boards, but first tought by the Church and later taken over by the schools.

As far as the religious instructions in the schools is concerned, I do not think that anything has to be changed in the present situation. No fault can be found with any national socialist teacher, who after the unmistakenly clear instructions of the Fuehrer's deputy, is ready to give school instructions in the Christian religion. For the contents of this instruction, however, the directives should still be binding which have in former years been made by the churches themselves. In the circular of the Fuehrer's deputy No. 3/39 of 4 Jan 1939 it is stated explicitly that the teachers charged with religious instruction are not to choose from the material on biblical history at their own discretion, but have the obligation to teach the entire biblical instruction material. Interpretations, explanations and separations in the sense of several attempts of particular church directions have to be omitted. The pupils must be given the entire picture of the biblical instruction material.

However, the teachers have the right to present this material as property of biblical thought and not as that of Germany or national socialism. If thus in some cases comparison will be drawn, this, according to the circular, corresponds only to the duties of the educator. Against such instruction of religion the churches cannot have any objections.

When, sometime later, the proposed directive for a new German conduct of life first to be used in the educational work of the party, will have founded entry into the schools, it shall in no way supplant classes in religion. It may perhaps be used as a foundation for some classes in German and must have validy for all pupils, without consideration of their religious affiliations. Against such educational procedure the churches could not object, either because it would really be a matter of additional education, which would take place next to the religious instruction and without any connection with it. On the contrary, the churches would have reason to be thankful to the state because it is not satisfied with the religious instruction according to the very insufficient moral education based on the ten commandments, but that it is giving youth an additional Education, which makes much higher demands on its moral conduct.

Parallel to that the desire of the parents for the instruction in the doctrines of faith may thus well go on. The stronger and more fertile our positive educational work in the schools will be formulated, however the more certain it is that instruction of religions will be loosing in importance.

If the youth which is now being educated according to our moral laws will later have to decide if it is still willing to have its children brought up in the far inferior Christian doctrines, the decision will in most cases be negative.

I would think that today, seven years after taking over the power, it should be possible to set up principles for a national socialist conduct of life. They have long been apparent to the people from the numerous early fighters for the national socialist idea.

H1235-0124

As long as we do not master this task, however, it will always be pointed out from various sides, and rightly so, that children, not taking part in religious instruction, are no longer taught even the most simple moral laws which are a standard for the communal life of all nations.

The Fuehrer's deputy finds it necessary that all these questions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future in the presence of the Reich leaders, who are especially effected by them. I would appreciate it very much if you would let me know your position in this matter before the discussion.

Heil Hitler !

/s/ M. Bormann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 098-PS

I, GERARD SCHAEFER, 2nd Lt., 01332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 098-PS

GERARD SCHAEFER
2nd Lt.
01332102

H1235-0125

Exhibit USA 688
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 099-PS.
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(First letter complete)

National Socialist German Workers Party.

The Fuehrer's Deputy

Staff leader

Munich 33
Brown House,
at present Berlin W 8, 9 Jan., 1940.
Wilhelmstr. 64 III Dr. Kl/G.

(Rubber stamp) (Chancellery Rosenberg
(Receipt No. 249 Dr, 25 Jan 40.
(Presented to the Reichsleiter
(Copy to AR, Urban and HESS
(Dr. Ziegler

Personal
REGISTERED

To

Reichsleiter
Party Comrade Alfred Rosenberg
Berlin W 35
Margareten Strasse 17

Subject: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches.

Enclosed, I forward to you the copy of a letter, sent today to the Reichsminister for Finance, for cognizance.

Heil Hitler

/s/ M. Bormann
(M. Bormann)

Enclosure.

H1235-0126

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT Ø99-PS
Continued

(Second letter Page 1, Line 1 to Line 21)

Berlin 19.Jan 1940
Dr. Kl/Gf.

To the
Reichsminister for Finance

Berlin W 8
Wilhelmplatz 1-2

Subject: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches.

As it has been reported to me, the war fund of the churches has been specified from the 1 November 1939 on, at first for the duration of three months at

RM 1,800,000.-- per month,

of which Rm 1,000,000.- are to be paid by the Evangelical church and RM 800,000.-- by the Catholic church per month.

The establishment of such a low amount has surprised me, I construe from numerous reports, that the political communities have to raise such a large war fund, that the execution of their tasks, partially very important for example in the field of public welfare, is endangered. In consideration of that, a larger quota from the churches appears to be absolutely appropriate.

X X X X X X X X X X

(Page 3 Line 1 to end of letter)

In my opinion, the determination of the amount cannot be affected by the argument, that the fund could only have as a consequence a decrease of the material expenses, but not of the personnel expenses of the churches. I consider it absolutely bearable, to decrease also the personnel expenses, especially for the Catholic clergymen. In contrast to all other German men obliged to serve, not one Catholic clergymen is in the field as the soldier; also none of the Catholic clergymen takes obligations unto himself voluntarily, like the ones, which must be borne by every German family head.

As far as the technical handling of the war fund to be determined for the Catholic Church is concerned, in my opinion, the state does not have to bother to figure out the individual partial contributions, which must be raised by the various Orders and religious associations. I would rather consider it correct if the amount is determined in one for the entire Catholic Church, and if one then leaves it to the Church to divide up this amount according to its own best knowledge. However, the state must be free to call upon the property and funds of the various individual parts and groups of the church arbitrarily to make its demands valid.

As far as the Evangelical Church is concerned, for years the efforts of the Reichminister for Church Affairs have been in the direction to organize all the State Churches (Landeskirchen) of the Evangelical Church into one unified organization with a unified leadership for the spiritual as well as for the financial affairs. Despite the objections, raised by the party, these plans were more and more elaborated upon; even during the war, they were followed up without interruption. Therefore it is not unjust, to determine in one for the Evangelical Church the war fund to be raised according to the same principles, which have been developed for the Catholic Church.

2.

H1235-0127

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 099-PS
Continued

It should be left up to the State Churches (Landeskirchen) and religious associations, who consider such treatment unjust, to demonstrate in an easily perceptible manner, that they are not in any dependent relationship to the leadership of the German Evangelical Church, and do not desire to come under the latter's dominion.

I would be thankful to you, if you could inform me very soon, how high the amount of the war fund of the churches has been set at. The sum, calculated for the duration of the first three months, of which, as I understand, the churches have not paid one penny, may not correspond in any way to the capability, as figured from the entire fortune and from the contribution and/or tax income of the Churches.

Heil Hitler
By order
M B
(M. Bormann)

I, T/3 Charles A. Moosmann, 12141925, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of part of Document 099-PS.

T/3 CHARLES A. MOOSMANN
12141925

H1235-0128

Exhibit + USA 691
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 100 PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Deputy of the Führer
Chief of Staff

Munich 33 -
Brown House -
at present Berlin, 18 Jan 40
Bo/Si

Mr Rosenberg, member of the executive board
of the Party (Reichsleiter)

Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr.17

Office Rosenberg
No of entry 196. 20 Jan-40
submitted to RL Rosbg 1/20
Copies AR and Urban

Dear Party Member Rosenberg:

A few days ago you expressed to the Fuehrer at the Reich Chancellery that Reich Bishop MUELLER had written an excellent book for the German soldier. I am of different opinion. This book familiarizes a new soldier who has already given up Christianity with partly camouflaged trains of thought.

As I have written to you already, I consider it the most essential demand of the hour that NS publications worth reading for the German soldier should be written immediately by your Office and other qualified National Socialists. This opinion has been confirmed by many regional Party leaders. Thus we set against the sale of Christian pamphlets the highly increased sale of national socialist publications which are popular.

Heil Hitler:

Yours
signed: BORMANN
(M.Bormann)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 100 PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. Nr. 01335567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document Nr. 100 PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf. 01335567

H1235-0129

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 101-P S
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

National Socialist German Workers' Party.

Munich 33,
the Brown House

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Director

At Present, Berlin W 8
17 Jan. 1940
Wilhelmstrasse 64
III - Dr. Kl/Gf

Rosenberg Chancellory
Entry No 187 - ?? 18 Jan 40

Reich Director Rosenberg
-Shown 189
-Copy ? ?

To
Reich Director Party Member
Rosenberg
Berlin W 35
Margaretenstr. 17

Nearly all the districts report to me regularly, that the Churches of both confessions are administering spiritually to members of the Armed Forces. This administering finds its expression especially in the fact that soldiers are being sent religious publications by the spiritual leaders of the home congregations. These publications are in part very cleverly composed. I have repeated reports that these publications are being read by the troops and thereby exercise a certain influence on the morale.

I have in the past sought by sounding out the General Field Marshall, the High Command of the Armed Forces and Party Member Reich Director Amann, to restrict considerably the production and shipment of publications of this type. The result of these efforts remain unsatisfactory. As Reich Director (REICHSLEITER) Amann has repeatedly informed me, the restriction of these pamphlets by means of the printing paper rationing has not been achieved because the paper used for the production of these writings is being purchased on the open market. Publications can only be confiscated by special police measures because they are designed to weaken the morale of the troops. Such police measures are really unsatisfactory and in their final execution very much disputed.

Likewise, the prior consorship of all writings by the High Command of the Armed Forces which takes place at the distribution points of the Armed Forces service bureau, is not sufficient in my opinion, to guarantee that the soldiers are not given an undesired influence by the Churches. A publication, the contents of which are clearly tied to the Christian dogma and which do not contain attack against Party, State or the Armed Forces, can not in general be refused permission by this examining commission.

If the influencing of the soldiers by the Church is to be effectively combatted, this will only be accomplished, in my opinion by producing many good publications in the shortest time possible under the supervision of the Party. These publications should be so composed that the soldiers will really prefer to read them, and at the same time, indoctrinate the soldiers with a National Socialist

H1235-0130

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 101-PS
CONT'D

World philosophy, not the Christian viewpoint.

Thus at the last meeting of the deputy Gauleiters complaints were uttered on this matter to the effect that a considerable quantity of such publications are not available. This is the reason I believe, that the publication by your expert, Office Director (AMTSLEITER) Party Member Ziegler, "Soldier Belief - Soldier Honor" (SOLDATENGLAUBE - SOLDATENEHRE) has had so great a sale in a short time.

I maintain that it is necessary that in the near future we transmit to the Party Service Offices down to local group directors (ORTSGRUPPENLEITERN) a list of additional publications of this sort which should be sent to our soldiers by the local groups (ORTSGRUPPEN), Party military units (STURME) or their adherents and friends in the field. I should not regard it as necessary or even good if the majority of these publications should have a spiritual or philosophical character. Rather I should regard it as much preferable if these publications in their finished form were styled in as varied a manner as possible, thus having an appeal to all members of the Armed Forces, regardless of their occupational or professional achievements, regardless of their interests and their background.

I should be very appreciative if you would devote your very special attention to this task, in the near future. My expert, Party Member Dr. KLOPFER, is available to you for consultation about the material on hand here which is at your disposal at any time upon your call.

As the production of these publications (which at the moment are not in existence) will take a certain amount of time, and as, on the other hand, I believe that the supplying of the troops with good publications ought not to be delayed a day, I should be indebted to you if you would transmit to me a list of the already existing publications which the deputy of the Fuehrer can recommend to the Party Service Offices as suitable for dispatch to the Armed Forces.

Heil Hitler!

(Signed) M. BORMANN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 101-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt., Inf., 01335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document No. 101-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt., Inf.
01335567

H1235-0131

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 107-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

Deputy of the Fuehrer
Staff Leader

Munich 17 June 1938
The Brown House

CIRCULAR LETTER NR. 72/38

To all Reichsleiter and Regional Directors (Gauleiter)

Enclosed please find, for your information, a copy directions for participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in religious celebrations.

signed: M BORMANN

Rosenberg Chancellory
In Nr.226601 on 21 June 38

Certified true copy

M

1 inclosure

C O P Y

Directions for the participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in religious celebrations.

The Reichsarbeitsdienst is a training school in which the German youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit of National Socialism.

This problem can only be solved, if all the ideas which at one time were directed to the breaking up of national unity, are subdued in Reichsarbeitsdienst. Therefore it is forbidden to have any class, professional and religious barriers in the Reichsarbeitsdienst.

What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor, but it is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German.

Every religious practice is forbidden in the Reichsarbeitsdienst because it disturbs the comrade-like harmony of all working men and women.

On this basis every participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in churchly, that is religious, arrangements and celebrations is not possible.

A religious creed will strive within the German people for predominance. The Reichsarbeitsdienst in all its male and female leaders, working men and women strive for the indissoluble binding of the whole people.

Therefore not only allowing the members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst to attend church in a body, but also participation by the

H1235-0132

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 107-PS
CONT'D

members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious celebrations for example, weddings or funerals, violates the educational task which is facing the organization.

As little as it is the affair of the Reichsarbeitsdienst to forbid its individual members to have a church wedding or funeral, so definitely must the Reichsarbeitsdienst avoid taking part as an organization in a festival which is strictly religious, that is, which excludes Germans of other beliefs.

It is therefore, in any case, necessary to execute a clear temporal separation between the churchly celebration and the debut of the Reichsarbeitsdienst.

The Reichsarbeitsdienst does not participate in religious celebrations, but rather turns her support at the marriage or burial of a member before or after the churchly celbration.

The participation of the musical band of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in classical churchly concerts (for example, production of the "Schoepfung" by Haydn) is not to be regarded as a partaking in a religious celebration, and is always to be decided according to the local conditions.

signed: HILRL

Authenticated:

REISMEIR

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 107-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 01335567, hereby certifity that I am thoroughly vonversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document no. 107-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
01335567

H1235-0133

 Exhibit USA 686
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 113-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Rosenberg
(in pencil)

NATIONAL SOCIALISTIC GERMAN LABOR PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich, 27 July 1938
Brown House

III
Entered 11 Aug 38 6691
(Stamped)

(Stamped) Rosenberg Chancellery
Entry No. 2896k 3 Aug 38

REGULATION NR 104/38
(Not to be published)

Requested to be returned fro
III, Returned 22 Aug
(in pencil)

With regard to the constantly emphasized neutrality of the party with the churches, it is pertinent to eliminate, as far as possible, the existing frictions. Since pastors, as political and subordinate leaders have shown in the past that they were not able to make decisions when the job of trusteeship was added to the danger of having them drawn into church conflicts, the Deputy of the Fuehrer has decreed the following:

1. Pastors are to released immediately from their party function as standard bearers (Hoheitstraeger).
2. Pastors are to be interchanged little by little according to replacements at hand as political or subordinate leaders of the congregations.
3. As of now, it is forbidden to continue appointments of pastors to posions in the Party, to their congregations, and to groupe associated with church activities.

signed: M. BORMANN

Certified true copy:

Friedrichs

Distributor: II b

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 113-PS

27 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 113-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf., O-1335567

H1235-0134

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 116
II6-PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF
COUNSEL

Copy Dt.

National Socialist German Workers Party.

The deputy of the Führer
Staff Director.

Munich, 24 January
1939

III D - Fs
3830/0/I5 - 4278 g.

S E C R I T

Rosenberg Chancellery

Receipt Nr. 6007-3IJan3[illegible]

To the
Delegate of the Führer for
the surveillance of the whole
spiritual and world political
philosophy schooling and
education of the Nazi Party.
Reich Director ("Reichsleiter") Party[illegible]ember
Alfred Rosenberg, - or representative. -

Berlin W.35.

Margarethenstr. I7

Concerning: Theological Faculties.

[illegible]y dear Party[illegible]ember Rosenberg:

I am transmitting to you by the attached enclosure a copy of a letter I have written today to the Reich Minister for Knowledge, Education and popular education. I request that you take cognizance of the same.

Heil Hitler!

Your very devoted,

(Signed) M. BORMANN.

I Attachment.

Exhibit USA 685
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
II6-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF
COUNSEL.

Copy Dt.

National Socialist German Workers Party

The Deputy of the Fuhrer

Munich, 24 January 1939
III D-Fs
3.30/0/I5 - 4278 g

S E C R E T

To the

Reich Minister for Knowledge,
Education and Popular Education.
To the Attention of Government Counsel Jahnert.
- or representative in the Office. -
Berlin W. 8
Unter den Linden 6.

Concerning: Theological Faculties.

In regard to your letter of 26 Nov 38 - (Office Chief W) - and the conference between Mr. State Minister Dr. Wacker and my expert party member WEIFR, I would like to again inform you of the stand, the party is taking.

Fundamentally, theological inquiry cannot be placed on the same footing as the general fields of knowledge in the universities as it represents less a free field of knowledge than a confessional (i.e. religious) aim of research. No doubts exist on this ground if the theological faculties in the German High schools are appreciably restricted.

In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter, the clause of the Concordat and the Church Treaties are to be taken into consideration. In the case of certain faculties, which are not mentioned by a specific clause in the Concordat and Church Treaties, as for example Munich and a few others, a suppression can be begun without further to do. This is equally true of the theological faculties in Austria ("Ostmark"), Vienna and Graz.

But also, in the case of the faculties which are specifically mentioned in the Concordat or Church Treaties, there now exists a special legal situation which has been created by the general change in circumstances. Particularly, the introduction of military service and the execution of the Four Year Plan must be considered. By virtue of these measures, and in addition by virtue of the fact of an extraordinary lack of replacement men in contrast to the earlier numerous replacement men available, it will be necessary to execute a certain reorganization of the German High Schools. Thus economics and simplifications are necessary. I should like to refer particulary once more to these questions on the basis of the oral discussion between Mr. State Minister Dr. Wacker and my expert.

H1235-0135

H1235-0136

Because of this I would appreciate it very much if you would restrict the theological faculties insofar as they cannot be wholly suppressed in accordance with the above statement. In this event the matterconcerns not only the theological faculties in the universities, but also the various state establishments which still exist in many places as institutes of high learning exclusively devoted to theology and without connection with a university.

I request in this instance the omission of any express declaration to the churches or to other places as well as the avoiding of a public announcement of these measures. complaints and the like must be answered (if they are to be replied to) in the fashion that these measures are being executed in the course of the economic plan of reorganization and that similar things are happening to other faculties.

I would appreciate it very much if professorial chairs, thus vacated, can be then turned over to the newly created fields of enquiry of these last years, such as racial research, archeology studies, etc.

Heil Hitler !

as representative

signed: M. BORMANN

Certified true copy
signed: ENGEL

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. II6-PS

2° August 1945

I, FRED NIFFENEGGER, 2nd Lt Inf O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document II6-PS.

FRED NIFFENEGGER,
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567.

H1235-0137

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 117-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

National Socialist German Workers' Party
The delegate of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich 28 Jan. 1939
III D - Es
2240/0/21 3400 g.
Personal.
Secret.

To: The Fuehrer's delegate for
the supervision of the entire
mental and doctrinal teaching
and education of the National
Socialist German Worker's Party
(NSDAP)
Reichsleiter Rosenberg.
Berlin W. 35
Margaretheustr. 17.

Chancellory Rosenberg
In: Nr. 6231 - 10 Feb. 39.

SUBJECT: ARMED FORCES AND CHURCH

Dear esteemed party member Rosenberg,

I sent to you in the annex for your reference a copy of my letter of to-day to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

Heil Hitler

Your very devoted,

Signed: BORMANN.

1 Annex.

H1235-0138

National Socialist German Workers' Party.

Carbon copy.

The Fuehrer's Deputy.

28 January 1939
III D Es
2240/0/21 - 34 g.

SECRET

TO: The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

TO: Captain Thomee or his representative.

BERLIN W 35
Tirpitzufer 72-76

SUBJECT: Armed Forces and Church

In reference to the conference between Brigadier General REINECKE and my expert party member, Chief Councillor to the Government WEMMER, of Wednesday the 11th of this month, I want to explain to you once more in order to confirm the arrangements made by my expert, the attitude of the party with regard to these questions.

In the last years, the party had to announce its position, time and time again, to the plan of establishing a State Church, or of a closer connection between the State and the Church. The party has repudiated these plans with all its force and for the following reasons.
In the first place it would not be compatible for the doctrinal demands of National Socialism to unite the State with the churches as the outer organization of the religious communions which do not have as aim in all their fields the carrying out of the National Socialist principles. In the second place, considerations of a political nature oppose such an outer unity. At present, the churches, the Protestant as well as the Catholic one, are disunited internally, and partly externally too, seen from an organizational point of view, they do not form a unity any longer. A union of these churches with a State built on a strong close leadership and on any National Socialist principles is bound to fail. Such a union, furthermore, would result in constant arguing between Church and State. Furthermore, competence quarrels would arise constantly there, where measures have to be taken concerning either the State or the Church; in this case also one must always count with the difficulty that the Churches would refuse such decisions out of dogmatic reasons. Numerous examples of such an attitude can be found there, where out of historical reasons, there still is a union between State and Church, such as for instance in the case of the School. But even there, where the State has recently tried to bring order in the affairs of the Church by making decisions such as for instance the setting up of the State's finance committee for the Church administration, experience has been made that one portion of the churches thought these decisions were necessary, but another portion thought, for dogmatic reasons, that this was an intolerable meddling with the church life. With such unfortunate circumstances, there is always a danger for the State that it has to execute its decisions forcibly if these are not being carried out; this particular condition must be prevented for several reasons.

For these reasons of doctrinal and political nature, the deputy of the Fuehrer has opposed the setting up of a State Church; he has also rejected the attempts to make use of the authority of the State for a

H1235-0139

different kind of union between the State and Church and to settle outer organizational matters which should be the task of the Church. The party, therefore, would regret very much if contrary to this attitude, the Armed Forces would continue with their plans to set up a private consistory for the Armed Forces, that is to say to create a private church for the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces Church would indeed be nothing else but a State Church within the Armed Forces. To supplement this I would like to bring out the following points:

1). A great portion of the ministers of both churches stand, in accordance with the attitude of the churches, in concealed and also open opposition to National Socialism and the State led by it. In these questions a different judgment of the case is presented as it would have been before or during the World War when the churches were in a more positive relationship to the State. To-day, however, the churches and the ministers, should a crisis arise for this National Socialist State, would pass from concealed to open opposition. They will not in times of crisis support or help this state but at best leave it to its own fate. That they will even fight this State in these times in order to regain lost fields is clearly demonstrated by the Protestant beseeching prayer in reference to the Sudetenland crisis; I want to bring this incident to your attention once more. This high treason-like beseeching prayer proves that the churches have only been waiting till the National Socialist State found itself, at least in their opinion, in a moment of uneasiness, to take up the fight against the State with their whole psychological influential means. In my opinion this fact deserves special attention, because this beseeching prayer clearly demonstrates in which spiritually extraordinary successful way these churches try to influence the individuals. I do not think that the ministers of these churches will be a support to the fighting troops, but that on the contrary, they will be to a great extent dangerous destroyers of the spiritual fighting strength in the decisive moment.

I want to emphasize that at that time this beseeching prayer was approved by most of the country's churches and that it was only later on, once these trying days were put to a good end, and often drawn out negociations from the part of the Reich's church ministry had been ended, that some of the country's churches announced their disapproval; this disapproval, however, in the meantime was in part repudiated. A separate church from the Armed Forces even though it might free itself, as to its organization, from the other country's churches, will not be spared from this danger. The Armed Forces church would have to get its recruits from the otherchurches. Even if one would go as far, and this in my opinion is practically impossible, as to how the Armed Forces form their own ministery from youth on, this separation of an Armed Forces church from the rest of the churches will not be possible because their church faith ideas will remain the same because they are all based on dogmatic principles.

2). It is known to me that certain disputes arose when the Armed Forces tried to bring about a union between the Protestant and Catholic churches; Furthermore, that certain organizational measures such as for instance the combining of the Church song book, the creation of a unified Church service etc. would be appropriate. But according to experiences which the party and the State encountered in these questions, the difficulties, instead of decreasing, on the contrary increase when these matters are taken in hand by authorities other than the church. But the party, by its logical attitude towards these matters, wanted to spare the State from these difficulties and arguments within the churches, that are always led back on dogmatic principles. It should remain up to the church if they can, want or do not, to accomplish these

H1235-0140

desirable organizational measures and unifications. The State or the party would furthermore oppose an inevitable development in this field by meddling in church matters; namely a development which would lead to leaving these affairs to forces which still want to be in connection with the Church.

The Fuehrer's Deputy has therefore considered it as his duty, after the basic decision to reject a union between State and Church had been made, to see to it that the basic ideological freedom of faith and conscience be also practically realized in all the State's decrees, decisions etc. Everywhere the church matters have been left up to the church, but also every religious constraint, wherever present, was removed. At the same time, those who wanted to busy themselves, with Church and religious matters in a correct carrying out of the basic faith and conscience freedom were given the possibility to do so.

The Fuehrer's Deputy would welcome it if the Armed Forces would act in these essential ideological decisions, after the same principles as the party and also now the State have laid out for themselves, instead of pursuing the plans for the creation of an Armed Forces Church or any other closer union between the Armed Forces and the church. I am convinced that in a short time there will be no more difficulties for the Armed Forces either, which difficulties had been brought about by the plan to create a separate Armed Forces Church. In fact the Armed Forced have already taken a position to these questions and basically also in the sense of accomplishing complete freedom of faith and conscience. It should be decisive, however, in this respect to note that these instructions are in many cases not always completely carried out. To assure a right execution of this principle of freedom of faith and conscience it would be in my opinion necessary to observe the following points:

(1) The orders stating that no constraint can be exercised in the attendance of church services during the free evening hours in army camps would really have to be complied with. The carrying out of these orders should not, as in reality it sometimes is, be left up to the discretion of some higher or lower ranking superiors. In most cases, no direct constraint is exercised but in some cases the non-assistance of church services is punished by extra duty etc. Such incidences should lead in the future to disciplinary action.

(2) The duty of Army Chaplains, if they are available in the Armed Forces, should be to give an opportunity to those members of the Armed Forces who have a need to talk things over with them. They could hold religious services if there is a need for it and if the members of the Armed Forces cannot attend the regular services. But the attendance would have to be on a voluntary basis for everybody.

It is evident that in the Armed Forces which grasp all German men, there will be a need to a certain extent for attendance of Church services. These members of the Armed Forces should be given an opportunity, provided it does not interfere with the service, to visit churches and ministers on their own. But further than that, Army chaplains should not be used to hold church services, to arrange evening hours etc. and to exercise any constraint to that effect. They should only be available in order to be present there where a need arises for them.

(3) Special officer ranks of the church service and similar institutions should be abolished.

H1235-0141

(4) The building of own Armed Forces Churches should also be discontinued. I hardly think that there will be many cases where the members of the Armed Forces will not have the possibility to visit a church, outside of the Army, just like everybody else.

(5) No formation Church attendance should take place.

(6) Church organizations should have nothing to do with the Armed Forces. Everything should be left up to the individual in his field.

In conclusion, I think I can say that with these and other measures, namely with the complete and exact accomplishment of the principle of freedom of faith and conscience, in a short time the technical difficulties which might have arisen here and there could be overcome. I want to point once more to the order dated 13.12.1938, issued by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. According to this order, military celebrations are not to be connected any more with a religious benediction at the time the recruits are being sworn in. The attendance of Church services of the soldiers, which take place possibly right after they are sworn in, is voluntary. The church services are to be held separately from the swearing in ceremonies.

It would, in my opinion be very necessary; it would also be in accordance with the basic attitude of the Fuehrer's deputy that these principles contained in this order would be applied wherever the question of the relationship between the Armed Forces and the church arises. Such a correct and exact accomplishment of the principle of freedom of faith and conscience would present the proof that the Armed Forces cannot be accused of being anti-Church or anti-Christian; on the other hand, it would also prove that the Armed Forces are not based on different ideological principles than the ones represented and executed by the State, the National Socialist Workers' Party (NSDAP) and its affiliation. In this way it would be made certain that the same educational principles exist in all the organizations as well as the teaching institutions of our German people, namely the Armed Forces, the Hitler Youth, School labor service and affiliations of the party. I think that this fact would do much more for the spiritual integrity of the German soldier than if the young German would find himself confronted, during the various stages of his education, with various attitudes toward these questions.

Heil Hitler

1 Annex.

Signed: M. BORMANN

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT No. 117-PS

19 December 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 117-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.,
0-1335567

H1235-0142

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 122-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich, 17 April 1939
Brown House

(Rubber stamp):
Receipt Rosenberg Chancellory 24 Apr 39

To the
Official appointed by the Fuehrer
for the Supervision of spiritual
and philosophical schooling and
education of the NSDAP
Attention of office director
KERKSIEK or his deputy in the
office.

Berlin W 35
Margaretenstrasse 17.

III/16 -Tho
3230/0/15
270 g

(Rubber stamp):
S E C R E T

(handwritten note: submitted to Pg Bradmann for comment - R)

Subject: Theological faculties.

I send you the enclosed photostatic copy of a plan suggested by the Reichs Minister for Science, Education and training, for the combining of theological faculties with a request for your cognizance and prompt action.

Heil Hitler!

1 enclosure

signed: M. BORMANN

SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT

Letterhead of
Reichs Minister of
Science, Education
and Training

Berlin W 8, 6 April 1939

The plan which I expect to put into operation at the beginning of the winter semester 1939/40 presents the following picture.

In the East the following faculties will be maintained: Koenigsberg (Evangelic), Braunsberg (Catholic), Breslau (Evangelic and Catholic), Vienna (Evangelic and Catholic). I have already ordered the combination of the Catholic faculty in Graz with the one in Vienna will remain the only place in Austria with both faculties.

In Bavaria after closing the Munich faculty there will remain the Catholic faculty at Wurzburg and the Evangelic faculty at Erlangen. The continuation of these is important but the five state theological institutes of Bavaria should be reduced to three. I ask you to suggest the two to be closed.

In the Southwest regions I suggest the removal of the Evangelical faculty in Heidelberg to Tubingen and of the Catholic faculty in Tubingen to Freiburg. That will provide an exchange between Wurttemberg and Baden based on the Catholic predominance in Baden and Evangelic predominance in Wurttemberg.

H1235-0143

In West Germany a similar exchange between Bonn and Munster is proposed but which shall be designated Catholic or Evangelic is a difficult question. A decision I should like to postpone a little time.

A similar question arises with the proposed transfer of the faculty from Giessen to Marburg. Since the closing of the forestry faculty at Giessen this university has not many students. The reversal of transfer is perhaps the solution but that is not feasible at this time because of the newly organized Institute for Religious Science. Professor FRICK who is to head this institute has pointed out that his transfer from religious to philosophical endeavors may be viewed as a tendency against religion. I have suggested a gradual transfer of activity and consider the final time of transfer to be the propitious moment for such a transfer of the Evangelic faculty of the University of Marburg to that of the University of Bonn. Until that time it will be best to maintain the faculty at Gottingen since its influence in the Anglican world is great.

In the central German regions I propose a transfer of the Leipzig faculty to the University of Halle. The small faculty at Jena I should like to maintain because of its German-Christian stand.

In north German regions a combination of the Evangelic faculties of Rostock and Kiel at Kiel is planned.

Finally I should like to combine the faculties of Berlin and Griefswald in Greifswald. A double purpose would be achieved. Greifwald's weak enrollment would be improved and the Berlin faculty would not have to be included in the new university city of Berlin. I am sure this proposal will rouse the Berlin faculty but believe I can handle that problem.

To recapitulate this plan would include the complete closing of theological faculties at Innsbruck, Sal-zburg and Munich, the transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna and the vanishing of four Catholic faculties.

a) Closing of three Catholic theological faculties or Higher Schools and of four Evangelic faculties in the winter semester 1939/40.

b) Closing of one further Catholic and of three further Evangelic faculties in the near future.

I ask your comments at your earliest opportunity. I propose then to give the Ministry of Churches this information.

By direction:

ZSCHINTZSCH

Authenticated -

H1235-0144

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 122-PS

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., 01335567, hereby certifity that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the indicated excerpt from Document no. 122-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd. Lt. Inf.
01335567

Exhibit + USA 686
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 123 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

COPY

NSDAP
The Deputy Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich, 23 June 1939
Brown House

III D-ES
3230/0/15
2131 g.A.
E. 50/39

SECRET

To the
Fuehrer's Commissioner for the supervision of all spiritual and political instruction and education of the NSDAP.

Attention: Verwaltungsleiter Kerksiek or deputy

Berlin W.35
Magarethen St. 17

Chancery Rosenberg
Receipt No. 29 June 39
8487

Subject: Theological Faculties

With regard to the Conference of Specialists on the Liaison Staff of the NSDAP please find enclosed a copy of my letter of today to the Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Education for your information.

I would like to request you to inform me in due time as to your further wishes regarding the point of view cited in my letter . I will also arrange that conferences on this subject take place in an inter-party form in order to put the wishes of the party offices before the Reichs Ministry of Education as soon as possible.

Heil Hitler!
Signed: M. Bormann

1. Enclosure

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 123 PS
Continued

H1235-0146

COPY

NSDAP
The Deputy Fuehrer

Transcript

Munich 23 June 1939

III D-ES
3230/0/15
2131 g.A.

Confidential

TO: The Reich Minister for Science, Education and National Education

Attention: Regienungsrat Jaehnert or Deputy

Berlin
Unter den Linden 69

Subject: Theological Faculties.

I have noted statements regarding the combining of the theological faculties at the German Universities, in your letter of the 6 April 1939-W.A. No. 76/39g. Concerning this subject a conference has taken place between all the party offices concerned, in which the principal points of view for the party as well as your statement were discussed. I would therefore like to inform you in detail of the Party's decisions as a result of this comprehensive discussion:

1) The Evangelical faculty of the Koenigsberg University must remain for the time being as it is since it is the only one of this type for East Prussia as well as for the whole northeast area.

2) In future there will no longer exist any necessity for the preservation of the state Catholic educational institution in Braunsberg. I request you, therefore, to combine this institution with the Catholic faculty of the University of Breslau.

3) Regarding Breslau, the Evangelic as welll as the Catholic faculties must be retained for the time being.

4) Similarly both faculties of the University of Prag must remain for the present as at this time it would not be advisable to reduce the University of Prag in any manner. Although in regard to a dispersal of the theological faculty in Prag there would be no difficulties with the Concordat, I do not deem it advisable at the moment to initiate measures of this sort there. Action regarding the University of Prag must still be retarded for a time.

5) The situation at the University of Vienna is very similar. Vienna is the only university of the Ostmark, at which the theological faculty is still in existence. I request, therefore, that you reserve any decisions in this matter a little longer, until the situation in regard to the University of Prag has been further cleared up. Nevertheless I would like to emphasize now that at a later date the dissolution of the theological faculties of the Universities of Wien and Prag will also be necessary in my opinion.

6) I request you to combine the Evangelicaltheological faculty in Rostock with the Evangelical theological faculty in Kiel, in conformance with both the arrangements described in you message and the proposal that I have already put forward.

7) In regard to the theological faculty in Berlin I am in complete agreement with you in that under no circumstances should this faculty be included in the new University Town (Hochschulstadt). The theological faculty of Berlin must disappear in the near future. I donnot deem it advisable, as you suggest should next be done to transfer this faculty to Greifswald. Fundamentally it is inadvisable to shift the theological faculty of a large city to a small town. The no possibility must not be allowed to arise of such a large number of theological students, as would come to a small university city as a result of such a transfer, giving this character to this city, and even perhaps to the whole region. Since this danger does not exist in a large city, I request you to leave the theological faculty in Berlin for the time being. I do not deem it necessary to determine the future of this faculty today, since the new university town will presumable not be completed for several years.

8) Since three theological faculties in the German Baltic area are not nece... I request you to transfer the theological faculty of the University of Greifs... as well as that of Rostock to Kiel. The theological faculties in Koenigsberg and Kiel should be quite sufficient. I do not believe special consideration fo... Greifswald in regard to the nothern states to be necessary since the university of Kiel has made the furthering of ties with the north its particular mission.

9) For Bavaria I request that more extensive measures be carried out than were provided for in your communication of the 6.4.1939. In the future the preservation of the five state philosophic-theological universities in Bavaria will no longer be necess ry. In so far as these are to be theological faculties in the future, the training of theologians is to be carried out by them and not by any state universities serving the church exclusively. I would ask you therefore not only to reduce these institutions to three, but also to break them up complet ly in the shortest possible time, if it is not possible to do so immediately. Above all, I request you to dissolve the universities in Passau, Regensburg and Bamberg in the aforementioned order, because they are the cores of extremely strong confessional activity against Nati nal Socialism.

10) In addition there is also Bavaria the Church's own Institution in Eichstadt for training bishops which receives considerable state subsidies even though there is no question of dissolving this church institution, nevertheless, I would like you to ensure that the State subsidies to this institution cease immediately.

11) I request that the Catholic faculty of the university of Wuerzburg be retain... until further notice.

12) In the same manner the Evangelical faculty of the University of Erlangen will have to be retained.

13) Regarding the south German area, I do not agree with your plan to transfer the Evangelical faculty in Heidelberg to Tubingen. Tubingen has already become an confirmed Evangelical-theological center. It is feared that the transfering of the Heidelberg Evangelical faculty to Tubingen would only still further emphasize this characteristic of the university town. I wish, therefore, that t... Evangelical faculty of Tubingen be combined with that in Heidelberg.

14) May I give you my decision later regarding your plan to transfer the Catholic faculty from Tubingen to Freiburg, since the necessity has arise to reconsider this matter.

15) In western Germany, I do not deem your projected exchange between Bonn and Muenster expedient. I wish youtto combine both theological faculties in Bonn.

16) Furthermore, I would request you to transfer the Evangelical faculty of the University of Marburg to Giessen. I do not consider that the ideas which you asserted regarding working with foreign Forscher (odd sects) at the institute for Religious Science which will be established in Marburg, solve the problem.

17) In addition, I wish you to transfer the theological faculty of Goettingen to Giessen.

18) The theological faculty of Jena would probably have to be retained until further notice.

19) Also the theological faculty in Leipzig should be combined with that in Halle.

In the above I have informed you of the Party's wishes after thorough investigation of the matter with all party offices. I would be grateful if you would initiate the necessary measures as quickly as possible. In regard to the great political significance for the Gau concerned, which will be the result in every single case of such a combination.

I would like you to always keep in contact with me when instituting these measures, in particular with regard to the arranging of the actual time, since I am in touch with the competent Gau administrations. Furthermore, I would like you to take into consideration the following in connection with the mergers which we have planned:

H1235-0147

1) As a result of these mergers a rather large number of professional chairs will become vacant. I believe it of the utmost important that these positions should not remain unfilled, but that they should be occupied again or at least the greater portions of them. When doing this, those branches of science must be primarily considered which have been able to prove that they formally had too few professional chairs. I would like to reserve the opportunity of getting in touch with you again regarding details.

2) Furthermore, as a result of these mergers a large number of institutes, libraries, buildings etc. will be vacated. I do not deem it wise to place all these accommodations at the disposal of the new theological faculties connected with these mergers. The necessity will probably arise of dealing specially with each separate case according to the circumstances. Here I would also like to request that you consult me when making decisions.

3) Above all, I request that you keep me continually informed regarding the individual arrangements to be carried out by you in order that I be able to inform the party offices interested and especially the appropriate Gau administration, which is mainly concerned in plenty of time.

Heil Hitler!

I.V.
Signed: M. Bormann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 123 PS

7 November 1945

I, E. GLAZIER, 37137, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 123 PS.

E. GLAZIER
P/O 37371

H1235-0148

Exhibit USA 687
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 131-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKER'S PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer
Chief of Staff

Munich, 12 December 1939
Brown House
III - So./Eis.
3230/O

TO: The Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete mental and doctrinal (eltanschaulich) training and education of the NSDAP

Reich Director A ROSENBERG
Berlin W 35
17 Margareten Strasse

Ministerial-Director Mentzel has recently informed us verbally that you intend to take over the seven existing professorships of the former catholic-theological faculty at the University of Munich. These are to serve as a fundament for the Seminary (Hohe Schule) for National-Socialism. Gauleiter Adolf WAGNER is supposed to have agreed to this.

I would appreciate it if you would confirm the correctness of the information given by Ministerial-Director Mentzel.

Heil Hitler!

signed: M BORMANN
(M Bormann)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 131-PS

17 December 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document 131-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1235-0149

H1235-0150

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 205-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

National Socialist connect Labor Party

Party Chancelry

The Chief of the Party Chancelry Führer's Headquarters
5 May 1943

Chancelry Rosenberg
Admit.No. 931 K
24 May 1943.

Circular No.70/43

Subject: Memorandum concerning the general principles for the treatment of foreign laborers employed within the Reich.

The Reich Propaganda Ministry and the RSHA have together issued a memorandum concerning the treatment of foreign laborers employed within the Reich.

I request in the attached copy that the necessity for a firm but just treatment of the foreign workers be made clear to members of the Party and the People.

A publication of this memorandum is not to be made.

signed: M.Bormann

Distribution: Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbandeführer
Kreisleiter
Ortsgruppenleiter

Index File Card: Foreign Laborers - Treatment - Behavior

Memorandum

concerning the general principles for the treatment of foreign workers employed within the Reich.

The struggle of the Reich against the destructive forces of Bolshevism becomes more and more a European affair. There is an apparent practical result in the employment within the Reich of millions of foreign workers from almost all the European countries on the continent, in addition to a large number of members of the conquered forces of hostile nations. From this fact arise special obligations for the German people, which are submitted first of all in the following principles:

1) Of primary importance is the security of the Reich. The Reichsführer of the SS and his units settle all questions on measures of the security police for the protection of the Reich and the German people.

2) The humane, production-increasing treatment of the foreign workers and the facilities granted them can obviously lead to the effacement of the clear lines of demarcation between the workers of foreignpeoples and members of the German race. It is demanded of members of the German race that they observe the difference between themselves and foreign nationals as a patriotic duty. By disregarding the fundamental principles of the National

H1235-0151

Socialist conception of blood ("Blutauffassung") a member of the German race must be aware of being liable to the severest penalties. The knowledge, that the outcome will be either victory or a Bolshevist chaos, must cause every German to draw the necessary conclusions in dealings with workers of foreign nationalities.

Everything is subordinated to the mission of ending the war victoriously. The foreign workers employed within the Reich are to be treated in such a manner that their reliability is retained and axpedited; that consequences unfavorable to the Reich be linited to a minimum in their home countries and that full labor be retained at a future date for the German war economy, yes, so that even a rise in production ensues. The following is to be regarded here as decided:

1) Everyone even the primitive man, has a fine perception for justice! Consequently every unjust treatment must have a very bad effect. Injustices, insults, trickery, mistreatment etc. must be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden. The workers of foreign nationality are to be correspondingly informed concerning the severe measures for insubordinate and seditious elements.

2) Winning someone to active cooperation for a new idea is impossible, if his innate consciousness of value is insulted at the same time. From people who are described as beasts, barbarians and sub-humans, no great accomlishment can be demanded: In contrast to all apportunities that arise, positive characteristics such as the will to fight against Bolshevism, security of their own existence and of their country, readiness to enlist and the willingness to work, all are to be spured on and expedited.

3) Moreover everything must be done in order to further the necessary cooperation of the European peoples in the struggle against Bolshevism. The foreign worker is not to be convinced by words alone that a German victory is also favorable for him and his people. Supposition is a suitable treatment.

Degressing from these view-points, the responsible plenipotentiaries for Arbeitseinsatz responsible for the recruiting and the working conditions of the foreign laborers as well as the other bureaus concerned, have issued the necessary directives for the employment of foreign laborers within the Reich. From these instructions the following are especially to be stressed:

a) If possible every foreign worker will receive a position for which he has the greatest ability according to his training and former employment.

b) The quartering of foreign labor personnel is to be, as a rule, in camps. The accomodations must be provided with all the necessities in respect to orderliness, cleanliness and sanitation. Measures of imprisonment such as confinement and barbwire are forbidden. It is especially emphasized that in this quatering, the national customs of the foreign workers, (make and female) are to be given the utmost consideration in conformation with the possibilities conditioned by war. The foreigners are as much as possible divided into national groups, and are to be quartered together. The assistance of the foreign workers in the administration of the camp and the maintenance of order within the camp is to be secured. For all camps there are camp directives which outline in particular the duties and rights of the camp and the leaders

H1235-0152

c) At the time of enlistment the foreign workers are to be urged to bring clothing and foot gear with them to Germany. So fas as this is not possible and so far as it has become necessary to replace articles of clothing that have become unusable, they are to be provided with clothing and footgear, considering limitations imposed by war, so that the necessary protection for the preservation of health against weather is guaranteed.

d) The foreign workers are to receive, in reference to diet, the same ration allowance as the German workers from the Reich Minister for nutrition and a agriculture. In this matter the usual cost will be considered. Care will be taken that supplies are issued to the foreign workers in accordance with the numbers placed at their disposal. Embezzlements, usurious prices etc. by supervisory bureaus or administrative offices will be punished as if the act were committed against Germans.

e) Every foreign worker has claim to efficient sanitation measures. The regulations for prevention of epidemics and contagious deseases are not to be deviated from. Medical attention according to local conditions is to be assured by the doctors of the camp district or insurance (Kasse). For permanent treatment in districts or hospitals the number of beds necessary are to be kept ready in a suitable manner. For nursing and maintenance nursing personnel of the same nationality are if possible to be called up, and if circumstances permit doctors and army-surgeons of the same nationality. For pregnant workers obstetrical necessities are to be provided; also peaceful accomedations and nurseries of suitable size are to be supplied. Female members of the nationality concerned are to be used for care of patients. The return home (Rückbeförderungen) of pregnant workers is to take place only in extremely exceptional cases on the request of the party concerned.

f) Recreation for the foreign workers is of the greatest importance for the conservation of working power and morale. Entertaining organisations, periods of free time, sports, etc. are of prime importance in the camp itself and are to be carried on by camp personnel. In addition, special performers and national groups of the various nationalities are to be used for the further development of this Recreation. In addition insofar as possible their own moving picture films will be presented. Furthermore books, periodicals and newspapers translated into the various foreign languages are to be available in every camp. Language courses are to promote understanding in the place of work. For the various nationalities special dictionaries are to be published.

In addition the workers from the East have at least the possibility of going out on their free day.

g) For all foreign workers recreation is possible, insofar as it is desired. For members of the Occupied Eastern territories care only from lay-priests is considered. Care from Russian and Ukrainian emigrants is forbidden.

In case of death all foreigners will be buried in the public cemeteries.

h) The political influence is directed mainly against Bolshevism and ought to be molded accordingly.

The above-mentioned principles are considered binding as policies of conduct for all organisations, bureaus and personnel, since they have been published as directives by the respective bureaus. All units which are concerned with the employment and care of foreign workers and particularly factory and camp leaders, are responsible for these principles being put into practice and

H1235-0153

being adhered to. They must understand quite clearly that violations of the foregiving fundamentals damage the German war economy and indirectly, the Front. Therefore they are not only punishable from the point of view of the nonpolitical crime (for example, assault embezzlement, usury) but also can be punished for treasonable crimes. Not only the author of such an act can be held responsible but also the responsible office chief. Also defective instruction or supervision of subordinate offices can lead to an official punishment.

All existing directives and instructions for the treatment of foreign workers will be tested by the bureaus concerned as to whether they conform to the principles set forth here. Where this is not the case, they will be immediately revised by suitable measures.

Berlin, 16 April 1943

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 205-PS

11 November 1945

I FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt.Inf., 01335567, hereby certify that I am thorougly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 205-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt.Inf.
01335567.

Exhibit USA 695
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 228-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0154

Circular No. 163/43
(Not for Publication)

Subject: Treatment of PWs

Individual Gau-administrations often refer in reports to a too indulgent treatment of PWs on the part of the guard personnel. In many places, according to these reports, the guarding authorities have even developed into protectors and caretakers of the PWs.

I informed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of these reports with the comment that the productive German population absolutely cannot understand it, if, in a time in which the German people is fighting for existence or non-existence, PWs - hence our enemies - are leading a better life than the German working-man, and that it is an urgent duty of every German who has to do with PWs, to bring about a complete utilization of their manpower.

The Chief of PW affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has now given out the unequivocal order, attached hereto in copy form, to the commanders of PWs in the military districts. I request that this order be brought orally to the attention of all party office holders in an appropriate manner.

In case that in the future complaints about unsuitable treatment of PWs still come to light, they are to be immediately communicated to the commanders of the PWs with a reference to the attached order.

Fuehrer - HQ, 25 November 1943

(signed) M. Bormann

Distribution: Distribution A and B

File reference: Treatment - PWs - Guard personnel.

H1235-0155

Chief of PW affairs in the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
Az. 2f24. 74f Kriegsgef. Allg. (Ia)
No. 11082143

Berlin, 26 October 1943
Badenschestr. 51.

To: the Commanders of PWs
in the Military Districts I to XIII, XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI,
Government-General.
with the commanders of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine and the East.
the PW District Commandant with the Commander of the Armed Forces
in Norway.

For information: to the Commanders of PWs in the
Operational Areas I to IV
to the PW District Commandants in Italy and Serbia

Subject: Treatment of PWs.

I. The intention of treating non-Soviet PWs strictly according to the Convention of 29 and the Soviet PWs according to the special directions of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, has in many cases led to forms, which are not in harmony with the total war forced upon us.

The PW must according to the convention "be treated humanely and especially be protected against acts of violence, insults, and public curiosity". This does not mean, however, that a similar care must be granted him, as is required for German soldiers.

In the case of the Soviet PWs, insofar as their diet is brought into harmony with the work output expected of them and they have recovered from the unavoidable rigors of the Eastern war, the sharp health supervision originally necessary, in part consisting of continuous weight check ups is as a rule no longer required. Weight check-ups may only have the aim of determining undernourishment; they are only to be utilized in individual cases.

The aerial terrorism of the enemy forces great parts of the German people into a way of life similar to that prevailing in the operational area. As a result of this, the treatment and conduct of PWs, who enjoy the protection of the convention of 29 and who are, moreover, through the receipt of packages, in many ways better nourished than their countrymen on the enemy side, are regarded critically. Especially, a too mild treatment of Soviet PWs will not be understood anywhere, as it is known what frightful sufferings German soldiers must endure, who have fallen into Soviet hands.

The leaders of the labor detachments and the guard personnel must, moreover, receive unequivocal orders and it must continually be pointed out to them through teaching and instruction that their primary duty consists in keeping the PWs to the full output of their working energy, and in ensuring that the lazy be apprehended most rapidly through such measures as are permitted to the Entrepreneurs or by the punishments reserved to the military superiors and that intractable elements be recognized and segregated.

Leaders of Labor detachments and guard personnel must be conscious of the fact that, in a time when unconditional and extreme effort is demanded from every member of the German nation, inferior production on the part of the PWs, which are traceable to malevolence or carelessness can in no case be tolerated. The great labor battle of the homeland depends upon the work output of every individual and thereby also of every PW.

The thought that PWs through their work primarily fill the wallet of the entrepreneur, and hence must be protected from him is erroneous. Entrepreneurs are now agents of the German people. They have exclusively to deliver things of importance to the war effort usually in a very limited time and for this to utilize completely all manpower at their disposal according to its best occupational suitability. The entrepreneurs know that manpower cannot be replaced and must therefore for this reason too, have the greatest interest in the preservation of this power.

TRANSLATION OF DOC. 228-PS
(cont.)

Labor detachment leaders, guard personnel, entrepreneurs and German workers form one front and have a common goal: the attainment of victory! To this end they must, by putting aside all personal wishes, and in closest and most unified cooperation make use of the manpower of the PWs put at their disposal by the Reich. Whoever does not work for this goal or interferes with its attainment is harmful to the nation and injures our comrades at the front.

Hence, the treatment of the PWs employed at labor is to be arranged solely to raise the labor output to the highest possible degree and immediately to take sharp action if the PWs are careless, lazy, or recalcitrant. The PWs are not to be "cared for" but are to be handled in such a manner that the required highest degree of work output be attained. With this, needless to say, goes, besides just treatment of the PWs, the supplying of the PWs with the rations, clothing, etc., due them according to existing directives.

II. The development of the situation and the increasing requirements for PW labor power force us to bring more and more PWs into the Reich. Despite this it cannot be counted upon that the guard forces will be correspondingly increased, also the quality of the guard personnel will not on the average be able to be improved.

In addition the problem becomes more difficult because the PWs erroneously believe that they can discern an advantage to themselves in the situation. Hence they become arrogant in many cases and attempt to escape to a greater extent. These symptoms can only be countered by immediately taking sharp measures against the PWs in case of recalcitrance or escape.

Weaklings, who should express themselves to the effect that in the present situation one must assure onesself of "friends" among the PWs by means of mild treatment, are defeatists and are to be prosecuted on the charge of subversion of national defense.

The PWs must not be in doubt for an instant that weapons will be ruthlessly employed against them, if they give any sort of passive resistance or should try to mutiny.

The commanding officers must take care that this policy concerning the treatment of PWs becomes the common property of all officers, officials, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men subordinate to them. This is not to be attained through written directives and pamphlets alone, but primarily by the spoken word and by a persistent and conscientious education of subordinates in the spirit of these statements.

I request that the local agencies of the National Socialist Party be, in a suitable manner, orally informed of this policy and that it be reported to the Commanders.

I request that no reproduction of this document be made.

(signed)
v. Graevenitz

Reprinting, even in part, forbidden.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 228-PS

9 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, LT., (jg) USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 228-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR
391590

H1235-0156

Exhibit USA 693
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 232 - PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0157

National Socialist German Workers Party.
Party Chancellery
The Chief of the Party Chancellery

Fuehrer headquarters, 13 Sep 1944

Proclamation.

Chancellery Rosenberg
Rec'd No. 2594 K/ 19 Sep 44.
Presented to the Reichsleiter on the 20, Sept. Rdsdir.

For the Information of :
1) Staff leader (Init.)
2) Central Office 27 Sep 44 (Init.)
3) Administration 27 Sep 44 (Init.)
Returned to the Chancellery

Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War - Tasks of the guard units.

The regulations, valid until now, on the treatment of Prisoners of War, and the tasks of the guard units are no longer justified in view of the demands of the total war effort. Therefore, the Supreme Command (OKW) of the Armed Forces, on my suggestion, issued the regulation, a copy of which is enclosed.

The following is cited for its contents :

1) The understanding exists between the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) and myself, that the cooperation of the party in the commitment of prisoners of war is inevitable. Therefore, the officers, assigned to the prisoner of war system, have been instructed, to cooperate most closely with the bearers of sovereignty (Hoheits-traeger); the commandants of the prisoner of war camps have to detail immediately liaison officers to the Kreisleiters.

Thus the opportunity will be afforded the Hoheitstraegers, to alleviate existing difficulties locally, to exercise influence on the behavior of the guard units and to better assimilate the commitment of thee prisoners of war to the political and economic demands.

2) The increase of performance (Leistungssteigerung) of the prisoners of war depends decisively on how the guard and auxiliary units understand their task, and what position they take toward the prisoners of war. From this knowledge the necessity is derived, to orient them again and again politically and ideologically, to put the meaning of their mission constantly before their eyes. For that, in all base camps (Stalags) National Socialist leaders from headquarters (hauptamtliche NS-Fuehrungsoffiziere) are being assigned.

I request the Hoheitstraeger to support the commandants of the prisoners of war in the selection of capable officers.
Above that, the Hoheitstraeger are to furnish the commandants of the prisoner of war camps with capable speakers for the orientation of the guard and auxiliary units. Collaborators of the offices for national questions (Volkstumfragen) are to be called upon especially for that.
Furthermore, a constant political orientation of the plant owner, who is invested now with special rights toward the prisoners of war and toward the guard units, must take place in cooperation with the German Labor Front (DAF).

/s/ M. B o r m a n n .

1 Enclosure !
Distribution: Reichsleiter
Gauleiter
Verbaendefuehrer
Kreisleiter,
Authenticated: (illegible)
Cross index file: Prisoners of war - Treatment - Guard units
File No. 8810.

H1235-0158

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 232 - PS.
CONTINUED

I, T/3 Charles A. Moosmann, 12141925, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Doc.232-PS.

T/3 Charles A. Moosmann
12141925.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 327-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

DRMfdbO.
II 1 c 1183/44g.

(Copies for the Political Main Staff Str. 19/10
(Q 19/X ? 20/10 Dr. Wetzelz.k W 21/10
(P_1, P_2
(with request for acknowledgement
(Dr. Kinkelein n.r.
(Z.d. A. Str. 31/10

Pencilled Notes

Copy
Secret

Berlin, 17 October 1944

To: The Chief of the Party Chancellory
Reich Leader Martin Bormann
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 63/64

Stamp: Political Main Staff
Journal No. P1011 a/44g:
Received 18 Oct. 1944
encl.

Subject: Actions against civilians in rear echelons.
Your circular No. 309/44 of 9 Oct. 1944.

Dear Party comrade Bormann: -

In order to prevent difficulties and delay -which is of course not desired by you- in the liquidation of the companies under my supervision, I have to-day dispatched the following telegram to the Gau Leaders because of the particular urgency:

"In order not to delay the liquidation of companies under my supervision, I beg to point out that the companies concerned are not private firms but business enterprises of the Reich so that also actions with regard to them just as with regard to government offices are reserved to the highest authorities of the Reich. I supervise the following companies:

(a) Zentralhandelsgesselschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H. (ZO). (Central Trading Company East for Agricultural Marketing and Requirements Limited)
(b) Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ostland und Ukraine (Agricultural Development Company Eastern Territories and Ukraine)
(c) Beschaffungsgesellschaft Ost m.b.H. (Supply Company East Limited.)
(d) Pharm. - Ost G.m.b.H. (Pharmaceutics - East Company Limited)

The following banks under my supervision are also not private firms:

(e) Zentralnotenbank Ukraine (Central Exchange Bank Ukraine)
(f) Notenbank Ostland (Exchange Bank Eastern Territories)
(g) Zentralwirtschaftsbank Ukraine. (Central Commercial Bank Ukraine)
(h) Verband der Wirtschaftsbanken in der Ukraine. (Association of Commercial Banks in the Ukraine)
(i) Gemeinschaftsbank Ostland und Weissruthenien. (Cooperative Bank Eastern Territories and White Ruthenia)

The liquidation of these companies and banks has been discussed with the Reich Plenipotentiary for total war effort and will be brought to a close not later than by the end of this year. Assets suitable for restitution of the companies have already been earmarked for the armed forces and war economy. Therefore, any intervention with regard to stocks and personnel does not only impede the liquidation of business which is inevitably necessary but also delays the supply of goods to the armed forces and war industry. For this reason I beg, to refrain from any intervention.

The Chief of the Party Chancellory has a copy hereof."

H1235-0159

Enclosed I am sending you a copy of my letter of to-day to the Reich Plenipotentiary for total war effort from which you will note that the liquidation of the companies under my supervision has been agreed upon with the Reich Plenipotentiary and will be concluded at a relatively close date considering the vast operations which are indispensable for the liquidation in the interest of an orderly war economy. Restored properly not yet surrendered has already been earmarked for the armed forces and war economy, so that any delay of the liquidation or perhaps even independent confiscation of the property by the Gau Leaders would impair or destroy an organized plan, something that should not be done without a compelling reason in the interest of war economy. In order to give you an idea of the past and present problems of these companies, I am attaching enclosed a corresponding survey.

I beg you to acknowledge receipt of the telegram to the Gau Leaders.

Finally, I want to point out also that in my mind it is not correct to simply order the Gau Leaders under the heading "actions against civilians in rear echelons" to press the speeding up of the liquidation of offices and establishments which have been brought back from the occupied territories. Without doubt cases have occurred where such pressure was warranted by all means. On the other hand, it has been proven that, for instance, thousands of decent men and women as well as firms, who have done their duty under the most difficult conditions there, have been brought back from the occupied territories and have recognized the need of the hour immediately, but can simply not complete their work still necessary for the liquidation at present from one day to the other. As far as the Eastern territories are concerned, the above applies to the majority of the people assigned, so that I am obliged to regret that you also associate these people with the most ill-reputed term of rear-echelon.

Heil Hitler
Yours
Signed A. Rosenberg

H1235-0160

Secret

(1). Zentralhandelsgesellschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H. (Z.O.).
(Central Trading Company East for Agricultural Marketing and Requirements Limited).

The following has been the mission of the Z.O. as a monopoly company for the Eastern Territories:

(a) Collection of all agricultural products as well as commercial marketing and transportation thereof. (Delivery to armed forces and the Reich),

(b) Trusteeship of enterprises dealing with food supplies,

(c) Providing enterprises dealing with food supplies with special equipment, supplying the agriculture with means of production and the rural population with commodities (premium goods).

The following is the present mission of the Z.O.:

(aa) Winding up of transactions relative to commodities and finances, particularly utilization of evacuated goods brought back from the Eastern Territories and goods which did not come into use there any more,

(bb) Collection of goods brought back from the agriculture and food industry of other occupied territories (General Government West),

(cc) Remaining current business,

(a) Fulfillment of the original assignments in the remainder of the Eastern Territories,

(b) Inter-territorial exchange of machines for the agriculture as well as for the dairy industry and inter-territorial exchange of seeds according to directives of the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan - business section food.

The actual significance of the Z.O. and the volume of its transactions can be seen from the following:

(1) 30 offices with 200 agencies were subordinated to each main office for the Eastern Territories, the Central District and the Ukraine,

(2) 11 subsidiary companies of the food industry with 130 branches were founded in the Ukraine,

(3) The Z.O. including its subsidiary companies employed at the peak of its business during the summer of 1943 about 7000 German party members of the Reich and in addition has setup about 250 German firms of the Reich.

(4) The total turn-over of the Z.O. amounted to about 5.6 milliard Reichsmark, from its foundation until the 31st of March 1944.

(5) During this period, the Z.O. together with its subsidiaries has collected:

Grain	9,200,000 tons
Meat and meat products	622,000 "
Lindseed	950,000 "
Butter	208,000 "
Sugar	400,000 "
Fodder	2,500,000 "
Potatoes	3,200,000 "
Seeds	141,000 "
Other agricultural products	1,200,000 "
Eggs	1,075 million eggs

The following was required for transportation:

1,418,000 railroad box cars and 472,000 tons of boat shipping space.

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(6) A total of 32,900 box cars of evacuated goods has been brought back by the Z.O. of which

22,400 are grain, lindseed and other seeds, etc.,
9,000 are agricultural machines, other machines, etc., and
1,500 are goods for supply and consumption.

While the utilization of the evacuated agricultural products has been completed in the main part in spite of all difficulties by means of transfer to the Reich Agencies, it has not been possible to effect the utilization of the remaining goods (machines, furniture, supply goods etc.) in the same time and with as little friction. The utilization of these goods is being effected with the cooperation of the Commissioner for utilization of goods, Dr. Kemna, for the Reich Minister of Economy and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. Moreover, part of these goods which are composed of thousands of types of different goods must first be overhauled and repaired.

The number of personnel of the Z.O. and its subsidiary companies has already been reduced from 7000 to 681 employees, exclusive 50 workers who are still working in the Eastern Territories.

(2). Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine.
(Agricultural Development Company, Ukraine)

The Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine (LBGU) had the following missions (Figures according to status of 1st July 1943):

(a) Supervisory management of almost 31,000 collective farms and agricultural cooperatives (former Kolhoze) with 1.7 million farms, of almost 540,000 individual farms with an area used for cultivation of maximum 38 million hektars (93.9 million acres) - 24.5 million hectars (60.5 million acres) during summer 1943-,

(b) Managing trusteeship of 1875 state-owned estates with an area used for agriculture of 2.8 million hectars (6.9 million acres),

(c) Managing trusteeship of 72 breeding stations with an area of 124,000 hectars (306,400 acres), seed reproducing area of 424,000 hectars (1,047,700 acres),

Trustee management of 17 offices for distribution of seeds of 270 seed distribution points and of 619 seed depots with a seed capacity of 192,000 tons.

(d) Managing trusteeship of 900 machine and tractor stations (MTS) with 49,600 tractors.

The LBGU maintained 1 central business office, 6 district offices (with 5 branches offices), 114 regional offices, 431 county offices, 2870 base offices and 400 supervisory bodies.

The LBGU has already completed the liquidation of the following affairs:

(1) Management of the general enterprises (see above under a),

(2) Management of the state-owned estates (see above under b),

(3) Sheep-breeders association Ukraine,

(4) Financial liquidation (balance-sheet of liquidation as of 1st July 1944 will be completed on 20th Oct. 1944).

At present the LBGU still attends to the following matters:

(aa) Utilization of still remaining 5400 tons of highly valuable, evacuated seeds (a total of 98,000 tons have been brought back), most of which will be transferred to the Landbau-Gesellschaft m.b.H. (Land Development Company Limited) founded recently by the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan, - termination by the end of this year-,

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(bb) Utilization of the rolling stock, parts of equipment and similar matters confiscated by the armed forces.

(cc) Realization of the MTS evacuation depots and work shops. The personnel used in connection with this (90 civilians, 34 military personnel) occupied mainly with new problems regarding the employment of agricultural machines and the repair thereof. The transfer of these machines to the above mentioned Landbau-Gesellschaft has been projected in the near future.

The number of personnel employed by the LBGU has been reduced from 4500 German and Dutch workers as of 30 June 1943 to 410 as of 1st Oct. 1944.

Of these latter 248 were made available for other important war jobs, especially in the general government, by way of orders and leaves from present jobs. 28 employees are assigned to supervise 50,000 Ukrainian workers in key-positions and skilled laborers of the LBGU. Another 90, as mentioned, are employed for the problems of utilizing agricultural machines and for the repair thereof (see above cc). Consequently, only 44 persons are employed to wind up the remainding affairs.

(3). Beschaffungsgesellschaft Ost m.b.H. (BGO).
(Supply Company East Limited)

The BGO has been founded with the purpose to procure machines and other investment goods for the economy of the Eastern Territories as well as to perform special assignments.

Today, it has the following assignments:

(a) Winding-up of concluded business-contracts (50 mill. Reichsmark of a total procurement in the value of 115 mill Reichsmark), according to which deliveries will be made within the next 9 months;

(b) procurement of machine tools and wood-working machines by order of the Reich Minister for Armament and War production.

(c) Collection and utilization at economic assets evacuated from the Eastern Territories and the General Government whereby the BGO acts as an executive company for Dr. Kemna, the Commissioner for the utilization of goods for the Reich Minister for Economy and the Reich Minister for Armament and War-production (see Annex (1) and (2)).

(d) Liquidation of the Steine und Erden Ost G.m.b.H. (Stone and Soil East Company Limited).

To (a): According to orders by the Reich Minister for Armament and War production the machines which are being delivered in agreement with current business contracts are being transferred particularly to German industries damaged by bombing. The other deliveries are being disposed of in accordance with orders of the OKH/Chef H Ruest u.BdH. (Supreme Command Army) as well as of the economic administrative agencies and of the Planning Commissioners.

To (b): This procurement is also done for the German industry.

To (c): The execution of these assignments is in full swing, and the work connected with it is steadily increasing. So far the BGO has collected about 1000 carloads of evacuated goods. One part of these is directed by the B.G.O. to agencies charged with their utilization which operate under its management. Another part - particularly machines and investment goods - are stored in own depots, repaired, catalogued and catalogue submitted to the Office of Armament Supplies as well as to Special Agencies (Sonderringe)* and apportioned according to their directions to the Armament Industry.

The number of personnel employed at present by the BGO is 118 employees of whom 55 are male employees.

(4). Pharm-Ost G.m.b.H.
(Pharmaceutics-East Company Limited).

The company had the assignment to supply the Eastern Territories with medicines and other drugs within the range of human and veterinary medicines as well as with all equipment for medical and veterinary requirements, hospital requirements, etc.

Apart from supplying the remainder of the Eastern Territories, the company's main assignment at present is essentially to direct the evacuated goods to other consumers, the armed forces in particular, its stocks and those goods which are to be delivered according to business contracts already concluded, while observing the necessary financial liquidation procedure.

* Translators note: Committees of industrialists and engineers set up by Speer to organize the production of component parts for the armament industry.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 327-PS

25 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 327-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567.

H1235-0164

H1235-0165

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 654-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

U I b

Discussion with Reich Führer of SS Himmler on 18.9.42 in his Field Headquarters in the presence of State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger, SS Gruppenführer Streckenbach and SS Obersturmbannführer Bender.

also in cases where ? sentences ? ? (marginal note in pencil)

1. Correction (2 illegible pencilled words) by special treatment at the hands of the police in cases where judicial sentences are not severe enough. On the suggestion of Reichsleiter Bormann, the following agreement was reached between the Reich Führer of SS and myself:

a) In principle the Führer's time is no longer to be burdened with these matters.

b) The Reich Minister for Justice will decide whether and when special treatment at the hands of the police is to be applied.

c) The Reich Führer of SS will send the reports, which he sent hitherto to Reichsleiter Bormann, to the Reich Minister for Justice.

d) If the views of the Reich Führer of SS and those of the Reich Minister for Justice agree, the final decision on the case will rest with them.

e) If their views are not in agreement, the opinion of Reichsleiter Bormann will be brought to bear on the case, and he will possibly inform the Führer.

f) In cases where the Führer's decision on a mild sentence is sought through other channels (such as by a letter from a Gauleiter) Reichsleiter Bormann will forward the report to the Reich Minister for Justice. The case will then be decided as already described by the Reich Führer of SS and the Reich Minister for Justice.

2. The delivery of anti-social elements from the execution of their sentence to the Reich Führer of SS to be worked to death. Persons under protective arrest, Jews, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians, Poles with more than 3-year sentences, Czechs and Germans with more than 8-year sentences, according to the decision of the Reich Minister for Justice. First of all the worst anti-social elements amongst those just mentioned are to be handed over. I shall inform the Führer of this through Reichsleiter Bormann.

3. Administration of justice by the people.

This is to be carried out step by step as soon as possible, first of all in the villages and the small towns of up to about 20,000 inhabitants. It is difficult to carry it out in large towns. I shall rouse the Party particularly to cooperate in this scheme by an article in the Hoheitsträger (NSDAP publication). It is evident that jurisdiction may not lie in the hands of the Party.

according to the permanency of the courts (?) (marginal note in pencil)

4. Orders regarding the police and justice are, in future, to be tempered, for example, not prosecuting unmarried mothers if they attempt to procure abortion.

H1235-0166

5. The Reich Führer of SS is agreed that the cancellation of sentence, even for members of the police, will rest, as in Article 8 of the law relating to the cancellation of sentence, with the Reich Minister for Justice.

6. The Reich Führer of SS has given full consent to the ruling I have planned on the corporal punishment ordered by the Führer.

7. I shall refer to the Common Law relating to Aliens and will give notification of the claims of Justice, e.g. in the identification of young people as anti-social elements and their arrest. Also, it seems to me that the actual circumstances which serve to stamp a person as anti-social are not laid down in the law with sufficient clarity. The Reich Führer of SS is waiting for our opinion, and until then will not carry out the text of the law.

8. The Reich Führer of SS has agreed to a clause for the Juvenile Court Law, whereby the age of discretion can be reduced to 12 years and the reduced age of discretion can be extended to over 18 years.

by which he has made clear that a reduction in the age limit of full age of discretion is meant. (Marginal note in pencil)

9. SS - Obersturmbannführer Bender, of the Staff of the Reich Führer of SS, is appointed by the Reich Führer of SS as liaison officer for matters which appear to necessitate direct liaison with the Reich Führer of SS. He can be contacted any time by teleprinter in the Field Headquarters of the Reich Führer of SS, and will come once every month to Berlin to report to me here. Hauptsturmführer Wanniger is appointed as liaison officer for other matters, and he will be at Security Headquarters (Sicherheitshauptamt).

illegible pencilled word

10. The Reich Führer of SS declared that, in the infliction of punishment, special establishments should be set up, on the principle that confirmed criminals should be confined separately and that those capable of improvement should be separated according to the nature of their crimes (e.g. impostors, thieves and those who have committed acts of violence). This was recognised as correct.

11. The Reich Führer of SS demands that the penal register should be kept by the police. Arguments against this are to be examined (cancellation and tightening up of the Penal Register Bill and additions made to it). The question is to be further discussed with Gruppenführer Streckenbach.

12. The Reich Führer of SS pointed out as reliable SS - Obersturmführer Reichsgerichtsrat Altstötter, at present on active service as a Major, and also Landgerichtspräsident Stepp; he designated as unreliable Generalstaatsanwalt Jung in Dresden.

13. Finally, the Reich Führer of SS broached the subject of the Office of the Public Prosecutor and its transference to the police. I rejected it flatly. There was no further discussion of this subject.

14. It is agreed that, in consideration of the intended aims of the Government for the clearing up of the Eastern problems, in future Jews, Pole, Gypsies, Russians and Ukrainians are no longer to be judged by the ordinary courts, so for

H1235-0167

as punishable offences are concerned, but are to be dealt with by the Reich Führer of SS. This does not apply to civil lawsuits, nor to Poles whose names are announced or entered in the German Racial Lists.

Signed Th.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 654-PS

I, PETER FRASER, Captain, K.R.R.C., 76538, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 654-PS.

PETER FRASER
Captain, K.R.R.C.
76538

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 656-PS
Office of U.S. Cheif of Counsel.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY
Party Chancelry

The Chief of the Party Chancelry

Fuehrer's Headquarters
S E C R E T!
(Stamp)

Circular No 12/43g.

S E C R E T !

Subject: Law of Self-Defense against P.O.W's. I acknowledge the copy of the annexed order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht.

/s/ M. BORMANN

F.d.R
Hilegardt

1 copy

Distrb. Reichsleiter
Gauleiter,
Verbaendefuehrer

index cards: Prisoners of War/Guard Personnel
Self Defense/Physical Punishment.

- -

Copy of Copy

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht
Az 2f 24.74 AWA/Prisoners of War. General (IA)
No. 3868 142g

Berlin 29.1.1943

S E C R E T

Subject: Self Defense against Prisoners of War
Reference: None

The question of the treatment of Prisoners of War is continually being brought up and discussed by Wehrmacht and Party bureaus, namely that the possibilities of punishment provided in the agreement of 1929(M. Dv.-38/2) are not sufficient. Primarily neither the military punishment law nor the discipline law, which has been eliminated for German military personnel, offers a punishment which can be used with satisfactory success in case of an insubordinate and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War. The following is hereby fundamentally affirmed:

1.) The M.Dr. 38/2 (Agreement 1929) article 46 states that Prisoners of War cannot receive any other punishments than those meted out to German military personnel. That applies to all Prisoners of War with the exception of Soviet Prisoners of War. For Soviet Prisoners of War the order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht 2 f 24.73 AWA/Prisoners of War, General (IA) No. 389/42g of the 24.3.1942 Article A, fourth paragraph is applicable.

2.) Improper and provoking attitude of Prisoners of War toward German guard personnel as well as toward German contractors and workers forces and justifies this being enacted for the preservation of their own dignity and of national esteem. German law has an application for this; in the case of self-defense ST GB Art 53 is applicable. According to the existing law, self-defense occurs not only in the case of present actual attakks but also present attacks on one's honor, on one's property, etc. The Law of Self-defense concerns not only the party attached, it applies also to the protection of a third party from attack. Third in the sense of the N Art 53 a.a. G are not only persons, but also the persons of the public and

H1235-0168

and private law, as for instance the State, the municipality, society etc. The party attacked can use for protection any means that the situation requires and the use of which does not contradict the healthy national interest.(Gesundem Volksempfinden). A subsequent punishment of a prisoner of war for improper and provoking attitude of Physical chastisement is not permissable since self-defense is no longer present.

3) In case of the diminishing of the effort to work only the guard and the assistant guard(for example among the farmers there is very often a personal union between assistant-guard and contractor) can interfere as the military superior of the Prisoners of War. In this he is not only authorized but also obliged by duty(see Order of the OKW A2 2f 2417a Chief of Prisoners of War/General (I)/Org (IIIb) No. 2916/42 of the 26.6. 1942). Should the prisoners of war not fulfill his order, then he has in the case of the most pressing need and danger,-the right to force obedience with the weapon if he has no other means. He can use the weapon as much as is necessary to attain his goal. If the assistant guard is not armed, then, he is authorized in forcing obedience by other applicable means.

4.) The military personnel, officials, and assisting guard personnel who are charged with the duty of guarding prisoners of war are to be instructed accordingly. It is to be made clear to them what means the law puts at their disposal, in order that they may be able to combat insubordinations, provocative attitudes and abatement of the will to work on the part of the prisoners of war, and what also the limits are to which they can go.

Distribution:
.....

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Wehrmacht

/s/ Reinecke
F.d.R.

/s/ v. Graevenitz
Majorgeneral.

D.d.R.d.A. :
Weber

- -

5th October, 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 656-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67.

H1235-0169

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 705-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Reichsfuehrer SS
SS Hauptamt, Office VI
VI/1 - Ni -
VS - Tagbuch No 704/43 geh.
VI - Tagbuch No 214/43 geh.

Berlin-Grunewald
1. Feb 1943
Hagenstrasse 45

S E C R E T

Stamped:
000579 * 5 Feb 1943
Akt Z ... G/S/23

To
SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers
Ahnenerbe Office

Berlin - Dahlem
Puecklerstr 16

By order of SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg, Office VI - German Leitstelle - sends in the enclosed the minutes of the conference on the 12 Jan 1943 of the SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone, with a request for acknowledgement.

By direction

BERGER (?)
(SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer)

(Translator's note: Pencilled notes not translated)

H1235-0170

H1235-0171

The Reichsfuehrer-SS
SS-Hauptamt, Office VI
VI/1 - Dr. Schm/Ni.-

Bln-Wilmersdorf 1, 20 Jan 1943
Hohenzollerndamm 31

S E C R E T

VS-Tgb Nr 704/43 geh.
VI-Tgb Nr 214/43 geh.

Minutes of the conference on the 12 Jan 1943 at 1200 of the SS-Committee for General Labor in the German zone, took place at the SS-Hauptamt

The following participated in the conference:

1.	SS-Brigadefuehrer Bauer	SS-Fuehrungshauptamt, Kommando Allgemeine-SS
2.	SS-Oberfuehrer Ellersieck	Kommandeur der SS-Mannschafts-haeuser
3.	SS-Standartenfuehrer Loerner	SS-Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptamt
4.	SS-Standartenfuehrer Schmidt	Fuersorge- u. Versorgungsamt Ausland
5.	SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers	Amt Ahnenerbe
6.	SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg	SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
7.	SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr Stier	Stabshauptamt of the Reich Commissioner for the consolidation of the German nationality
8.	SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Paulus	SS-Personal-Hauptamt
9.	SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr Tesch	Amt Lebensborn
10.	SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr Sichelschmidt	Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle
11.	SS-Obersturmfuehrer Harderer	Race and Settlement Hauptamt
12.	SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr Schneider	Amt Ahnenerbe
13.	SS-Obersturmfuehrer Dr Schmidt	SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI
14.	SS-Obersturmfuehrer Ulrich	SS-Hauptamt, Amt VI

As introduction SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg delivered a report on conditions in the German territories.

During the period covered by the report, hostile circles in the German territories have made themselves more actively noticeable. Various measures have had an aggravating effect on the political developments, primarily the compulsory labor and service conscription in Flanders and the Netherlands.

The development of the conscription situation makes it necessary to have larger procurement programs organized even in Germanic regions. All Germans - with the exception of the Flemish - are collected in one German association. The Flemish remain in the "Langemarck" regiment.

Meanwhile the "Prinz Eugen" division has been transferred to Croatia. Furthermore a Croation legion is to be activated here, which is to be under the command of SS-Gruppenfuehrer Phleps

Of great importance is the fact that the Fuehrer has assented to the activation of an SS-Standart of French volunteers, which is to be called the "Karl der Grosse" standart.

Norway — Meanwhile in Norway Minister Fuglosang has succeeded the late Minister Lunde after the latter's unfortunate demise.

H1235-0172

In spite of promises made by the Quisling Party, one cannot count on Norway supplying a contingent of appreciable size.

Denmark In Denmark the situation is especially favorable since SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best has taken over the control. One can be sure that here SS-Gruppenfuehrer Dr Best will offer a good example of national Reich politics.

The situation in regard to Parteifuehrer Clausen has had unfavorable developments recently. Clausen agreed to the plan of activating a combat corps as introduction to the German Schutzstaffel in Denmark only on the supposition that membership in this corps would exclude membership in the Party. Negotiations for this very necessary collecting organisation of the combat corps go on apace. The monopolistic position of the Party is not tenable; all recruits must be brought in, even if Clausen himself - however without his clique - is to stand in the foreground.

Netherlands: Meanwhile Reich Commissioner Dr Seyss-Inquart has proclaimed Mussert leader of the Netherland people. This measure has had an extremely disturbing effect on the other Germanic countries, especially in Flanders. The decisive role devolves again on the General Commissariat, whose principle of using Mussert too much, in order to disregard him, must be rejected on the part of German Reich policy in the sense of the Schutzstaffel.

Flanders: In Flanders the recent developments of the VNV have become even more unfavorable. Even the very clever policy of the new VNV-leader, Dr Elias, has been a disappointment; Dr Elias, moreover, once stated the opinion that Germany was ready for concessions in the natural political sphere, only when matters were going very badly for her.

Recently the Walloon question has been particularly accentuated. Leon Degrelle, who was a lieutenant in the Walloon Legion and earned there the Iron Cross First Class, is at present in Belgium and uses this time in testing the political barometer in all quarters. Degrelle's intention of founding a Wallonian Allgemeine SS has been rejected. Judging by the connection between religion and politics, it appears in Degrelle's case that he is a Frenchman in his thinking.

A favorable development has occurred in the case of the Flemish Arbeitsdienst. The negotiations carried out by the Reichsarbeitsfuehrer and especially by Oberstarbeitsfuehrer Mueller-Brandenburg with the assent of the Reichsfuehrer SS have had as a result that on the 1 April 1943 labor-duty becomes obligatory in Belgium, both in the Flemish and Wallonian sectors. To bridge the gap students and apprentice officials were inducted into the Labor Service on the 15 Jan 43.

Finland: In Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim has been proposed as successor to the national presidency.

In correspondence with General Talvela particular discretion is suggested.

Just now wounded Finns (Officers, NCO's, men and Lottas are in Germany as guests of the Reichsfuehrer-SS. This caring for the wounded has proved itself quite essential.

Southeast: Meanwhile in the southwest all volunteers from the Germans residing, outside the Reich have been assigned to the SS.

In Hungary, as has been previously stated, there are difficulties in regard to the procuring of the necessary bills of exchange for the maintenance of the families of inducted volunteers. The suggestions of the Hungarian government are always only patch-work.

In general a strong violence manifests itself in the southeast as a consequence of the general military situation, and doubtless one must count on the existence of a certain sympathy with hostile powers through the Vatican.

After the order of the 12 August 42 by Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the competence of the Reichsfuehrer-SS in all German matters and the strict supervision of all Party units had been issued, a similar decree was prepared by Reich Minister Dr Lammers for the sphere of the State, which is soon to be issued. The new formulation demands even in sectors of the state the right of the Reichsfuehrer SS to a joint stipulation in fundamental national questions, that is to say, the Reich commissioners are to consult with the Reichsfuehrer SS in all actually fundamental questions regarding the nation.

SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr Riedweg reports again on questions of terminology which had been mentioned in the internal labor conference of the German Leitstelle in Copenhagen. Principally this terminology concerns the conceptions "Reich", "Nation", "Volk" and "Stamm", as well as "nordisch" and "germanisch".

In agreement with the Ahnenerbe office it was determined that the concept "Reich" is to remain reserved for the whole Reich of all German races and people. For Germany the official expression "Deutsches Reich" is to be used.

"Nation", being a concept stamped predominantly by liberalism, is no longer to be applied to the German peoples.

Difficulties arise also in differentiating between the concept "Stamm" and "Volk". The expression "Volk" is whenever possible to include the whole German area.

The word "Stamm", where it applies, is to be used for countries.

In regard to the definition of the term "nordisch" and "germanisch", the first expression must be used less and less. With the expression "nordisch", too high a position has been granted Norway, Sweden and Denmark at the expense of the west Germans.

SS-Standartenfuehrer Sievers of the Ahnenerbe office states again the importance of the December conference of Office VI and reports on the conference of the scientific committee, which has been concluded there. A conference on the German historical historical work took place in the RSHA.

SS-Standartenfuehrer Loerner reports on an inventory of finances and affirms that a new agreement has been reached between the Reichs Treasurer and the Economic Administrative Office.

SS-Standartenfuehrer Schmidt still wishes a condensation of the bureaus on Flanders for the simplification of the work, in particular shifting the Antwerp bureau to Brussels. In addition he reports on the continuous difficulties in the work of family maintenance especially in Hungary.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 705-PS

H1235-0173

3 October 1945

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg), 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 705-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt.(jg) USNR
391590

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 735-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Illegible pencil note at top.

S. O. only
access only through officer

Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
No. 771793/44 Most Secret, S. O. only

Führer Headquarters
6.6.1944
Most Secret

3 Copies
1st Copy

Subject: Treatment of enemy terror aviators

Minutes of a meeting

1). Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner informed the deputy Chief of WFSt in Klessheim on the afternoon of 6.6, that a conference on this question had been held shortly before between the Reich Marshall, the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsführer SS. Contrary to the original suggestion made by the Reich Foreign Minister who wished to include every type of terror attack on the German civilian population, that is, also bombing attacks on cities, it was agreed in the above conference that merely those attacks carried out with A/C armament, aimed directly at the civilian population and their property, should be taken as the standard for the evidence of a criminal action in this sense. Lynch law would have to be the rule. On the contrary, there has been no question of court martial sentence or handing over to the police.

2). Deputy Chief of WFSt stated the following:

a). First and foremost, following the lines of the generally distributed declaration made by Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels and numerous press notices written in the same vein, it is essential to announce any definitely established incident of this kind giving the names and units of the aviators, the place the incident occurred and any other relevant facts. The purpose of this would be to make clear the serious intentions of the Germans in the face of disbelieving enemy propaganda and especially to discourage effectively any further murderous action against our civilian population. Therefore the question is whether the SD knows of such a case or whether the necessary proof is available from which to construct a case like this with the required statements.

Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner replied to both in the negative.

b). Deputy Chief of the WFSt mentioned that, apart from Lynch law, a procedure must be worked out for segregating those enemy aviators, who are suspected of criminal action of this kind, until they are received into the Reception Camp for aviators at Oberursel; if the suspicion was confirmed, they would be handed over to the SD for special treatment.

For this purpose the WFSt would cooperate with the Supreme Command of the Air Force to set out the necessary regulations for the use of the head of the camp at Oberursel.

Obergruppenführer Kaltenbrunner expressed his complete agreement with this view and that the SD take charge of those aviators segregated.

c). On the question of making announcements, it is settled that, for the present, agreement should be reached in every case between OKW/WFSt, OKL, and the Reichsführer SS to decide the form that the announcement should take.

H1235-0174

H1235-0175

The participation of the Foreign office is to be assured by the WFSt.

3). At a conference with Colonel von Brauchitsch (C-in-C Air Force) on 6.5, it was settled that the following actions were to be regarded as terror-action, justifying Lynch law.

a). Low level attacks with aircraft armament on the civilian population, single persons as well as crowds.

b). Shooting on our own (German) air crews in the air who have baled out.

c). Attacks with air craft armament on passenger trains in the public service.

d). Attacks with aircraft armament on military hospitals, hospitals and hospital-trains which are clearly marked with the Red Cross.

The head of the Reception camp for aviators at Oberursel will be informed of these facts given in Section 3 above. If the facts of any case of this kind are established on examination, the prisoners are to be handed over to the SD. Colonel von Brauchitsch declared, at the end, that another report to the Reich Marshall on this subject would be superfluous.

sgd. Warlimont

Distribution:

Chief OKW via Chief WFSt	1st Copy
Deputy Chief WFSt/Ktb.	2nd Copy
Qu (rough copy)	3rd Copy

Remarks by the Chief of OKW on the agenda dated 6.6.44 No. 771793/44

Most Secret S. O. only.

"If one allows the people to carry out Lynch law, it is difficult to enforce rules!

K

Min. Dir. Berndt got out and then shot the enemy aviators on the road.

I am agains legal procedure! It doesn't work out!

sgd. K. " (Keitel)

Remarks by Chief of WFSt:

"To 3. This conference is insufficient. The following points must be decided quite definitely in conjunction with the Foreign Office:

1). What do we consider as murder?
Is RR in agreement with point 3b?

(marginal note) A. A. ? (Foreign Office)

2). How should the procedure be carried out?

a). by the people?
b). by the authorities?

3). How can we guarantee that the procedure be not also carried out against other enemy aviators?

4). Should some legal procedure be arranged or not?

sgd. J. " (Jodl)

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 735-PS

5 November 1945

I, ESME SHERRIFF, 2/O, W.R.N.S., 36482, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 735-PS.

ESME SHERRIFF
2/O, W.R.N.S.
36482

H1235-0176

Exhibit USA 684
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 838 PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

Munich 33, 3 June 1939
The Brown House

Stabsleiter

Circular No. 122139

Subject: Adherents to Christian Science who are members of the Party

---

In decree No. 51/1939, dated 6 March 1939 the deputy of the Fuehrer has forbidden that members of the Party be followers of Christian Science due to the outspoken international connections of Christian Science and he decreed that wherever double-membership exists it will have to be annulled immediately.

I request that the leaders of the organizations of the Party issue the necessary decree within the realm of their jurisdiction and also make sure that no double-membership of Christian Science and of party organizations exist.

I also request of the leaders of the affiliated organizations to make sure by issuing decrees that within their realm of jurisdiction members of the Christian Science will not hold official positions. I have no objection for members of the affiliated organizations to be members of the Christian Science.

Signed: M. Bormann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 838 PS

8 November 1945

I, GOETZ MAYER, T/5, 33812169, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 838 PS.

GOETZ MAYER, T/5
33812169

H1235-0177

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 840-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY

The Deputy of the Fuehrer

Munich 33, 14 July 1939
Brown Hans

Regulation No. 140/39

SUBJECT: Admission of Clergymen and Students of Theology into the NSDAP

In my regulation No. 24/37 dated 9 February 1937 I have decreed that in order to avoid the penetration of contrasts of ecclesiastical-political nature into the movement and to avoid the suspicion of a one-sided attitude for or against an existing denomination, the admission of members of the clergy into the Party is to be avoided. It turned out that the non-admission of members of the clergy into the Party is not sufficient for the purpose in question.

In his regulation No. 34/39 on the lifting of the restriction of memberships dated 10 May 1939 the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP has done justice to this experience by decreeing that clergymen as well as other fellow Germans who are also closely connected with the church, cannot be admitted into the Party.

In addition to this I decree that in the future Party members who enter the clergy or who turn to the study of Theology have to leave the Party. This decree does not affect those students who are matriculated mainly in other factors and, not intending to become clergymen later attend only some lectures of the theological faculties.

signed: for

BORMANN

attested:
(signature illegible)

Distribution IV b

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 840-PS

1 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-133567 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 840-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
0-133 55 67

H1235-0178

H1235-0179

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 841-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY

Fuehrer's Deputy
Chief of the Staff

MUNICH 33, the 17 Jan.1939
Brown House

S E C R E T

ORDER NO 1/39 secret.

Subject: Jews.

Upon proposal of Field-Marshal GOERING, the Fuehrer has made some basic decisions concerning the Jewish problem. I make these decisions known to you in the enclosure and request that you observe to take these directives under all circumstances.

Signed: M. BORMANN

1 Enclosure

Distrikation III b

certified
signed:(illegible)

C O P Y

PRIME MINISTER FIELD-MARSHAL
GOERING
Commissioner for four year plan

Berlin, 28. Dec. 1938

S E C R E T

Upon my proposal, the Fuehrer made the following decisions concerning the Jewishproblem:

A.

I. Housing of Jews.

1. a) The tenant protective law, as a rule is not to be abrogated for the Jews. On the contrary, it is desired, if possible, to proceed in particular cases in such a way, that the Jews are quartered togehter in separate houses in sofar as the housing conditions allow that.

   b) For this reason the aryanizing of the house ownership is to be postponed until the end of the total aryanization, that is to say, for the present, the aryanizing of houses has to be carried out only where in individual cases urgend reasons exist. The aryanizing of industries businesses, agricultural estates forests etc., is to be considered as urgent.

2. Use of steeping- and dining-cars is to be forbidden to the Jews. At the same time, no special Jewish-compartiments to be established. As well, the use of trains, street-cars, suburban-railways, underground-railways, busses and ships, can not be prohibited to the Jews.

3. Only the use of some public establishments etc., is to be prohibited to the Jews. In this category belong the hotels and restaurants visited especially by party-members (for instance: Hotel Kaiserhof - Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten - Munich; Hotel Deutscher Hof - Nuemberg, Hotel Drei Mohren - Augsburg, etc.). The use of bathing establishments, some public places, Bashing-resorts etc. can be prohibited to the Jews, also. Medicin-baths, so far as they are prescribed in particular cases by physicians, may be used by Jews, but only in such wise, that no offense is created.

II. Jews - who were officials and have been pensioned are not to be denied, their pensions. Investigations though have to be made as to whether, these jews can get along with a reduced allowances.

III. The Jewish wel-fare organizations are not to be aryanized or abolished so that the Jews do not become a public charge, but may be supported by Jewish wel-fare organizations.

IV. Jewish patents are property, and as such have to be aryanized (A similar procedure toward the Germany) was carried out by U.S.A. and other countries during World War I).

B.

Mixed marriages.

I. 1. with children (part jews 1st class)

a) If the father is a German and the mother a Jewess, this family may stay in the future in its present lodging. The regulations for exclusion of Jews are not to be applied to such families, as far as their housing is concerned.

In these cases, the property of the Jewish mother can be transfered to the German husband, or to the mixed children.

b) If the father is a jew and the mother a German, such families also, are not to be moved for the present into Jewish quarters, because the children (Part-Jews 1st class) in the future, must serve in the labor-service and the armed forces, and must not be exposed to Jewish propaganda. Concerning the property one must for the present proceed in such a way, that if can be completely or partly transfered to the children.

2. without children.

a) If the husband is a German and wife a Jewess - the provisions of 1 a) are valid accordingly.

b) If the husband is a jew, and the wife a German, these childless couples are to be proceede against as if they were fullbluded Jews. The husband's property can not be transfered to the wife. Both, husband and wife, can be moved into the Jewish houses or Jewish quarters.

Especially, in case of emigration, such married couples are to be treated as Jews, as soon as an increased emigration is gotten under way.

H1235-0181

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 841-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(Cont.)

II. If a German wife divorces a Jew - she recuters the German racial community and all disadvantages for her discontinue.

Signed:
GOERING.

certified copy
(illegible)

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 841-PS

24. November 1945

I, Charles E. BIDWELL, S/Sgt., 13146054, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 841-PS.

Charles E. BIDWELL
S/Sgt.
13146054

H1235-0182

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1395
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

1933 Reichsgesetzblatt Page 1016
1 Dec 1933

Law on securing the unity of Party and State
1 Dec. 1933.

Gesetz zur Gicherung der Ginheit von Partei und Staat, Vom 1 Dezember 1933.

The Reichs government has decided on the following law which is announced herewith:

Art 1

1) After the victory of the National Socialistic Revolution, the National Socialistic German Labor Party is the bearer of the concept of the German State and is inseperably the state.
2) It will be a part of the public law. Its organization will be determined by the Fuehrer.

Art 2.

The deputy of the Fuehrer and the Chief of Staff of the SA will become members of the Reichs government in order to insure close cooperation of the offices of the party and SA with the public authorities.

Art.3

The members of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and the SA(including their subordinate organizations. as the leading and driving force of the National Socialist State will bear greater responsibility toward Fuehrer, people and state.
2) In case they violate these duties, they will be subject to special jurisdiction by party and state.
3) The Fuehrer may extend these regulations in order to include members of other organizations.

Art 4.

Every action or neglect on the part of members of the SA(including their subordinate organizations) attacking or endangering the existence, organization, activity or reputation of the National Socialistic German Labor Party, in particular any infraction against dissipline and order, will be regarded as a violation of duty.

Art 5.

Custody and arrest may be inflicted in addition to the usual penalties.

Art 6.

The public authorities have to grant legal and administrative assistance to the offices of the Party and the SA which are entrusted with the execution of the jurisdiction of the Party and SA.

Art. 7

The law regarding the authority to inflict penalties on members of the SA and SS, of the 28 April 1933(RGBI p. 230) will be invalidated.

Art. 8

The Reichs Chancellor, as Fuehrer of the National Socialistic German Labor Party and as the supreme commander of SA will issue the regulation necessary for the execution and augmentation of this law, particularly with respect to the organization and procedure

H1235-0183

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1395-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Contd.

of the jurisdiction of the Party and SA. He will determine the time at which the regulations concerning this jurisdiction will be effective.

Berlin 1 Dec. 1933

Reichs Chancellor

Adolf Hitler

The Reichs Minister of the Interior

Frick.

- -

5 October 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt(jg) USNR, 391590 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1395-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt(jg) USNR
391590.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1409-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1938 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 1709

Order concerning the Utilization of Jewish Property of 3 December 1938

Verordnung über den Einsatz des judischen Vermögens vom 3. Dezember 1938

On the basis of Article 1 of the Second Regulation by the Administrator for the Four Year Plan based on the Decree of November 24, 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl. I 1668), the following is decreed in cooperation with the competent Reich Ministers:

Chapter 1

Industrial Enterprises

Article 1

The owner of a Jewish industrial enterprise (Third Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938, RGBl I 627) may be ordered to sell or liquidate the enterprise within a definite time. Certain conditions may be stipulated in the order.

Article 2

1) A trustee may be appointed for Jewish industrial enterprises, the owners of which have been ordered to sell or liquidate (Article 1), for the temporary continuation of the enterprise and for the completion of the sale or liquidation, especially if the owner of the enterprise has not complied with the order within the definite period and his application for an extension of time has been rejected.

2) The trustee is empowered to undertake all judicial and extrajudicial actions and legal measures, which the business of the enterprise, its liquidation or sale require. His authority replaces any legally required power of attorney.

3) The trustee must exercise the care of a responsible businessman and is subject to State control.

4) The owner of the enterprise is to pay the expenses of the trustee in connection with his work.

Article 3

1) The owner of the Jewish industrial enterprise is to be notified of the instructions specified in Articles 1 and 2.

2) In case of absence of the person affected, notification may take place through publication in the Deutsche Reichsanzeiger and Preussische Staatsanzeiger. In these cases the day of publication is to be considered the day of notification.

Article 4

As soon as the owner of the enterprise is notified of the order through which a trustee is appointed according to Article 2, he loses the right to dispose of the property for the administration of which the trustee has been appointed. He regains this right only if the appointment of the trustee expires.

Article 5

The consent for the sale according to Article 1 of the Decree based on the Decree of April 26, 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl I, 415) is necessary also in such cases in which the sale has been ordered; this also applies to the sale by a trustee.

H1235-0184

H1235-0185

Chapter II

Land and Forest Enterprises
Real Estate and other Property

Article 6

A Jew (Article 5 of the First Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935)(RGBl I, 1333), may be ordered to sell wholly or partly his land or forest enterprise, his other land or forest properties, his other real estate or other properties within a definite time. Certain conditions may be stipulated in the order. The regulations of Article 2 to 4 are to be applied accordingly.

Article 7

1) Jews cannot legally acquire real estate and mortgages.

2) The regulations of Article 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the Decrees based on the Decree of 26 April 1938, for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl I, 415) are to be applied accordingly.

3) At the foreclosure of real estate, the court ordering such sale must reject bids if there is reason to suspect that the bidder is a Jew.

4) The rejection according to Paragraph 3 loses its force if the bidder protests against it immediately (Article 72, Paragraph 2 of the Law Regarding Foreclosure) and if he proves that he is not a Jew.

5) If, as is provided in (4) the bidder protests the rejection of an offer, the decision on the public adjudication must not be made before two weeks after the conclusion of the auction.

Article 8

1) Jews require authorization to dispose of real estate and mortgages. They require authorization to dispose of other property if the sale has been ordered according to Section 6 of this decree. This also applies in the case of a trustee disposing of said property.

2) The regulations of (1) also apply to contracts in which an obligation to sell is assumed.

3) The regulations of Article 1 (2) and Article 2 of the Regulation under the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property (RGBl. I, 415) are to be applied accordingly. In disposing of immovable property, the regulations of Articles 4, 5 and 6 of said Decree are also to be applied accordingly.

4) In case of foreclosure of a piece of land, the bidder requires authorization for his bid; a bid for which the necessary authorization is not proven immediately is to be rejected. Where the Reich Law regarding Foreclosure and Forced Administration is in force, in cases of Article 81, (2) of said law, public adjudication to a person other than the highest bidder is permissible only if the person can prove that consent was given for this deal.

Article 9

1) The authorization according to Article 8 replaces those authorizations required according to the Regulation regarding Traffic in Real Estate of 26 January 1937 (RGBl I, 35), the Settlements (RGBl I, 659), the First Decree for the Execution of the Law of 17 August 1937, Regarding the Protection of the Reich Frontiers and Reprisals (RGBl I, 905) as well as according to price fixing regulations.

2) At the sale of land or forest enterprises or the granting of usufruct in such enterprises, the authorization according to Article 8 replaces the authorization according to Article 1 of the decree based on the Decree of 26 April 1938 for the Reporting of Jewish-owned Property.

H1235-0186

Article 10

1) If a Jew sells a piece of land which is situated within the confines of Berlin, the Reich Capital Berlin has a right of preemption for the purpose of carrying out the measures of the General Building Inspector for the rebuilding of the City.

2) Articles 12 and 13 of the Decree of 5 November 1937 Regarding the Reconstruction of the Reich Capital Berlin (RGBl I, 1162) are to be applied accordingly.

3) The right of preemption does not exist if the Reich, one of the German States, or the National Socialist Party is involved in the legal transaction as a buyer.

Chapter III

Compulsory Deposit of Securities

Article 11

1) Within a week after this decree goes into effect, Jews must deposit all their stocks, shares in mines, bonds, and similar securities at a foreign exchange bank. New securities must be deposited within a week after their acquisition. The holder of securities belonging to a Jew may not deliver them to anyone but a foreign exchange bank for the account of the Jew.

2) Insofar as securities are already deposited at a foreign exchange bank on behalf of Jews or titles registered or coupons deposited with an administrative authority for which preferred annuities will be granted, the Jews must immediately notify the said bank, the Administration of Public Loans or the administrative authority by a written declaration of the fact that they are Jews. In case of (1) Sentence 3, this declaration must be made to the said holder.

3) The deposits and the registered titles are to be marked as Jewish.

Article 12

The disposing of securities deposited as Jewish, as well as the release of such securities require the consent of the Reich Minister of Economics or an authority named by him.

Article 13

The provisions of Articles 11 and 12 do not apply to foreign Jews.

Chapter IV

Jewels, Gems and Objects of Art

Article 14

1) Jews are forbidden to acquire, pawn or sell objects of gold, platinum or silver as well as precious stones and pearls. Such objects, except in the case of existence of attachments on behalf of a non-Jewish creditor at the time when this decree goes into effect may only be acquired by public purchasing offices, established by the Reich. The same applies to other jewels and objects of art insofar as the price of the individual objects exceeds one thousand Reichsmarks.

2) The provisions of (1) does not apply to foreign Jews.

Chapter V

General Regulations

Article 15

1) The authorization for the sale of Jewish enterprises, Jewish real estate, or other Jewish property can be given under conditions that may consist in the payment of money by the buyer on behalf of the Reich.

2) Authorizations of the kind mentioned in Paragraph 1 may also be granted with the proviso that the Jewish seller is to receive obligations of the German Reich or registered titles against the German Reich instead of the total or partial consideration as provided for in the sales contract.

Article 16

The regulations specified for Jews in Article II also apply to industrial enterprises as well as organizations, foundations, institutions, and other enterprises which are not industrial, insofar as they are to be considered Jewish according to the Third Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 14 June 1938 (RGBl I, 627).

Article 17

1) The higher administrative authorities are qualified to issue instructions based on the regulations of Article I and II insofar as the special provisions of Paragraphs 3 and 4 (Note of translator: "and 4" lined out in original) are not to be applied. The higher administrative authorities are also to supervise the appointed trustees.

2) Section 6 of the Decree of 26 April 1938 determines which authorities are higher administrative authorities within the meaning of this Decree Regarding the Registration of Jewish Property (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 414) with the proviso that the following authorities are qualified:

In Anhalt - the Anhalt State Ministry, Department of Economics;

In Baden - the Baden Minister of Finance and Economics;

In Wuerttemberg - the Wuerttemberg Minister of Economics;

In Austria - the Reich Commissar for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich or the authorities named by him;

In the Sudeten German territories - the Government Presidents.

3) Insofar as it is a question of agricultural property, the Oberpraesident in Prussia (Agricultural Department) and the Higher Settlement Authorities in the non-Prussian States take the place of the higher administrative authorities. Insofar as it is a question of forest property, the Higher Forest Authorities take the place of the higher administrative authorities.

/ Articles 18 to 23 are not necessary for understanding of law /

Article 24

This decree goes into effect on the day of publication.

Berlin, 3 December 1938

Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
Walther Funk
Reich Minister of Interior
Frick

- - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1409-PS

1 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1409-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567

H1235-0187

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1422-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0188

1943 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 372

Thirteenth Regulation under the Reich Citizenship Law of 1 July 1943

Dreizehnte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz vom 1. Juli 1943

Under Article 3 of the Reich Citizenship Law of September 15, 1935 (RGBl I 1146) the following is ordered:

Article 1

1) Criminal actions committed by Jews shall be punished by the police.

2) The provision of the Polish penal laws of 4 December 1941 (RGBl I 759) shall no longer apply to Jews.

Article 2

1) The property of a Jew shall be confiscated by the Reich after his death.

2) The Reich may, however, grant compensation to the non-Jewish legal heirs and persons entitled to sustenance who have their domocile in Germany.

3) This compensation may be granted in the form of a lump sum, not to exceed the ceiling price of the property which has passed into possession (Verfügungsgewalt) of the German Reich.

4) Compensation may be granted by the transfer of titles and assets from the confiscated property. No costs shall be imposed for the legal processes necessary for such transfer.

Article 3

The Reich Minister of the Interior with the concurrence of the participating higher authorities of the Reich shall issue the legal and administrative provisions for the administration and enforcement of this regulation. In doing so he shall determine to what extent the provisions shall apply to Jewish nationals of foreign countries.

Article 4

This regulation shall take effect on the seventh day of its promulgation. In the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia it shall apply where German administration and German courts have jurisdiction; Article 2 shall also apply to Jews who are citizens of the Protectorate.

Berlin, 1 July 1943

The Reich Minister of the Interior
Frick
Chief of the Party Chancellery
M. Bormann
Reich Minister of Finance
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Thierack

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1422-PS

4 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1422-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
O-1335567.

H1235-0189

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NOTES

about a discussion with the FUEHRER
at the Fuehrer Headquarters on the 8th May 1942.

Present at first Reich Minister Dr, Lammers.

I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the N.S.D.A.P. of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 Million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.

Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the "inrormation service" of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked about the "Policy of Colonisation" in the East. - Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 Officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reenforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.

As regards the re-settlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be re-settled again. I told the Fuehrer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life.

At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which , as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called "Green Folder" of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans.

Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused me to grant self-administration to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my decree to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In praxis it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safet clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception has been made with Riga. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be

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avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration.

We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.

Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economic management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO (Zentralhandelsges. Ost-Eastern Central Trade) are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. LAMMERS interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the whole question examined once again.

Then the problem of <u>religious freedom</u> for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter BORMANN, who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises.. BORMANN entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under "religious freedom" was to be interpreted <u>by the Churches,</u> and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its uitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled <u>by myself</u> in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that theleaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the "Atheist Museum". In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, SCHEWTSCHENKO, are quoted and it may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language inan sense which in truth was not for the church. Also Such freedom

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of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphazised that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out churchpolitical lectures in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary idealogical fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.

Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany's wards was discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing ment the same as for the Orientals "the losing of face." Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prosoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know hwo to keep silent. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.

I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the three delegations of farmers in grateful acknowledgement of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ukranian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.

I then dealt with the employmentoof foreign workers in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister LARSEN had travelled the Eastland with the General-Director JUNKER who was the chief of the Danism committee for employment in the East. This jouney already had produced tangible, practical results: in Fort Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be delivered with in a few weeks. After an initial starting time about 75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two experts had to be sentttthere, and within a few weeks one could start with the installations. The same applies to a large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings are also being considered. Especially the oilfactory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch, and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch

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people in the region of Libau. It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to by cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled. The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigate, Moreover the DAF German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the building of concrete ships.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their emmisaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.

Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and the policy of the AA. (Foreign Ministry) towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with us. According to my information received from the manager of chief section "Policy", the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has learned the Turkestan languages, and the Trukestans have accepted German military terms and have an anti-Bolshewist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples "Asiatics", had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against those designes, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a panturanian movement towards the East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.

I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise, I said that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. BINZING and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the AA. (Foreign Ministry). The AA. then created for him a seperate department for planning and appointed him to be a Regierungsrat (Advisor of the Government).

It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the case of the Turkestanian KAYUM. The questions had long been discussed with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA. for the

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purpose of broadcasting propaganda. Now the A.A. was sending him to Paris, in order to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to the Reich Minister Dr. LAMMERS, to inform the A.A. officially that it had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked to State Secretary v. WEIZSAECKER a few weeks ago and requested him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to speaking to him personally. WEIZSAECKER said that the two points of view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he said that he did not understand from this talk that he was to arrange the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this remark that the matter was to be put off until after the congress of emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed by a liaison man of the A.A. that they did not at all consider the attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private character. The Fuehrer once more emphazised his point of view.

I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used in Germany, the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities. The tasks of Reich Minister SPEER and his relationship with me, were then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example 3 had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions resulted, if the entire administration of railroad traffic had not been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has control, and SPEER already proved at the beginning of his officials duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice. I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to SPEER from the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that is that this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the war and secondly, that the departmental Chief of the O.T. (Organistion Todt), who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.

The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry SPEER would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate wareffort. Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which are not war essential. Dr. LAMMERS suggested to include by way of agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer

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the present general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration of the commissioner in chief, with the result that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be - to use their own phrase - deported. Those men would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners in chief, these conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister SPEER would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation would worsen very decisive by. The Fuehrer listened to the report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree for SPEER, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happend, and he instructed Dr. LAMMERS, that he was to reject such demands on the Fuehrer's orders.

Dr. LAMMERS was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich Minister SPEER in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to myself for the duration of the war.

In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms of the occupied territories. - I reported to him the results of the exhibition in Algier, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the exhibition "Fight for EUROPE".-

The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future complications the bearer of the EK (iron cross) might have to be subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explainde that soldiers of the Baltic nations - according to many utterances - looked upon an award as a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

the skimming of nationalistic forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.

I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official journeyyinto the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the fesults of metal collection in the Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.

I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of the N.S.D.A.P. since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from 1943 on more than 100,000 ha willlibe worked. The harvest will then provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from (synthetic rubber production.

During the report I turned the converstion toward the planning departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party member GRANZ who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. LAMMERS was of the opinion that one could not start fight away with the highest ranks. If GRANZ was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was it a question of appointing the major Cranz, but of the jurnalist who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations with the Reich Commissioner. This was not an ordinary Special department ministry (Ressortministerium), but it had other, far more extended tasks! The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not mich in favorto create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because Dr. LAMMERS had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had made special propositions. I then requested Dr. LAMMERS to give me his support in this matter.

Berlin,
13th May 1942.
R/H.

Signed: R.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 1520-PS

26 November 1945.

I, ERNST M. COHN, pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and the the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1520-PS.

pfc ERNST COHN
33925738

Exhibit USA 690
Filed Jan 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden

The Director. Dresden-A1, 1 June 1940.

To: Ministerialrat Dr. Hanssen
Berlin W 8
Wilhenmstr. 64

Dear Ministerialrat!

Permit me to express my thanks for having sent me the copy of the letter of the State Secretary Dr. Landfried.

I herewith enclose a copy of my letter of 16 March 1940 to Reichsleiter Bormann, referring mainly to the confiscated property of the convents in the Ostmark. In accordance with the Fuhrers decree on Jewish property, a generally applicable procedure may be recommended in this case, too; the Fuhrer should have the final word in the distribution to the individual consumers, rather the first option on any purchase (this regulation should be made to be retroactive as of the time of the assumption of power if possible.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully
H. Posse.

1 enclosure.

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RL.M.B. At present the Fuhrer's HQ, 16 Jan 41
Bo/Fu

1) Director Dr. Posse
Dresden-Hellerau

Personal!

Registered!

Tunnigtweg 14

Dear Dr. Posse!

Enclosed herewith I am sending you the pictures of the altar from the convent in Hohenfurther near Kruman. The convent and its entire property shall be confiscated in the immediate future because of the attitude, hostile towards the State, of its inhabitants.

It shall be up to you to decide whether the pictures shall remain in the convent at Hohenfurth or be transferred to the museum in Linz after the latter shall be completed

I await your decision in the matter.

Heil Hitler!

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures. (initialed by Bormann)

2) Presented again: 3 May 1941.

H1235-0196

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

The State-Picture Gallery in Dresden.

The Director. Dresden-A1, 16 May 1941

The Reichsleiter Martin Bormann,
Berlin W 8
Wilhelmstr. 64

Personal!

Dear Reichsleiter!

I report that I have returned today from a weeks trip to Oberdonau and Vienna. Besides checking on the confiscated convents and monasteries, the main reason for my trip to Linz and Oberdonau was to find out whether any of the confiscated convents offered facilities suitable for temporarily storing the collections acquired by the Fuhrer.

After having seen the convents at Hohenfurth, St. Florian, Krenesmunster, Schloegel, Wilhering etc., and after having discussed the matter with Gauleiter Eigruber and his deputies, I found that the convent in Krenesmunster is extremely suited for this purpose. There are in this convent 50-60 rooms that can be locked; the various new acquisitions can be stored there temporarily. There is also the "Emperor's Stall" there, 25 m long, and a flight of 7 rooms in good shape, at present the picture-gallery of the convent, not very valuable, is on exposition. From time to time, the newly acquired collections may be presented to the Fuhrer there.

Krenesmunster is situated in the woods, far away from industrial area; therefore, a threat from the air hardly exists.

In case the Fuhrer should agree with the proposal to have Krenesmunster as a depot for Linz, it is suggested that the Germans from Bessarabia who are at present living in the convent, be moved into another convent, in order to safeguard the stocks, particularly against fire.

Therefore, I beg to have the Fuhrer state his intentions regarding their proposal which is also supported by Gauleiter Eigruber not only is the collection Lanz in Amsterdam, packed in the meantime, awaiting, also several other collections of paintings for which there'd hardly be space enough in Munich, are ready, and so is Dr. Topfer's library which was bought in Switzerland. Also the very rich stocks, already packed and stored in Vienna, confiscated from Jewish owners, and many new acquitions from Vienna could be brought to Krenesmunster. This way, room could be made in Vienna and what remains of confiscated art-treasures could be distributed.

Heil Hitler!

Yours faithfully

H. Posse.

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Report on the trip, undertaken on orders to Cracow and Warsaw, so as to ascertain the kind and the amount of confiscated art-treasures.

It was impossible to carry out the order as such, as well as that part of it which drafting of a plan as to how to dispose of the confiscated art treasures, since most of them were still packed away in cases and were either stored in Cracow, or in other places, particularly in Warsaw ready for shipment to Cracow.

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H1235-0198

Since 6 October, under the direction of Understate secretary Dr. Muhlmann, as the special deputy of General Field Marshall Goering and as the Director of the Department of Science and Training, the storing of all the valuable Art treasures has been in full swing with assistance of suitable experts from Berlin, Vienna, and Breslan, and, so far as I could determine it has been almost completely carried out.

Works of art and culture, mainly from Warsaw were saved, particularly from the badly damaged chateau of the Kings whose furniture and interior decorations were salvaged to a large extent. In Crawcow, box-cars containing the works of art secured from public, clerical and private ownership arrived almost daily. The Art treasures are being collected in the particularly suitable building of the Jagellonic Library in Carcow and are being set up there properly, a task which may be finished by February 1940. As soon as the task of collecting shall be finished and an inventory is made so that a complete survey of the entire valuable Polish Art-treasure can be made, I shall again travel to Cracow so as to carry out the order given me.

The official pictorial service is photographing all important works of art little by little. The governor general shall present these pictures in one form of a photo-Album to the Fuhrer.

I was able to gain some knowledge on the public and private collections as well as clerical property in Cracow and Warsaw. It is true that we cannot hope too much to enrich ourselves from the acquisition of great Art works of paintings and sculptures there with the exception of the Veit Stoss-altar and the plates of Hans von Kulmbach in the Church of Maria in Cracow, the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt from the collection Czarborpki and several other works from the National Museum in Warsaw--works of a rather high value of whose existence we in Germany had already known. Richer and more extensive is the Polish stock of "objects d'art", such as handicraft in gold and silver of German origin to a large part, particularly from the Church of Maria and the cathedral of Wawel) Tapestries, arms, porcellans, furniture, bronzes, coins, valuable parchment-scrips, books etc. Those were the principle fields of interest for Polish collectors. besides their interest in Polish National Art, particularly of the 19th century. It is characteristic that apart from original paintings so many copies can be found in Polish castles and private collections (for example Czartoryski, Wilano etc). However, many thousand works of art of all kinds ought to be found in the Jagellonic Library.

As I said before, I shall not be able to make proposals regarding the distribution as long as an inventory of the entire material does not exist. However, I should like to reserve for the museum in Linz the three most important paintings of the Czartoryski collection, namely the Raffael, Leonardo and Rembrandt which are at present in the Kaiser-Frederick Museum in Berlin. We in Dresden are particularly interested in the interior decorations of the castle of the Kings in Warsaw since Saxonian architects and artists have created them; therefore, the suggestion is made that the salvaged parts of it (panellings-, doors, inlaid floors, sculpturs, mirrors, glass-chandeliers, porcellans etc) be used for the interior decoration of the Pavillion of the "Zivinges" in Dresden.

A number of fine drawings of Albrecht Durer's and other old German masters kept in the Ossolineum in Lemberg, has fallen into Russian hands. Maybe at least Durer's 27 pieces could still be salvaged for Germany.

While in Warsaw, a Polish collegue of mine whom I have known, for quite some time told me that the storing of the art treasures was begun already in June 1939; by the end of July the entire official museum property was packed in cases and ready for shipment. In spite of that the Poles did not manage to carry any important stocks away and save them for themselves, with the exception of the famous tapestry, collection of Wawel, the riding costumes kept also ther, arms and historically valuable pieces like the

blood-banner of the Prophet which, as far as I could ascertain, fell into Russian hands.

/s/ Hans Posse.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1600-PS

11 Oct. 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, LT(jg) USNR 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 1600-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
LT(jg) USNR
391590

H1235-0199

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 172
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COU

H1235-0200

EXTRACT FROM VERFUEGUNGEN
ANORDNUNGEN BEKANNTGABEN
P.430-39

Security Police

Cooperation of the Party offices with the Secret State Police (Gestapo).

In a summary of all the previously issued decrees on the cooperation between the Party and the Gestapo I refer to the following and ordain:

1. To the Gestapo has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds directed against both. The successful solution of this mission forms one of the most essential pre-requisites for the unhampered and frictionless work of the Party. The Gestapo, in their extremely difficult task, is to be granted support and assistance in every possible way by the NSDAP. The supervision of the Party itself does not come under the jurisdiction of the Gestapo.

I prohibit all offices of the Party, its organisations and associated groups to conduct investigations and interrogations regarding affairs which concern the Gestapo only. All occurrences of a political criminalistic nature are to be reported without prejudice along Party channels and as ever brought to the knowledge of the Gestapo immediately.

2. The secret state police must report automatically all occurrences of a criminal nature, even if it includes Party Members, to the responsible public prosecutor according to the laws of the National Socialist State, in force for all nationals. In such cases, the State police offices will notify, as before, the county and Gauleiters concerned, of the reports made to the public prosecutor. Reports will include reasons for the incidents. In the interest of the movement the functionaries (Hoheitstrager) are obliged to suspend, if necessary, the party members, after contacting the responsible Party Court; the latter will hold a public hearing, to decide on the temporary suspension.

Invitation of the leaders of offices in the Security Police and the Security Service to attend Party meetings.

In order to establish closer connections between all the offices of the Party and their organisations and the office leaders of the Security Police and SD, the leader of the Party Chancellory asks that they should be invited in the future to all large official meetings of the Party.

The taking over of political offices by officials of the Gestapo.

The Secret State Police has the mission to safeguard the unhampered development of all forces active in the party and released by it in the National Socialistic State.

Since it is still in a state of being organised and the available officials and employees are very much in demand they are only to be employed in order to take over positions in the Party in as much as it is compatible with their official duties in the Secret State Police.

I, therefore, ask to check in every single case and in close harmony with the department of the Secret State Police concerned, whose leader welcomes the taking over of political functions by officials and employees of the Secret State Police, whether the transfer of political missions into the Party can be justified

in the interest of the official obligations of the Secret State Police.

Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices

The Chief of the Security Police and SD has issued the annexed decrees of 29 March 1940 and 4 November 1940. It is ordered herewith that departments of the Secret State Police will be obliged to execute the presentation request when the same emanates from the Reichsleiters or the Gauleiters. If the request for presentation originates from subordinate departments of the party it will only be granted if particular interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.

In the future the county (Kreis) administration and local (ORT) administrations are to direct all requests through the district (Gau) administration to the responsible department of the Secret State police.

Berlin, 29 March 194

The Chief of the Security Police and SD

I A 1 NR. 102/40 - 176

To all State police departments

By way of information to the Inspectors of the Security Po. and SD.

Subject: Presentation to the State Police upon request by Party offices.

Repeated requests by Party offices for presentation to the State Police of Volksgenossen who did not heed the summons of the Party offices, cause the following regulatio to be decreed:

1. If the district administration makes the reques the same is to be granted as long as no important interest of the State Police interfere.

2. If a party office subordinate to the district administration requests the presentation, the same has to b denied in as far as no important interests of the State Police seem to warrant a presentation.

Signed: HEYDRICH

Verified: SCHOENBRUNN OF THE CHANCELLORY

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H1235-0203

The Chief of the Security Police and SD

IB 1 NR 763/40 - 151 Berlin SW 11 4 November 19[illegible]

To All State Police Departments

By way of information

to the Inspectors of the Security Police and SD

SUBJECT: Presentation to State Police upon request of Party Offices

Reference: Decree of 29 March 1940 IA 1 NR 102/40 - 176

In supplement to my decree of 29 March 1940 I order that presentation requests by Reichsleiters be granted in so far as important interests of the State Police do not interfere.

Signed: HEYDRICH

Protective Custody

Protective custody must be viewed as the strongest measure in order to impressively instruct the Volksgenossen, who maliciously neglect their duties toward the community or endanger the security of the State, that they have to conform themselves to the universal interests and to adapt themselves to State discipline. Therefore it should only serve as a means of combatting real enemies of the Reich, but should never be used for the clarification or punishment of different or insignificant offenses.

An excessive use of protective custody, as well as its infliction without previous indispensable clarification of the state of affairs and the question of guilt is neither justified with regard to the future of the one involved nor with respect to the reduction of its moral effect.

Therefore it must be expected that protective custody is only to be employed in really pressing and substantial cases.

I request that the county leaders be instructed orally to avoid any written communications; special emphasis on secrecy.

Protective Custody (Regulations)

Through the circular of the 25 January 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior has issued new regulations regarding the introduction of protective custody. In the following, I announce the wording of this decree for confidential information.

The Reich Minister of the Interior Berlin 25 Jan. 1938

The following regulations regarding protective custody go into effect on the 1 February 1938. At the same time, these are rescinded:

a. My decree of 12 April 1934 - I 3311 A/28.2 along with the supplement of 26 April 1934 and 10 July 1934 (directed to governments of the states and to the Reich statthalters).

b. My decree of 12 April 1935 - VI B 757A/3014 along with the supplementary decree of 1 June 1935 VI B 11568/3014 (directed to the governments of the states, Reichstatthalter, Prussian presidents of government districts).

c. My decree of 17 June 1935 - III P 3311/329 (directed to the state government and the Reichstatthalter.

d. The decree of office of Secret State Police of 3 July 1934 - B Nr. 19582 II I D (directed to the presidents of the Prussian government districts).

e. The decree of the Political Police Commander of the Lands of the 9 Sept 1935 - B. Nr. 37840/35 II 1 D (directed to the Political police of the states and the Prussian State Police offices).

Article I

Admissibility

Protective custody can be decreed as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who endanger the

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security of the people and the state through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and state.

Protective Custody shall not be decreed for penal purposes or as a substitute for punitive arrest. Punishable offenses have to be decided finally by the courts.

Article 2

Competence

1. The Secret State Police exclusively is competent for the application of protective custody.

2. Motions in behalf of the application of protective custod have to be directed to the Secret State police through the State police offices. Every motion has to be substantiated detail; the statements of the arrested person have to be considered in it. A copy of the hearing of the person temporari apprehended has to be forwarded immediately.

3. Protective custody may only be inflicted if the accused previously had a hearing on offenses imputed to him.

Article 3

Temporary Arrest

1. The Secret State police bureau, the offices of the State police director and of the State Police are authorized under the provisions of par 1 to order the temporary arrest of persons:

a. If it is feared that the freedom will be abused for activities hostile to the state.

b. If danger of under-cover activities exists.

c. If there is suspicion of escape.

2. The accused has to be notified at the latest within 24 hours after the arrest. He is to be heard on the grounds for the infliction of the temporary arrest according to protoc

3. A temporarily arrested person has to be released at the latest after an elapse of 10 days from the day of apprehension if the Secret State police bureau has in the meantime not decreed protective custody (5).

.....

Article 6

Execution

The protective custody has to be executed generally in the State Concentration Camps.

Article 7

Duration

1. Protective custody shall only be upheld as long as it serv its purpose.

2. The Secret State police bureau authorizes release from protective custody. For that reason the bureau investigates periodically but not exceeding 3 months, whether the protective custody should be cancelled. The release must have taken

place, at the latest, on the third day after the lifting of th protective custody.

Article 8

Foreigners

As a matter of principle deportation proceedure has to be carried out against foreigners who have been taken into protective custody unless particular reasons interfere.

Article 9

Executory Regulations

The Chief of the Security Police issues the necessary regulations for the execution.

5 October 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 1723-PS

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf
0-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOC. NO. 1815-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

R.S.H.A.
IV B I

Berlin 12 May 1941

To all

Staatspolizei-leit-stellen

For Information - The SD-Leit-Abschnitten
The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD

Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics

The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by the Stapostellen. (see the plan for the division of work issued by the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus take over the entire 'Gegnernachrichtendienst' in this sphere.

In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that 'Church Specialists' hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political Sphere) there.

On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching agreement with the heads of Amts III, II and I, those 'Church Specialists' specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I. Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-'Specialists' must immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable for Nachrichtendienst work.

The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that 'Nachrichtendienst' files concerning Church Political Opposition, hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of making copies or photostats of these reports.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0208

Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility of loopholes, I am endeavouring to ensure that the change-over in organisation should take place immediately.

On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion of the actual change-over of organisation, and, at the same time, draw up a list of personnel, giving the names of those 'Specialists' who, after the re-organisation, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen, and of those who are conducting the intelligence paper of the Nachrichtendienst.

I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to an 'Arbeitstagung' (conference) in Berlin at which they will receive important instructions for the carrying-out of their work.

Signed MÜLLER

Beglaubigt:
Kanzleiangestellte

(p.1 through 2 in original file)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1815-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Aachen, 26 September 1941.

Report of Regierungsrat ROTH's speech
before Conference dated 26 September 1941

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Sicherheitspolizei measures for combatting Church Politics and Sects

While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed.

a) Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing. Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo.

b) It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedure. Owing to the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The so-called "Agitator-Priests" must therefore be dealt with in future by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the R.S.H.A.

c) Offences and crimes against the "Sammlungsgesetz" (Order to contribute to Party Funds) and the "Flaggenerlass" (Order to beflag Churches etc.,) come under normal procedure. (A pencilled note states that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in question).

d) The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness of the case - as follows:

1) Warnung (Warning)
2) Sicherungsgeld (Fine)
3) Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach)
4) Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish)
5) Betätigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest)
6) Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest)
7) Schutzhaft (Protective custody)

The instructions for the application of individual measures are known. The following points must be remembered:

The Aufenthaltsverbot (forbidden to remain in parish) is very much feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the R.S.H.A. for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather place the priest under short-term arrest. The "Aufenthaltsverbot" is to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and disquiet among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle).

Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a

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measure against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and preach much injurious matter.

Betätigungsverbot (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet been applied, but is possible.

Schutzhaft (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance with the Order issued by the R.S.H.A. on 24.8.36 the "Agitator Priest" is to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I's responsibility to present the charges.

Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of funds. Proposals for "Declaration of Enmity to People and State" with the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed to the R.S.H.A., which works non-executively, and directs the necessary negotiations with the MdI.

Monasteries/Convents.
It is not expected at the present that they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process of "Dissolution" it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36 suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that the Order of 28.2.33. should be quoted, and it will only be brought up if the Stapo measures are to come under "legal justification" (Betätigungsverbot 4).

Actions against Monasteries/Convents.
About 100 monasteries in the Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have lead to disagreeable consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the Aktionsleiter (Officer in charge of the proceedings).

Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it should be avoided. The principle to be followed during the period of "Sicherstellung" is that life should go on within the framework of an ordered administration.

Further points made were:

Retreats, recreational organisations, etc., may now be forbidden on grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly activity could be given as a basis.

Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle. Church organisations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the black-out regulations.

Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the over-burdened transport conditions. For local events too technical traffic troubles and the danger of air-attack may serve as grounds for their prohibition (One Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of it wearing out shoe-leather).

There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Con-

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b) The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an "Action", the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are of especial significance.

c) The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally.

d) In order to ensure that the Nachrichterdienst organisation is as comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy.

9) It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vatican - other than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this.

10) The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to extract the names of those Papal "Protonotare", Chamberlains, Prelates, and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties. Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they are employed as "agents" to and from the Vatican.

11) Reports are also to be submitted on those Theological students destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these Institutes, in the guise of a Theological Student, we should received immediate notification.

(signed) gez. HEYDRICH

Attested:

KLANN (?)
Chancellory Clerk

(The foregoing is a translation of Pages 31 thru 33 of Document No. 1815-PS)

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fessional literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional publications.

Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above all, not to the "Aufbaugebiet".

In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the R.S.H.A., in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services.

The R.S.H.A. requests that questions of policy should be submitted to them, but that, on ther other hand, they should not be bothered with unnecessary inquiries. Above all definite proposals on how to handle the case in questions should always be given, and not just requests for direction or decision.

The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it has lost.

The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained through Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existance.

(signed) HAMMES

Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr.

(The foregoing is a translation of pages No. 12 thru 15 of Document No. 1815-PS)

H1235-0212

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO.1815-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Reichssicherheitshauptamt

Berlin, 22 October 1941

IV B 1 - 2744/41 g

To all Stapostellen

For Information to:

a) The Fuhrers of all SD-(Leit)Abschnitte
b) To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
c) To the "Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU"
d) To the "Kommandeure der Sipo/SD - KRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.

Concerning - Present Conditions within the Organisation of the Catholic Church.

Enclosure - I Report.

Minute

I am enclosing a report on the present position of the Organisation of the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for:

a) The education of the appropriate Specialist.
b) To aid "Nachrichtendienst" activity.

The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst activity:

1) If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice-versa, we should be informed.

2) It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orders, and Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome. Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of reporting through V-Männer.

3) If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with Stapo action.

4) Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and Nuncio, or the Bishops and the "Instanzen" subordinate to them, this is to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes.

5) Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop candidates.

6) If not already known, it must be found out with what particular department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there is a Bishop entrusted with special duties - (The Bishop of Berlin with Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with "Jugendseelsorge", the Archbishop of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work connected with the Church in the Eastern regions...etc...) have Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance.

7) Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the R.S.H.A.

8) The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst activity -

a) In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the appropriate Ordinarists are engaged.

H1235-0213

summed up the most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He summarized the culminating points as follows:

1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church and its establishments.
2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/ convents, including "camouflaged" measures of this type.
3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases the decision of the Fuhrer will be sought.
4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won.
5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Fuhrer's instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in no way sufficient for the intorudction of decisive measures.

The "Nachrichtennetz" is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is attached to contacts between Church circles and "Staatsstellen."

The lecturer closed with the following words:

"Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made everywhere. The main thing is that that the enemy should be constantly tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative."

(signed) HEINZE — Kriminal-Secretär

(signed) HAMMES — Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr.

(The foregoing is a translation of pages No. 10 and 11 of Document No. 1815-PS)

H1235-0214

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 1135-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Aachen, 8 October 1941

Report of Hammes on Conference dated
8 October 1941 at Aachen.

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Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen.

On the 22nd and 23rd September 1941 a Conference of Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture-Hall of the R.S.HA in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part.

I. On 22. 9. 1941

1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, and our outstanding tasks at this moment - SS-Stubaf. HARTL

2. Sipo measures for combatting the Political Church and Sects, - Regierungsrat ROTU & Reg.Ass. HANNENBUCH

3. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism in the Reich - SS-Ostuf. KUNZE

4. Vatican world-politics, and our nachrichtendienst tasks - SS - Untersturmführer JAKOBS.

II. On 23. 9. 1941

5. Present conditions within the German Protestant Church - SS - Obersturmführer STILLER.

6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combatting of Sects -- SS - Hauptscharführer EHRHARDT.

7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford Movement - Nachrichtendienst work evolving from these subjects -- SS - Obersturmführer STILLER.

8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and Nachrichtendienst measures - SS - Untersturmführer WANDESLEBEN.

9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of Freemasonry - SS - Hauptsturmführer KOLREP.

10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church Political opposition - SS - Sturmbannführer HARTL.

I

In the absence of SS-Obergruppenfuhrer HEYDRICH, the Conference was opened by SS-Brigadeführer MULLER, who, after a short speech of welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most important lectures - those under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down and filed.

The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the Specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the best of their ability.

Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally SS-Stub. HARTL, also deputising for the absent HEYDRICH,

H1235-0215

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

R.S.H.A.
IV B

Berlin 14.8.1941

To all Stapo-leit-stellen
Information: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD
Concerning: Conference of the 'Kirchenbearbeiter' (Specialists in Church Affairs) attached to the Stapostellen.

On 22nd and 23rd of September 1941 a Conference for Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW 11. Date of Arrival: 21.9.41. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots.

I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they send those officials responsible for the entire 'Kirchenbearbeitung' (Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches (SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must have their names sent in before 10.9.1941, in order that accomodation may be found for them. Billetting-forms will be issued on arrival in Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to be given up at the entrace of the lecture-hall at the opening of the conference at 9 hrs. - 22.9.41.

H e y d r i c h

Beglaubigt:
Kanzleiangestellte

Notification signed HEYDRICH of conference in Berlin 22 and 23 September, 1941 for church specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen

(Page 6 in original document)

H1235-0217

1816-PS

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT

OF THE MEETING ON "THE JEWISH QUESTION"

UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL

GOERING

IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE

(12 November 1938--11 O'clock.)

- -

Office of the U.S.Chief of Counsel

Stenographic Report on a part of the Conference on the Jewish Question under the presidency of Fieldmarshall Goering at the Reich Ministry for Air on 12 November 1938--11 O'clock.

Goering: Gentlemen! Today's meeting is of a decisive nature. I have received a letter written on the Fuehrer's orders by the Stabsleiter of the Fuehrer's deputy Borman, requesting that the Jewish question be now, once and for all, coordinated and solved one way or another. And yesterday once again did the Fuehrer request by phone for me to take coordinated action in the matter.

Since the problem is mainly an economic one, it is from the economic angle that it shall have to be tackled. Naturally a number of legal measures shall have to be taken which fall into the sphere of the Minister for Justice and into that of the Minister of the Interior; and certain propaganda measures shall be taken care of by the office of the Minister for Propaganda. The Minister for Finance and the Minister for Economic Affairs shall take care of problems falling into their respective resorts.

In the meeting, in which we first talked about this question and came to the decision to aryanize German economy, to take the Jew out of it, and put him into our debit ledger, was one in which, to our shame, we only made pretty plans, which were executed very slowly. We then had a demonstration, eight here in Berlin, we told the people that something decisive would be done, but again nothing happened. We have had this affair in Paris now, more demonstrations followed and this time something decisive must be done!

Because, Gentlemen, I have enough of these demonstrations! They don't harm the Jew but me, who is the last authority for coordinating the German Economy.

If today, a Jewish shop is destroyed, if goods are thrown into the street, the insurance company will pay for the damages, which the Jew does not even have-; and furthermore goods of the consumer goods belonging to the people, are destroyed. If in the future, demonstrations which are necessary, occur, then, I pray, that they be directed, so as not to hurt us.

Because it's insane, to clean out and burn a Jewish warehouse then have a German insurance company make good the loss. And the goods which I need desperately, whole bales of clothing and what not, are being burned; and I miss them everywhere.

I may as well burn the raw materiels before they arrive. The people of course, do not understand that; therefore we must make laws which will show the people once and for all, that something is being done.

I should appreciate it very much if for once, our propaganda would make it clear that it is unfortunately not the Jew who has to suffer in all this but the German Insurance Companies.

I am not going to tolerate a situation in which the Insurance Companies are the ones who suffer. Under the authority invested in me, I shall issue a decree, and I am, of course, requesting the support of the competent Government Agencies, so that everything shall be processed through the right channels, and the Insurance Companies will not be the ones who suffer.

It may be, though, that these Insurance Companies may have insurance in Foreign countries- If that is the case, foreign bills of exchange would be available which I would not want to lose. That shall have to be checked. For that reason, I have asked Mr. HILGARD of the Insurance company, to attend, since he is best qualified to tell us to what extent the insurance companies are protected against damage, by having taken out insurance with other companies. I would not want to miss this, under any circumstances.

I should not want to leave any doubt, Gentlemen, as to the aim of today's meeting. We have not come together merely to talk again but to make decisions, and I implore the competent agencies to take all measures for the elimination of the Jew from German economy and to submit them to me, as far as it is necessary.

The fundamental idea in this program of elimination of the Jew from German Economy is first, the Jew being ejected from the Economy transfers his property to the State. He will be compensated

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The compensation is to be listed in the debit ledger and shall bring a certain percentage of interest. The Jew shall have to live out of this interest. It is a foregone conclusion, that this aryanizing, if it is to be done quickly, cannot be made in the Ministry for Economy in Berlin. That way, we would never finish.

On the other hand, it is very necessary to have safety precautions so that the lower echelons, Stassholser, and Gauleitern- will not do things unreasonably. One must issue correction directives, immediately.

The Aryanizing of all the larger establishments, naturally, is to be my lot,-the ministry for economy will designate, which and how many there are-; it must not be done by a Statthalter or his lower echelons, since these things reach into the export trade, and cause great problems, which the Statthalter can neither observe, nor solve from his place.

It is my lot, so that the damage will not be greater than the profit, which we are striving for.

It is obvious, Gentlemen, that the Jewish stores are for the people, and not the stores. Therefore, we must begin here, according to the rules previously layed down.

The Minister for Economic Affairs shall announce which stores he'll want to close altogether. These stores are excluded from aryanizing at once. Their stocks are to be made available for sale in other stores; what cannot be sold, shall be processed through the "Winterhilfe" or taken care of otherwise. However, the sales values of these articles shall always be considered, since the State is not to suffer but should profit through this transformation. For the Chain and Department Stores- I speak now only of that, what can be seen, certain categories have to be established, according to the importance of the various branches.

The trustee of the State will estimate the value of the property and decide what amount the Jew shall receive. Naturally, this amount is to be set as low as possible. The representative of the State shall then turn the establishment over to the "ARian" proprietor, that is, the property shall be sold according to its real value.

There begins the difficulties. It is easily understood that strong attempt will be made to get all these stores to Party-members and to let them have some kind of compensations. I have witnessed terrible things in the past; little chauffeurs of Gauleiters have profited so much by these transactions that they have now about half a million. You, Gentlemen, know it. Is that correct?

(Assent)

Of course, things like that are impossible. I shall not hesitate to act ruthlessly in any case where such a trick is played. If the individual involved is prominent, I shall see the Fuehrer within two hours and report to him.

We shall have to insist upon it, that the Arian taking over the establishment is of the branch and knows his job. Generally speaking he is the one who must pay for the store with his own money. In other words, an ordinary business-transaction is to be sought-one merchant selling, the other one buying a business. If there are party members among the contenders, they are to be preferred, that is if they have the same qualifications: first shall come the one who had the most damage, and secondly, selection should be according to length of Party membership.

Of course, there may be exceptions. There are party-members who, as may be proven, lost their business concessions by action of the Schuschnigg or Prague Government, and so went bankrupt. Such a man has naturally first option on a store for sale, and he shall receive help if he does not have the means to help himself. The trustee of the State can justify this help, if he is more business like in the transfer. This party-member should have the chance to buy the store for as cheap a price as possible. In such a case the state will not receive the full price, but only the amount the Jew received. Such a buyer may even receive a loan, besides, so that he will get off to a good start.

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I wish to make it clear that such a proceeding shall only be legal if the Party-member has once owned such a store. For example, a Party-member was the owner of a Stationary store, and Schuschnigg took away the concession to operate it so that the man lost the store and went bankrupt. Now, if a Jewish Stationary store is being aryanized, this party-member should get the store on conditions whixh he'll be able to fulfil. Such a case shall be the only exception though, in all other cases the procedure shall be of a strictly business-like nature whereby the Party-member, like I said before, shall have the preference, if he has the same qualifications as any other candidate, who is not a member of the party.

When selling for the actual value we shall find only about 60 Arians ready to take over 100 Jewish stores. I don't think that we have a German for every Jewish store. You must not forget that the Jew sees his main activity in the field of trade, and that he owns 90% of it. I doubt that we'd have a demand big enough. I even doubt that we'd have enough people, particularly now since everybody has found his field of work.

Therefore, I ask the Minister for Economy to go beyond what we think ought to be done for the sake of the principle, in liquidating the establishments-I ask him to go further, even though there won't be any candidates. That'll be perfectly alright.

The transfer of stores and establishments shall have to be executed by the lower echelons, not through Berlin but through the Gaue and through the Reichstatthalterschaft. Therein shall be the seat of the members of the Board of Trustees, even if it consists of a few people only. The Statthalter and his people cannot do this job; the trustees will have to tackle it. But the Statthalter shall be the authority which supervises, according to the regulations given him, the Trustees, particularly in dealings such as the transfer to Party-members.

Naturally, these establishments cannot disappear all at once but we'll have to start by Monday, in a manner that shall make it obvious that a change has begun to materialize. Besides that, certain stores could be closed which will make things here easier.

Another point! I have noticed that Arians took over a Jewish store and were then so clever to keep the name of the Jewish store as "formerly", or kept it altogether. That must not be; I can no permit it. Because it may happen-what has just happened-stores were looted because their sign-boards bore Jewish names-because they had once been Jewish, but had been "aryanized" a long time ago. Names of former Jewish firms shall have to disappear completely, and the German shall have to come forward with this or his firm's name. I ask you to carry this out quite definitely. That much then regarding aryanizing of stores and wholesale establishments, particularly in regards to sign-boards and of all that is obvious!

Of the consequences resulting from this for the Jew, I shall speak later, because this is connected with other things.

Now for the factories. As for the smaller and medium ones, two things shall have to be made clear.

1) Which factories do I not need at all, which are the ones where productions could be suspended? Could they not be putto another use? If not, the factories will be razed immediately.
2) In case the factory should be needed, it will be turned over to Arians in the same manner as the Stores. All these measures have to be taken quickly, since Arian employees are concerned everywhere. I'd like to say right now that Arian employees shall have to be given employment immediately after the Jewish factory is closed. Considering the amount of labor we need these days, it should be a trifle to keep these people, even in their own branches.
As I have just said; if the factory is necessary, it will be aryanized. If there is no need for it, it being abandoned shall be part of the procedure of transforming establishments not essential, for our national

welfare into one that is essential for it,-a procedure that shall take place within the next few weeks. For it, I shall still need very much space and very many factories.

If such a factory is to be transformed or razed, the first thing to be done is check the equipment. The questions arising will be: Where can this equipment be used? Could it be used after the place is transformed? Where else might it be needed badly? Where could the machinery be set up again? It follows that aryanizing factories will be an even more difficult task than the aryanizing of stores.

Take now the larger factories which are run solely by a Jewish owner, without control by a Board of Directors; or take corporations where the Jew might be in the Supervisory Council or Board of Directors. There the solution is very simple: the factory can be compensated in the same manner as in the sale of stores and factories; that is, at a rate which we shall determine, and the trustee shall take over the Jew's interest as well as his shares, which he in turn may sell or transfer to the State, which will then dispose of them. So, if I have a big factory, which belonged to a Jew or a Jewish corporation, and the Jew leaves, perhaps with his sons who were employed there, the factory will still continue to operate. Maybe a director will have to be appointed because the Jew has run the factory himself. But otherwise, particularly if the maintenance of the establishment is very essential everything will run smoothly.

Everything is very simple. I now have his shares. I may give them to some Arian or to another group or I may keep them. The State takes them over and offers them at the stock market, if they are acceptable there and if it so desires, or it makes use of them in some other way.

Now, I shall talk of the very big establishments, those in which the Jew is in the Board of Directors, in which he holds shares etc, and so is either the owner or one of the co-owners; in any case in which he is greatly interested. There too, things are comparatively simple; he delivers all of his shares which shall be bought at a price fixed by the trustee. So the Jew gets into the account book. The shares shall be handled like I've just explained. These cases can not be taken care of by the Gaue and Reichsstatthalter, but only by us here on top; because we are the only ones to decide where these factories are to be transferred to, how they may be affiliated with other establishments or to what an extent the State shall keep them or hand them over to another establishment belonging to the State. All this can only be decided here. Of course, will the Gauleiter and Statthalter be to glad to get hold of the shares, and they'll make great promises to beautify our capital cities etc. I know it all! It won't go! We must agree on a clear action that shall be profitable to the Reich.

The same procedure shall be applied where the Jew has a share in, or owns property of German Economy. I am not competent enough to tell off hand in what forms that might be the case, and to what an extent he'll have to lose it. Anyway, the Jew must be evicted pretty fast from German Economy.

Now, the foreign Jews. There we'll have to make distinctions between the Jews who have always been foreigners,-and who shall have to be treated according to the laws we arranged with their respective countries. But regarding those Jews who were Germans, have always lived in Germany and have acquired foreign citizenship during the last year, only because they wanted to play safe, I ask you not to give them any consideration. We'll finish with these. Or have you any misgivings? We shall try to induce them through slight and then through stronger pressure and through clever manoevering,-to let themselves be pushed out voluntarily.

Woermann: I'd like the Foreign Office to be included, since a generally valid decision could hardly be made

Goering: We cannot consult you in every case,-but on the whole we will.

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Woermann: Anyway, I'd like to make known the claim of the Foreign Office to participate. One never knows what steps may become necessary.

Goering: Only for important cases! I do not like to take this category under special consideration. I have learned only now to what extent that has been done, particularly in Austria and Checkoslovakia. If somebody was a Check in Sudetenland, we do not have to consider him at all, and the Foreign Office doesn't have to be consulted because that person now belongs to us. And in Austria and also in Sudetenland, too many become all of a sudden Englishmen or Americans or what not -and generally speaking we cannot consider that a great deal.

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(PART II IS MISSING)

(Part III)

Funk: That is quite a decisive question for us: should the Jewish stores be re-opened?

Goebbels: If they will be re-opened is another question. The question is will they be restored? I have set the dead line for Monday.

Goering: You don't have to ask whether they'll be re-opened. That is up to us to decide.

Goebbels: Number 2. In almost all German cities synagogues are burned. Now, various possibilities exist to utilize the space where the synagogues stood. Some cities want to build parks in their place, others want to put up new buildings.

Goering: How many synagogues were actually burned?

Heydrich: Altogether there are 101 synagogues destroyed by fire, 76 synagogues demolished, and 7,500 stores ruined in the Reich.

Goering: What do you mean "destroyed by fire"

Heydrich: Partly, they are razed, and partly gutted.

Goebbels: I am of the opinion that this is our chance to dissolve the synagogues. All those not completely intact, shall be razed by the Jews. The Jews shall pay for it. There in Berlin, the Jews are ready to do that. The synagogues which burned in Berlin are being levelled by the Jews themselves. We shall build parking lots in their places or new buildings. That ought to be the criteron for the whole country, the Jews shall have to remove the damaged or burned synagogues, and shall have to provede us with ready free space.

Number 3:-I deem it necessary to issue a decree forbidding the Jews to enter German Theaters, movie houses and circuses. I have already issued such a decree under the authority of the law of the chamber for culture. Considering the present situation of the theaters, I believe we can afford that. Our theaters are over crowded, we have hardly any room. I am of the opinion that it is not possible to have Jews sitting next to Germans in Varietees, Movies and Theaters. One might consider, later on, to let the Jews have one or two movie-houses here in Berlin, where they may see Jewish movies. But in German theaters they have no business anymore.

Furthermore, I advocate that the Jews be eliminated from all positions in public life in which they may prove to be provocative. It is still possible today that a Jew shares a compartment in a

sleeping car with a German. Therefore, we need a decree by the Reich Ministry for Communications stating that separate compartments for Jews shall be available; in case where compartments are filled up, Jews cannot claim a seat; They shall be given a separate compartment only after all Germans have secured seats. They shall not mix with Germans, and if there is no more room, they shall have to stand in the corridor.

Goering: In that case, I think it would make more sense to give them separate compartments.

Goebbels: Not if the train is overcrowded!

Goering: Just a moment. There'll be only one Jewish coach. If that is filled up, the other Jews will have to stay at home.

Goebbels: Suppose, though, there won't be many Jews going on the express train to Munich, suppose there would be two Jews in the train and the other compartments would be overcrowded. These two Jews would then have a compartment all themselves. Therefore, Jews may claim a seat only after all Germans have secured a seat.

Goering: I'd give the Jews one coach or one compartment. And should a case like you mention arise and the train be overcrowded, believe me, we won't need a law. We'll kick him out and he'll have to sit all alone in the toilet all the way!

Goebbels: I don't agree. I don't believe in this. There ought to be a law. Furthermore, there ought to be a decree barring Jews from German beaches and resorts. Last summer----

Goering: Particularly here in the Admiralspalast very disgusting things have happened lately.

Goebbels: Also at the Wannsee-beach. A law which definitely forbids the Jews to visit German resorts!

Goering: We could give them their own.

Goebbels: It would have to be considered whether we'd give them their own or whether we should turn a few German resorts over to them, but not the finest and best, so we cannot say the Jews go there for recreation.

It'll also have to be considered if it might not become necessary to forbid the Jews to enter the German forest. In the Grunewald, whole herds of them are running around. It is a constant provocation and we are having incidents all the time. The behavior of the Jews is so inciting and provocative that brawls are a daily routine.

Goering: We shall give the Jews a certain part of the forest, and the Alpers shall take care of it that various animals that look damned much like Jews,- the Elk has such a crooked nose,-get their also and become acclimated.

Goebbels: I think this behavior is provocative. Furthermore, Jews should not be allowed to sit around in German parks. I am thinking of the whispering campaign on the part of Jewish women in the public gardens at Fehrbelliner Platz. They go and sit with German mothers and their children and begin to gossip and incite.

Goebbels: I see in this a particularly grave danger. I think it is imperative to give the Jews certain public parks, not the best ones- and tell them: "You may sit on these benches:" these benches shall be marked "For Jews only". Besides that they have no business in German parks. Furthermore, Jewish children are still allowed

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in German schools. That's impossible. It is out of the question that any boy should sit beside a Jewish boy in a German Gynnasium and receive lessons in German history. Jews ought to be eliminated completely from German schools; they may take care of their own education in their own communities.

Goering: I suggest that Mr. Hilgard from the Insurance Co. be called in; he is waiting outside. As soon as He'll be finished with his report, he may go, and we can continue to talk. At the time Gustloff died, a compensation for the damage Germany had suffered, was prepared. But I believe that at present we should not work it through rained taxes but with a contribution paid only once. That serves my purpose, better.

(Hilgard appears)

Mr. Hilgard: The following is our case. Because of the justified anger of the people against the Jew, the Reich has suffered a certain amount of damage. Windows were broken, goods were damaged and people hurt, synagogues burned etc. I suppose that the Jews, many f them are also insured against damage committed by public disrder etc.

(Hilgard:- "Yes"

' that is so, the following situation arises; the people, in their stified anger, meant to harm the Jew; but it is the German insurce companies that will compensate the Jew for damage. This situton is simple enough; I'd only have to issue a decree to that fect that damage, resulting from these risks, shall not have to be ld by the insurance companies. But the question that interests primarily, and because of which I have asked you to come here, i this one; in case of reinsurance policies in foreign countries, hould not like to lose these, and that is why I'd like to discs with you ways and means by which profit from reinsurance, ssibly in foreign currency will go to the German economy, instead o the Jew. I'd like to hear from you, and that is the first question I nt to ask: In your opeinion, are the Jews insured against such dage to a large extent?

Hilard: Permit me to answer right away. We are concerned with three kis of insurances. Not with the insurance against damage resulting fr revolt or from risks. But with the ordinary fire-insurance, the oinary glass-insurance, and the ordinary insurance against theft. Th people, because of their contracts, who have a right to claim compensation are partly Jews, partly Arians. As for the fire-insurance they are practically all Jewish, I suppose. As for the department-stores, the victimsis identical with the Jew, the owner a: that applies more to the synagogues, except for neighbors to wse places the fire may have spread. Although the damage is done tthe latter's property seems to be rather slight, according to th inquiries I made late last night.

As for the glass-insurance which plays a very important part i this, the situation is completely different. The majority of te victims mostly the owners of the buildings are Arians., the JN has usually rented the store, a procedure which you may observe al over, for example on Kairfuerstendamin.

Goering: That is what we've said.

Goebbels: In these cases, the Jew will have to pay.

Goering: It doesn't make sense, we have no raw-materials. It is all glass imported from foreign countries and has to be paid for in foreign currency! One could go nuts.

Hilgard: May I draw your attention to the following facts; the glass for the shop-windows is not being manufactured by the Bohemian, but by the Belgian glass industry. In my estimation, the approximate money-value of which these damages amount is 6,000,000- that includes the broken glass, glass which we shall have to replace, mainly to Arians because they have the insurance policies.

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Of course I have to reserve final judgement in all this, Your Excellency, because I have had only one day to make my inquiries. Even counting on about half of the 6,000,000 being spent in transacting the business-specialists from the Industry itself are more confident in this matter than I am, we might well have to import glass for approximately 3,000,000. Incidentally, the amount of the damage equals about half of a whole year's production of the Belgian glass industry. We believe that half a year will be necessary for the manufacturers to deliver the glass.

Goering: The people will have to be enlightened on this.

Goebbels: We cannot do this right now.

Goering: This cannot continue! We won't be able to last with all this. Impossible! Go on then! You suggest that the Arian is the one who suffers the damage; is that right?

Hilgard: Yes, to a large extent, as far as the glass-insurance goes.

Goering: Which would have to replace the glass.

Hilgard: Yes. Of course there are cases in which the Arian, the owner of the store is identical with the owner of the building. That is so with all department stores. In the case of the department store Israel, the owner is the Jew.

Goering: And now the third category.

Hilgard: Under this fall the victims of thievery.

Goering: I have to ask you a question. When all kinds of goods were taken from the stores and burned in the streets, would that also be thievery?

Hilgard: I don't think so.

Goering: Could that be termed as "Riot"?

Hilgard: That is just the question which we are unable to decide at this moment. Is it ordinary theft if entry into a dwelling or a container of any kind is forced and something is taken away?

Goering: That is a case of "Riot".

Hilgard: Riot does not mean much since we have very little insurance against damage caused by riots, these were discarded by us long ago.

Goering: But this here is "Rioting ". That is the legal term. There was no theft, and no individual broke into any place. But a mob rushes in and knocks everything to pieces., or "Public Disturbances"

Hilgard: Public disturbance. It is no riot.

Goering: Are they insured against damages caused by public disturbances?

Hilgard: No, no more. May I show this by an example. The most remarkable of these cases is the case MARGRAF Under Den Linden. The Jewelry store of MARGRAF, is insured with us through a so-called combined policy. That covers practically any damage that may occur. This damage was reported to us as amounting to 1,700,000 because the store was completely stripped.

Goering: Daluegue and Heydrich, you'll have to get me this jewelry through raids, staged on a tremendous scale!

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Saligue: The order has already been given. The people are being controlled all the time. According to reports, 150 were arrested by yesterday afternoon.

Goering: These things will otherwise be hidden. If somebody comes to a store with jewels and claims that he has bought them, they'll be confiscated at once. He has stolen them or traded them in alright.

Heydrich: Besides that, looting was going on in the Reich in more than 800 cases, contrary to what we supposed. ; but we have already several hundred people who were plundering, and we are trying to get the loot back.

Goering: And the jewels?

Heydrich: That is very difficult to say. They were partly thrown into the street and picked up there. Similar things happened with furiers, for example in Friedrichstrasse, district C, There the crowd was naturally rushing to pick up minks, skunks etc. It'll be very difficult to recover that. Even children have filled their pockets, just for fun. It is suggested that the Hitler-Youth is not to be employed and to participate in such actions without the Party's consent. Such things are very easily destroyed.

Daluegue: The Party should issue an order to the effect that the police will immediately recieve a report in case the neighbor's wif everybody knows his neighbor, has a fur coat altered or in case somebody appears wearing new rings or bracelets. We'd like the Party to support us here.

Hilgard: These damages are not covered by the policy, I believe. May I say a word in general about our liabilities and a "Fetidum" of the Versicherungswirkschaft report. We'd like to make it our point, Mr. General Field Marshall, that we shall not be hindered in fulfilling the obligations for which our contracts call.

Goering: But I have to. That is important for me.

Hilgard: If I may give reasons for this request, I'd like to say that it simply has to do with the fact that we carry out, to a large extent, quite a number of international transactions. We have a very good international basis for our business-transactions, and in the interest of the equilibrium of the Foreign exchange in Germany, we have to make sure that the confidance in the German Insurance shall not be ruined. If we now refuse to honor clear-cut obligations, imposed upon us through lawful contract, it would be a black spot on the shield of honor of the German Insurance.

Goering: It wouldn't the minute I issue a decree, a law sanctioned by the State.

Hilgard: I was leading up to that.

Heydrich: The insurance may be granted, but as soon as it is to be paid, it'll be confiscated. That way we'll have saved face.

Hilgard: I am inclined to agree with what General Heydrich has just said. First of all, use the mechanism of the insurance company to check on the damage, to regulate it and even pay, but give the insurance company the change to:

Goering: One moment! You'll have to pay in any case because it is th Germans who suffered the damage. But there'll be a lawful order forbidding you to make any direct payments to the Jews. You shall

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also have to make payment for the damage the Jews have suffered, but not to the Jews but to the Minister of Finance.

(Hilgard: Aha!)

What he does with the money is his business.

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Schmer: Your Excellency, I should like to make a proposal. A Cert in rate should be fixed, say 15% or maybe a little higher, of all the registered wealth, I understand one billion is to be confiscated so that all Jews shall pay equally, and from the money raised this way, the insurance companies shall be refunded.

Goering: No. I don't even dream of refunding the insurance companie the money. The companies are liable. No, the money belongs to the State. That's quite clear. That would indeed be a present for the insurance companies. You make a wonderful Petidum there. You'll fulfill your obligations, you may count on that.

Kerl: It seems that in one respect, we'll have to arrange this somewhat differently. As far as the glass-insurance goes, the fact of the matter is that thw owners of the buildings will definitely have to be paid for the damage, as stipulated. The majority of these companies, with the exception of one Joint Stock Company in Cologne, are all very smallReciprocity-companies(Gegenseitsvereine). They won't be able to make up for the damage. We'll have to find out how far they are covered by re-insurance which I cannot tell at the moment.

Hilgard: In this connection, the re-insurance plays a relatively small role, except for the large fire-insurance policies taken out by department stores. There is no re-insurance in the glass insurances, for the simple reason that, under normal conditions glass insurance is one of our best branches in the insurance business; and therefore does not need re-insurance. I have to add, though, that the amount of this damage is approximately twice as high as the amount of damage for an average year. It makes all our calculations wrong and completely wipes out our chance for profit.(Interrupted by Kerl)

No, Sir, that is the way it is. The whole premium of the German glass insurance amounts to 14,000,000. if I am not wrong. Under normal conditions it amounted to 4 or 5 million. The glass insurance is our greatest asset. So far, the greates profits were made in it. But now, the amount of this damage is alone twice as high as the amount for one ordinary year. With the various special glass-insurances, it altogether different.

Goering: One moment! 4 to 5 millions normally. Twice as much would be about 10 million. You suggested 14 million. There are still 4 million left.

Hilgard: We'll also have to pay for the expenses. No, it is a very great catastrophe for us. Let me point out that the damage in the whole of Germany, in my estimation, shall amount to approximately 25 million mark. I wanted to be careful.

Heydrich: We estimate that the damage to property, to furniture and to consumer-goods amounts to several hundred million; although that includes the damage the Reich shall suffer from loss of taxes. sales taxes, taxes on property and on income. I assume that the Minister for Finance too , has been informed on all this.

V. Krosigk: I have no idea about the extent.

Heydrich: 7,500 destroyed stores in the Reich.

Daluege: One more question ought to be cleared up. Most of the goods in the stores were not the property of the owner but were kept on the books of other firms, which had delivered them. Then there are the unpaid for deliveries by other firms, which definitely are not all Jewish but Arian, those goods that were delibered on the basis of commission.

Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel
Conta.

Hilgard: We'll have to pay for them, too.

Goering: I wished you had killed 200 Jews, and not destroyed such values.

Heydrich: There were 35 killed.

Kerl: I think we could do the following: Jews we don't pay anyhow. As for Arians, payment shall have to be made; the insurance company may contact us through the "Reichsgruppe" and we shall investigate each case. I am thinking of the small Reciprocity-Companies; it should be easy to find out whether they are capable of paying or not. In their cases, the amounts involved are not too large. We may find an arrangement for this later on; I am thinking of one in which the insurance companies arrange for recompensation exclusively to Arian, and once they know the results of their inquiries, contact us. We shall then find a way out for these small companies. Of course only in cases where it is absolutely necessary.

Funk: That is not necessary. I'd like to refer to what I've said before about the decree. That seems to be the easiest solution.

Goering: We cannot do that. These people make a point of their ability to pay.

Funk: If the Jews pay for it, the insurance companies don't have to pay.

Goering: Right, well, Gentlemen, this is all very clear. We'll stick to it. At this moment every insurance company, except Mr. Hilgard who is here, counts on having to pay for the damage. They want to pay too, and I understand this very well. They'll have to want that, so they cannot be reproached for not being secure enough to pay. The glass insurance, and a point was made of that, has brought the highest profits so far. That means they'd have enough surplus money, and if they haven't divided it all up in dividends, they'll have savings enough for the compensation. Such an insurance company will have to be in a position to pay for a damage of 10, 12, 15 million, that is three times the amount paid in the normal year. If they are unable to do that, then we'll have to wonder whether we should let small companies live at all. It would be insane to keep insurance companies which would be unable to pay for such a damage. To permit an insurance company like that to exist would simply mean to cheat the people. I suggest now the following. The damage shall be determined in each case. And for the time being, the insurance companies shall have to honor their contracts in every respect and shall have to pay.

(No. 4 is missing)

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PART V

Goering: Now for the damage the Jew has had. At Margrafs', the jewels disappeared, etc. Well, they are gone, and he won't get them refunded. He is the one who has to suffer the damage. As far as the jewels may be returned again by the police, they belong to the State. Now for the consumer foods which were thrown into the street, stolen or burned. There too, the Jew will be the one who has the damage.

As for the goods that were kept on the basis of commissions, the Jew shall have to make good for the damage.

Goebbels: That doesn't have to be put in the decree, though. This decree is quite sufficient the way it is.

Hilgard: I wonder to what an extent insurance companies in foreign countries might be involved in this.

Goering: Well, they'll have to pay. And we'll confiscate that.

Hilgard: As for this merchandise sold on the basis of commissions, I can imagine that the American supplier of fur coats, shipping them from England or from America would in many cases insure it with English or American insurance companies!

Goering: Then they'll pay him for the damage. The question merely is the following: do you think there are re-insurances for all this damage in foreign countries?

Hilgard: Very few, amounting to very little.

Goering: Of course, the Aryan cannot report any damage because he hasn't had any. The Jew will make good.

The Jew shall have to report the damage. He'll get the refund from the insurance company but the refund will be confiscated. If it's all said and done, there will remain some profit for the insurance companies since they can't have to make good for all the damage. Mr. Hilgard, you may enjoy yourself.

Hilgard: I have no reason for that - The fact that we won't have to pay for all the damage is called profit!

Goering: Just a moment! If you are compelled under the law to pay 5 million and all of a sudden there appears an angel in my somewhat corpulent form before you, and tells you: you may keep 1 million - why, cannot that be called making a profit? I should actually split with you, or whatever you'd call it. I can see it, looking at you. Your whole body grins. You made a big profit.

(Remark: Let's initiate a tax for damages, resulting from public disturbance, to be paid by the insurance companies)

Hilgard: For me it goes without saying that the honorable German merchant cannot be the one who suffers. I have discussed this matter with the enterprises and I have spoken for it that the Aryan must not be the one who has the damage. But it is decidedly he who has it, because all the insurance companies, not one insurance company, are the ones that shall have to pay higher rates and at the same time shall receive lower dividends. Therefore, all the insurance companies are the losers. That is so, and that'll remain so, and nobody can tell me differently.

Goering: Then why don't you take care of it that a few windows less are being smashed! You belong to the people too! Send your representatives out. Let them instruct the people. If there should be any more questions speak to Mr. Lange.

(Reichsgruppenleiter Hilgard leaves the meeting)

Gentlemen, let us continue.

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Woermann: I think that the foreign Jews are left out completely in Article 1. They are covered only by Article 2. But they should also be taken care of in Article 1. Otherwise they can be dealt with only if they are insured, and not if they are not insured.

Goering: Well, they'll have to insure themselves - or what else do you mean?

Woermann: As for insurances, the foreign Jews are, to my understanding, mentioned only in Articles 2 and 3, and not in Article 1. If I remember correctly, you were going to say in Article 1: "Jews inside the country". Well, we'll have plenty of complaints then.

Goering: Pardon me. According to Article 2, they'll receive their compensation.

(Woermann: If they are insured!)

The number of those who are not insured is negligible.

Heydrich: I'd like to say one more thing of primary importance. In the decree we should not mention the confiscation. We can do that easily.

Goering: No, you cannot do that tacitly. A clear legal procedure will have to be employed there. But that is not what Mr Woermann means, he is talking about these foreign Jews who are not insured. As far as they are insured, they are covered. This here concerns those who are not insured. That may be the case here and there.

Woermann: We shall then have plenty of complaints.

Goering: I'd like to avoid paying too much attention to the foreign Jews.

Woermann: But if Article 2 contains that provision, Article 1 may as well have it. The first draft by the Minister for Justice covered it all very nicely.

Guertner: Now, if I don't misunderstand, Mr Woermann, he is primarily concerned with the obligation for restoration which shall be valid generally while only Jews who have German citizenship are mentioned regarding the insurances.

I'd like to know whether there are any objections against compelling also the foreign Jews to restore the damage, and to inform him that he shall not be paid the money from the insurance.

Goering: He is quite able to do that.

Woermann: Even if he is not insured?

Guertner: Oh-!

Goering: There should hardly be such instances. Let's take a chance on it.

Stuckart: If he is not insured, he'll have to have the damage restored anyway. How can he then make claims against anybody?

Goering: He cannot.

Woermann: He can file claims against the State.

Stuckart: According to which law? Damage caused by riots? We won't recognize riots.

Goering: Perfectly right.

Woermann: Generally speaking, may I say: regarding foreign Jews, the reservation that the contract is to be taken into consideration was made only for the organization. That is valid for all branches which we have discussed today, and also for the expropriation.

Goering: Like the Fuehrer says, we'll have to find a way to talk this over with the countries which also do something against their Jews. That every dirty Polish Jew has a legal position here and we have to stand him, - that ought to cease. The Fuehrer was not very happy about the agreement that was made with the Poles. He thinks we should take a few chances and just tell the Poles; all right, we are not going to do that; let's talk over what we may be able to accomplish together; you are doing something against your own Jews in Poland; but the minute the Itzig has left Poland, he should suddenly be treated like a Pole! I'd like to disregard these stories from foreign countries a little.

Woermann: It ought to be considered whether or not, the U S might take measures against German property. This question cannot be handled equally for all countries. I have to make a formal and general reservation.

Goering: I have always said and I'd like to repeat it that our steamship companies and German companies in general should finally catch on and liquidate their investments in the U S, sell them, etc. That country of scoundrels does not do business with us according to any legal rules. Once before they stole everything from us, that is why I don't understand how we could do it again, just for some temporary profit. It is dangerous. You can do it with a regular country but not with one that cares for the Right as little as the U S. The other day I had the American ambassador with me, we talked about the zeppelin and I told him: "We don't need any helium, I fly without helium but the prerequisite will have to be that this ship will be flying to civilized countries where the Right prevails. It goes without saying that one cannot fly to such gangster-states" He had a rather silly look on his face. One ought to tell these Americans. But you are right, Mr Woermann, it ought to be considered.

Woermann: In other words, the foreign office is granted the right to be consulted.

Goering: Granted, but I'd like to avoid mentioning the foreign Jews as long as we can help it. We'd rather have the foreign office take part in those cases where that question becomes acute, so that some compromise can be reached.

Woermann: Generally, and in particular cases.

Funk: The decisive question is: Are the Jewish stores to be reopened or not?

Goering: That depends on how big a turnover these Jewish stores have. If it is big, it is an indication that the German people are compelled to buy there, in spite of its being a Jewish store, because a need exists. If we'd close all Jewish stores which are not open right now, altogether before Christmass, we'd be in a nice mess.

Fisdiboeck: Your Excellency, in this matter we have already a very complete plan for Austria. There are 12,000 Jewish artisan and 5,000 Jewish retail shops in Vienna. Before the National Revolution, we had already a definite plan for tradesmen, regarding this total of 17,000 stores. Of the shops of the 12,000 artisans, about 10,000 were to be closed definitely and 2,000 were to be kept open. 4,000 of the 5,000 retail stores should be closed and 1,000 should be kept open, that is, were to be aryanized. According to this plan, between 3,000 and 3,500 of the total of 17,000 stores would be kept open, all others closed. This was decided following investigations in every single branch and according to local needs, in agreement with all competent authorities, and is ready for publication as soon as we shall receive the law which we requested in September; this law shall empower us to withdraw licenses from artisans, quite independently from the Jewish question.

Goering: I shall have this decree issued today.

Fisdiboack: It was granted us in connection with the economic plan for Austria. I believe the only reason why it was not yet published was that negotiations between the Reich Ministry for Economic Affairs and the National Food Corporation were going on. A basic agreement had already been reached. We'll be able to close these 10,000 stores as a matter of mere routine as soon as the decree will be issued. As for the actual execution

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of the matter, somebody will have to take care of the merchandise in these stores. Until last week we had intended to more or less leave it up to the Jews themselves to liquidate the warehouses. We cannot do that anymore. We intend to create a central agency which shall take care of the merchandise to be used. Generally, the best procedure might be to turn the merchandise over to the particular branch which in turn shall divide it up among the Aryan stores. These, in turn, shall re-sell it on the basis of commissions or for a fixed price.

If this is carried out as planned, it'll concern only the approximately 3,000 remaining stores which shall be aryanized, according to the investigations made in the various branches. Actual buyers for about half of these stores are waiting: their contracts have been checked and are ready to be approved. If many of these cases were not approved sooner, it is only because the decision on the planning had not yet been made. As for the remaining 15,000 stores, negotiations have also gone rather far in many cases. We think that a dead line should be set, say until the end of the year. If, by the end of the year, definite buyers for the stores designated for aryans, cannot be found, it'll have to be examined once more whether the stores should not be liquidated. In most cases that will be possible; an artisan's shop is of a rather individual character. As for retail stores, it would never be urgent enough, so as to say that the economic worth was too big. The very few stores which would still remain and found to be necessary but for which no buyer was available, could be taken over by trustees. This way, I believe that fewer than 100 stores would be left, and by the end of the year we would have liquidated all the Jewish owned businesses which so far has been obvious as such in the eyes of the public.

Goering: That would be excellent.

Fisdiboeck: Out of 17,000 stores 12,000 or 14,000 would be shut down and the remainder aryanized or handed over to the bureau of trustees which is operated by the State.

Goering: I have to say that this proposal is grand. This way, the whole affair would be wound up in Vienna, one of the Jewish capitals, so to speak, by Christmas or by the end of the year.

Funk: We can do the same thing over here. I have prepared a law elaborating that, effective 1 January 1939, Jews shall be prohibited to operate retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as independent artisan shops. They shall be further prohibited from keeping employees or offer any ready products on the market. Wherever a Jewish shop is operated, the police shall shut it down. From 1 January 1939, a Jew can no longer be employed as an enterpriser as stipulated in the law for the Organization of National Labor from 20 January 1934. If a Jew holds a leading position in an establishment without being the enterpriser, his contract may be declared void within 6 weeks by the enterpriser. With the expiration of the contract all claims of the employee, including all claims to maintenance, become obliterated. That is always very disagreeable and a great danger. A Jew cannot be a member of a copporation; Jewish members of corporations shall have to be retired by 31 December 1938. A special authorization is unnecessary. The competent Ministers of the Reich are being authorized to issue the provision necessary for the execution of this law.

Goering: I believe that we can agree with this law.

(Remark: Yes)

Of course there remain a few things to be straightened out even after 1 January. We shall be able to handle them with these general methods which we shall have to employ for handling all other Jewish property. As for the Jewish stores, we may proceed vigorously; we believe that by Christmas enough buyers shall be found to take over the stores which from now on shall be entirely under pressure. Also the merchandise may be taken the way you have proposed it. To me, all this seems to be prepared in an excellent manner.

Funk: In every single store everything is there.

Schmer: Everything is there, except that we have no control, anymore, over this business with the trustees. I personally am of the opinion that we don't need it at all; so far we have managed quite well with the aryanization. For those few stores that are to be kept open, we shall easily find buyers. All other rooms shall be rented without much ado. There is a great need for this right here in Berlin.

Goering: But my dear friend, that way the Jew will receive the full amount.

Schmer: He will receive the amount that is far below the value, and the aryanizing shall have to be authorized, as before.

Goering: The Jew will receive the amount and won't be put into the account-book.

Schmer: No. We can arrange that later. He cannot swallow the money. The amount is fixed, and under the law the Jew is compelled to report every change in his wealth, so that it can easily be controlled. He won't run away; we'll keep it in the Reich. The only thing you'd have to do is to issue a decree, or to transfer the provisions of Article 7 on to the Ministry for Economic Affairs in order to confiscate the Jewish property. He cannot run away from us.

Goering: Mr Schmer, could not the following be done: Somebody will become aryanized and get 300,000 marks into his hands. He runs into the next best jewelry-store around the corner and buys one piece of jewelry after another, and on the same day disappears across the border.

Schmer: In that case, we'll have to report this change in his property.

Goering: But if he wants to scram'.

Fisdiboeck: The O K on the aryanizing is not being given the minute the price for the purchase is being paid. We do that the following way. The aryanizing is being authorized only under the condition that the price for the purchase is to be paid in instalments lasting over a long period of time, in case the buyer is unable to pay; or, in case payment is being made, that the amount is to be put in the bank of a frozen account.

Goering: We could do the same thing here.

Schmer: In the provisions for the execution of the law we may stipulate that from a certain level on, payment shall have to be made in bonds of the Reich or something similar. That would have to be a decree made to the authorities which O K the aryanizing.

Daluegue: The number of Jewish stores is unknown. Until yesterday, 7500 were reported to us and the number does not increase.

Fisdiboeck: Because of what has happened the day before yesterday in Vienna, 5000 were shut down there. There were 40,000 altogether.

Schmer: Shall the arrangement made in Austria remain?

Goering: Nothing will be changed there.

Fisdiboeck: Everything can be shut down at any time.

Heydrich: I know that a very high limit has been set for registering, 3000 I believe.

Fisdiboeck: More than 5000.

Goering: Is that the same in the Reich?

Fisdiboeck: Yes, in the Reich too. In this connection, I'd like to make a few more remarks. What we are very much concerned with, is the situation regarding the Jewish apartment houses which contribute a large percentage of Jewish wealth. Surprisingly enough, the Jewish national wealth in Austria is reported to amount of 320 million marks only; the value of the

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apartment houses alone amounts to 500 million. We should appreciate it very much if the regulation which makes it possible to requisition Jewish property would be made to be valid also for the apartment buildings; thus we would be enabled to have these houses administered by a board of trustees and to give the Jews the right to have a claim on the debit ledger of the Reich. That could also be an occasion to cash the contribution which might be deducted this way in advance. The administration of these blocks of apartment buildings wouldn't be a problem at all. The only thing we'd need for it would be managers, and there'd be plenty of them. We'd like to requisition the apartment buildings and also any bonds that way. This question of the bonds has been left open so far. In Austria, a very large part of Jewish wealth, 266 billion Reichsmarks, is invested in bonds of all kinds in shares or simply in bonds bringing a fixed rate of interest. In my opinion, a danger for the market does not exist because the Ministry for Economic Affairs would have control over these bonds. We'll pay by handling out claims, on the debit-ledger of the Reich. Therefore, the finances of the Reich won't be affected; the Minister for Finance shall only pay 3% for the claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich. He in turn receives internal loans, that means saves money. And if the bonds are not being sold, one might keep them 30 years until these claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich shall be expired.

Funk: Why should Jews not be allowed to keep bonds?

Goering: Because that way he would actually be given a share.

Funk: That is entirely new.

Goering: No. I said very clearly before; bonds and shares.

Funk: Shares yes, but not internal loans.

Fisdiboeck: It is certainly better to pay the Jew 3% instead of 4%. We'd have no possibility to control Jewish wealth the minute we'd let him have shares.

Goering: Gentlemen, no arguments. It is out of the question that he'd keep the shares. He'll have to turn them in.

Fisdiboeck: In that case I'd like you to arrange this by calling the shares in so that the stock market won't be ruined. That can very easily be done. They'll be turned in. Administering the shares is also much simpler. The trustee turns the shares over to the depot and receives claims on the debit-ledger of the Reich in their place. With this, the whole affair is settled. The only question is whether you want to recall the shares or not.

Funk: This way, the Reich will become processor of half a billion shares.

Goering: Yes, Yes.

Goebbels: He'll be able to get rid of them according to its needs.

Fisdiboeck: But it is a business based on profits.

v. Krosigk: I am wondering, first whether it will bring us profits. I grant you that, though. But secondly, an entirely new point of view has to be entered here. I can very well see the point in what the Minister, Mr. Fisdiboeck, says. As for the values that otherwise bring fixed rates of interest, it is an entirely new idea to expropriate the Jew also in this, though the intention had been to refrain his status as the owner of the shares.

Fisdiboeck: The reason why this is so very important is that our whole action shall remain without success as long as the Jews shall be in the possession of values, which they may realize quickly and employ for any other undertaking.

Goering: That's it. We want to prevent the Jews from again secretly manipulating against us.

Fisdiboeck: For example, if we don't want the Jews to possess jewelry we can prevent them from having it by allowing them to possess only Internal Loan bonds, that means that they could acquire the jewelry only by paying with bonds.

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Goering: Nobody would pay them their claims on the debit-ledger.

Fisdiboeck: They are not transferable.

Goering: Only if authorized.

Heydrich: Is it not possible to issue an order forbidding the Jew to invest his money in certain values, such as art treasures?

Goering: The arrangement with the registration in the debit-ledger is much simpler. Claims on the debit-ledger are not transferable. He cannot do anything with them, and he cannot do much with those 3½%.

Heydrich: But we'll also have to find an arrangement for confiscation of valuable objects in Jewish possession.

Goering: What he has now in his possession, that'll come.

Schmer: Article 7 of the decree states that the use of Jewish wealth in German economy shall be regulated through the Four Year Plan.

Goering: I think Fisdaboeck's proposal is very good. We should give it the form of a draft now, find the apartment buildings, the shares, etc.

Fisdaboeck: I should also like to have a decision made on the following question. In Austria, individuals, not institutions, owe the Jews 184 billion Reichsmarks. This way the Jews certainly have invested money in a way we don't like. That is money which they have loaned out to other Jews, oftener enought to an Aryan. This way, a dependency of the Aryan artisan from the Jewish creditor is created which we do not want. Now the question arises, and I would answer yes. Should trustees not be created to administer these debts and then pay with claims on the debit-ledger, according to demand coming in. The goal of this procedure would be to make the debtor independent from the Jewish creditor, to insert Aryan trusteeship and pay the Jew, as far as his demands could actually be met. Therefore it does not have to be paid. So we should have to insert trusteeship in this case also, but the difference to that in the case of the bonds would be that we won't simply pay but leave the decision for payment up to the trusteeship.

Funk: If word of this debate should reach the public, we'd have a run on the capital market tomorrow.

Fisdiboeck: That's why we have postponed these ideas all the time. We have examples for it that the Jews have sold, head over heel, bonds of internal loans, shares and everything they had.

Goering: I could stop that with a single decree, ordering the immediate stoppage of traffic of Jewish capital. He is punishable who buys from Jews, and his purchase shall be confiscated. I would not do it any other way.

. . . . . .

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Part VII

Frick: The Ministry of the Interior shall have to take part in it.

Goering: I have said so before.

(Shout by Goebbels)

---that is a misunderstanding. That is now the committee which is elaborating on nothing but on this problem which is being tackled. How are the shares, how are the claims on the debit-ledger to be handled? Therefore, I shouldn't like to have anybody else in the Committee, in order to keep it as small as possible.

Buerkel: Is the plan for the arianizing to be discussed also?

Goering: Mr. Fischboeck shall bring that up. This place is the crux of the matter. I hope you have listened properly so that you know exactly what is to be valid for the Sudetengau!
Of course, I too am of the opinion that these economic measures ought to be strengthened by a number of Police-action-Propaganda-measures and cultural displays so that everything shall be fixed now and the Jewry will be slapped this week right and left.

Heydrich: In spite of the elimination of the Jew from the economic life, the main probelm, nsmely to kick the Jew out of Germany, remains. May I make a few proposals to that effect?
Following a suggestion by the Commissioner of the Reich, we have set up a center for the Emigration of Jews in Vienna, and that way we have eliminated 50,000 Jews from Austria while from the Reich only 19,000 Jews were eliminated during the same period of time; we were so successful because of the cooperation on the part of the competent Ministry for Economic Affairs and of the foreign Charitable organizations.

Goering: The main thing is, you cooperated with the local leaders of the "Green Frontier".

Heydrich: That amounted to a very small number, your excellency. Illegall---

Goering: This story has gone through the whole world-press. During the first night the Jews were expulsed into Checkoslovakia. The next morning, the Checks grabbed them and pushed them into Hungary. From Hungary, they were returned to Germany and from there into Checkoslovakia. They travelled around and around that way. They landed finally on an old Barge in the Danube. There they lived, and wherever they tried to go ashore, they were barred.

Heydrich: That was the report. There weren't even 100 Jews.

Goering: For practically two weeks, a number of Jews left every midnight. That was in the Burgenland.

Heydrich: At least 45,000 Jews were made to leave the country by legal measures.

Goering: How was that possible?

Heydrich: Through the Jewish Kulturgemeinde, we extracted a certain amount of money from the rich Jews who wanted to emigrate. By paying this amount, and an additional sum in foreign currency, they made it possible for a number of poor Jews to leave. The problem was not to make the rich Jew leave but to get rid of the Jewish mob.

Goering: But children, did you ever think this through? It doesn't help us to extract hundreds of thousands from the Jewish mob. Have you ever thought of it that this procedure may cost us so much foreign currency that in the end we won't be able to hold out.

Heydrich: Only what the Jew has had in foreign currency.

(Goering---agreed)

This way. May I propose that we set up a similar procedure for the

Reich, with the cooperation of the competent government agencies, and that we then find a solution for the Reich, based on our experiences, after having corrected the mistakes, the General Field Marshall has so rightly pointed out to us.

(Goering:--agreed)

As another means of getting the Jews out, measures for Emigration ought to be taken in the rest of the Reich for the next 8 to 10 years. The highest number of Jews we can possibly get out during one year is 8-10,000. Therefore, a great number of Jews will remain. Because of the Arianizing and other restrictions Jewry will become unemployed. The remaining Jews gradually become proletarians Therefore, I shall have to take steps;to isolate the Jew so he won't enter into the German normal routine of life. On the other hand, I shall have to restrict the Jew to a small circle of consumers, but I shall have to permit certain activities within professions; lawyers, doctors, barbers etc. This question shall also have to be examined.

As for the isolation, I'd like to make a few proposals regarding police measures which are important also because of their psychological effect on public opinion. For example, who is Jewish according to the Nurnberg laws, shall have to wear a certain insignia. That is a possibility which shall facilitate many other things. I don't see any danger of excuses, and it shall make our relationship with the foreign Jew easier.

Goering: A uniform!

Heydrich: An insignia. This way we could also put an end to it that the foreign Jews who don't look different from ours, are being molested.

Goering: But, my dear Heydrich, you won't be able to avoid the creation of ghettos on a very large scale, in all the cities. They shall have to be created.

Heydrich: As for the question of ghettos, I'd like to make my position clear right away. From the point of view of the police, I don't think a ghetto in the form of completely segregated districts where only Jews would live, can be put up. We could not control a ghetto where the Jews congregate amidst the whole Jewish people. It would remain the permanent hideout for criminals and also for epidemnics and the like. We don't want to let the Jew live in the same house with the German population; but today the German population, their blocks or houses, force the Jew to behave himself. The control of the Jew through the watchful eye of the whole population is better than having him by the thousands in a district where I cannot properly establish a control over his daily life through uniformed agents.

Goering: We'd only have to forbid long-distance calls.

Heydrich: Still I could not completely stop the Jews from communicating out of their districts.

Goering: And in towns all of their own?

Heydrich: If I could put them into towns entirely their own, yes. But then these towns would be such a heaven for criminals of all sorts that they would be a terrific danger. I'd take different steps. I'd restrict the movement of the Jews and would say; In Munich, the governmental district and the district----

Goering: Wait a minute! I don't care so much for it that the Jews don't appear in spots where I don't want them. My point is this one; if one Jew won't have any more work, he'll have to live modestly. He won't be able to go far on his 3½%, to restaurants, etc. He'll have to work more. That'll bring about a concentration of Jewry which may even facilitate control. You will know that in a particular house only Jews are living. We shall also have concentrated Jewish butchers, barbers, grocers etc. in certain streets The question is of course whether we want to go on tolerating that.

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If not, the Jew shall have to buy from the Arian.

Heydrich: No, I'd say that for the necessities in daily life, the German won't serve the Jew anymore.

Goering: One moment. You cannot let him starve. But there'll be the following difficulty. If you say that the Jews will be able to have so and so many retail stores, then they'll again be in business, and they'll continually have to sell for the wholesaler.

Schmer: In a small town that wouldn't work at all.

Goering: It could only be worked out if you'd reserve inadvance whole districts or whole towns for the Jews. Otherwise, you'll have to have only Germans do business, and the Jew shall have to buy from them. You cannot set up a Jewish barbershop. The Jew will have to buy fodd and stockings.

Heydrich: We'll have to decide whether we want that or not.

Goering: I'd like to make a decision on that right now. We cannot make another sub-division here. We cannot argue: so and so many stores will remain for the Jew because then again no control will be possible since these stores in turn would have to work with wholesale stores. I'd say, all stores should be Arian stores, and the Jew may buy there. One may go one step further and say that these and these stores will probably be frequented mostly by Jews. You may set up certain barbershops operated by Jews. You may make concessions in order to channel certain professions into certain streets for certain tasks. But not stores.

Heydrich: What about the ghetto? Would the Jew have to go to an Arian district to buy.

Goering: No. I'd say that enough German storekeepers would love to dwell in the Ghetto if they could do some business there. I wouldn't alter the principle that the Jew shall have no more say in German Economy.

Heydrich: I shouldn't like to comment on that. Now a few things which are important also form a psychological angle.

Goering: Once we'd have a ghetto, we'd find out what stores ought to be in there, and we'd be able to say;you, the Jew so and so, together with so and so, shal take care of the delivery of goods. And a German wholesale-firm will be ordered to deliver the goods for this Jewish store. This store would then not be a retail-shop but a cooperative-store, a cooperative one for Jews.

Heydrich: All these measures will eventually lead to the institution of the ghetto. I'd say one shouldn't want to build a ghetto. But these measures, if carried through as outlined here, shall automatically drive the Jews into a ghetto.

Funk: The Jews will have to move quite close together. What are 3 million? Everyone will have to stand up for the next fellow. The individual alone will starve.

Goering: Now, as to what Minister Goebbels has said before, namely compulsory renting. Now, the Jewish tenants will be together.

Heydrich: As an additional measure, I'd propose to withdraw from the Jews all personal papers such as permits and drivers licenses. No Jew should be allowed to own a car, neither should he be permitted to drive because that wgy he'd endanger German life. By not being permitted to live in certain districts, he should be furthermore restricted to move about so freely. I'd say the Royal Square in Munich, the Reichsweihestatte, is not to be entered any more within a certain radius by Jews. The same would go for establishments of culture, border fences,military installations. Furthermore, like

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Minister Dr. Goebbels has said before, exclusion of the Jews from public theaters, movie houses etc. As for cultural activities, I'd like to say this; cultural activities in holiday resorts may be considered an additional feature, not absolutely necessary for the individual. Many German Volksgenossen are unable to improve their health through a stay at a resort town. I don't see why the Jew should go to these places at all.

Goering: To health spas, no.

Heydrich: Well, then I'd like to propose the same thing for hospitals. A Jew shall not lie in a hospital together with Arian Volkgenossen.

Goering: We'll have to manage that gradually.

Heydrich: The same applies to public conveyances.

Goering: Are there no Jewish Sanatariums and Jewish hospitals? (Remarks--Yes!) We'll have to finagle all this. These things will have to be straightened out one right after another.

Heydrich: I only meant to secure your approval in principle so that we may start out on all this.

Goering: One more question, gentleman: What would you think the situation would be if I'd announce today that Jewry shall have to contribute this 1 billion as a punishment?

Buerckel: The Viennese would agree to this whole-heartedly.

Goebbels: I wonder if the Jews would have a chance to pull out of this, and to put something on the side.

Brinkmann: They'd be subject to punishment.

V. Krosigk: Mr. Fischboeck, one question, Could this authorization be ordered without their closing out their securities?

Funk: They are all registered. They'll also have to register the money.

V. Krosigk: But for the time being they may dispose of it.

Goering: It won't help them to cash them all. They can't get rid of the money.

Funk: They'll be the ones to have the damage if they sell their stocks and bonds.

Fischiboeck: There is a certain danger, But I don't think it is very great. But only then, when all the other measures shall definitely be carried out during next week.

V. Kronigk: They have to be taken during the next week at the latest.

Goering: I would make that a condition.

Fischiboeck: Maybe it is good that we put ourselves under pressure this way.

Goering: I shall close the wording this way; that German Jewry shal as punishment fortheir abominable crimes etc. etc. have to make a contribution of 1 billion. That'll work. The pigs won't commit another murder. Incidentally, I'd like to say again that I would not like to be a Jew;in Germany.--

H1235-0240

V. Krosigk: Therefore, I'd like to emphasize what Mr. Heydrich has said in the beginning; that we'll have to try everything possible, by way of additional exports, to shove the Jews into foreign countries. The decisive factor is that we don't want the society-proletariat here. They'll always be a terrific liability for us.

(Frick;--"and a danger!")

I don't imagine the prospect of the ghetto is very nice. The idea of the ghetto is not a very agreeable one. Therefore, the goal must be, like Heydrich said, to move out whatever we can!

Goering: The second point is this. If, in the near future, the German reich should come into conflict with foreign powers, it goes without saying that we in Germany should first of all let it come to a showdown with the Jews. Besides that, the Fuehrer shall now make an attempt with those foreign powers who have brought the Jewish question up, in order to solve the Madagascar project. He has explained it all to me on 9 November. There is no other way. He'll tell the other countries. "What are you talking about the Jew for?-Take him!" Another proposal may be made. The Jews, gotten rid of may buy territory for their "co-religionists" in North America, Canada or elsewhere.

I wish to summarize: The Minister of Economic Affairs shall direct the committee and he shall in one form or another, take all steps necessary within the next few days.

Blerning: I fear that during the next few days, beginning Monday, the Jews will start to sell bonds on internal loans for hundreds of thousands, in order to provide themselves with means. Since we hold the course of the internal loan in order to sell more bonds, The Reich-Treasury, Loan-Committee or the Reich Minister for Finance should have to back this internal loan.

Goering: In what way could the Jew bring his bonds on the market?

(Remark;--"Sell them")

To Whom?

(Remark:--on the stock market.
He orders a bank to do it.)

Well, I'll prohibit selling internal loan bonds for three days.

Blerning: That could be done only through a decree.

Goering: I can't see any advantage for the Jew. He won't know himself how and he'll have to pay. On the contrary, I believe he won't move.

Goebbels: For the time being he is small and ugly and stays at home.

Goering: I don't think it would be logical. Otherwise we'll have to do it. The reason why I want this decree in a hurry is that for the time being we have peace but who can guarantee that there won't be new trouble by Saturday or Sunday. Once and for all I want to eliminate individual acts. The Reich has taken the Affair in its own hand. The Jew can only sell. He can't do a thing. He'll have to pay. At this moment, the individual Jew won't think of throwing anything on the market. There'll be some chatter first, and then they will begin to run to us. They'll look for those great Arians with whom, they'll think they may have some luck., the so-called various mail-boxes of the Reich with whom they can lodge their protests. These people will run my door in. All that takes some time, and by then we'll be ready.

Daluege: May we issue the order for confiscating the cars?

Goering: Also the Ministry of the Interior and the Police will have to think over, what measures will have to be taken. I thank you.

(Conference closed at 2.40 P.M.)

6 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf. O-133 55 67, Hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation of the Stenographic Report of the meeting on "The Jewish Question" under the chairmenship of Field Marshall Goering in the Reichs Air Force on 12 November 1938--11 O'clock.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-133 55 67

H1235-0241

H1235-0242

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1950 -PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C O P Y

The Reichminister and
Chief of the Reich
Chancellory
RK. 789 B secret

Berlin, W8 3 Dec. 40
Voss Str. 6

S E C R E T

Rubber Stamp

Rec'd 13 Dec 1940
Ia Pol VIII -153/40g Blg A

To the Reich Governor in V I E N N A
Gauleiter von SCHIRACH
V I E N N A

Dear Mr. von SCHIRACH,

As REICHSLEITER BORMANN informs me, the Fuehrer has decided after receipt of one of the reports made by you, that the 60 000 Jews, still residing in the REICHSGAU VIENNA, will be deported most rapidly, that is still during the war, to the GENERAL GOUVERNEMENT because of the housing shortage prevalent in Vienna I have informed the Governor General in CRACOW as well as the REICHSFUEHRER - SS about this decision of the FUEHRER, and I request you also to falze cognisance of it. X

HEIL HITLER!

Your Obedient

/s/ Dr. LAMMERS.

in pencil

COPIES
1. to Dr. Dellbruegge
2. REG. PRALS. J U N G

I a Pol
Copy given to PP & HAGO .

9 DEC 40/ HK

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 1950 - PS

28th November 1945.

I, WILLIARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt (jg) 391 590; hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of the Document 1950 - PS.

WILLIARD E. SKIDMORE

Lt. (jg) 391 590.

H1235-0243

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF COUNSEL

Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, Page 141

Law to remove the distress of people and State of
24 March 1933

Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich vom
24.Maerz 1933

The Reich-Parliament has resolved upon the following law which is promulgated herewith with approval of the Reich-Council after it has been established that all the requirements of legislation for changing the constitution have been complied with.

Section 1

Laws for the Reich can be resolved upon also by the Reich-Government besides the procedure provided by the constitution of the Reich. This also applies to the laws pursuant to sections 85 sub-section 2 and 87 of the Reich-Constitution.

Section 2

The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Government may deviate from the Reich-Constitution insofar as they do not deal with the institution of the Reich-Parliament or the Reich-Council as such. The powers of the Reich-President will remain intact.

Section 3

The laws for the Reich resolved upon by the Reich-Government are issued by the Reich-Chancellor and promulgated in the Reichsgesetzblatt. They will become effective, insofar as they don't determine otherwise on the day following their promulgation. Section 68 to 77 of the Reich-Constitution are not applicable to the laws resolved upon by the Reich-Government.

Section 4

Treaties of the Reich with foreign countries relating to matters of the legislation of the Reich do not require the approval of the bodies participating in the legislation. The Reich-Government issues the rules necessary for the execution of such treaties.

Section 5

This law will become effective on the day of its promulgation. It becomes ineffective on 1. April 1937. Moreover it becomes ineffective if the present

H1235-0244

Reich-Government should be replaced by another.

Berlin, 24 March 1933

The Reich-President
von Hindenburg

The Reich-Chancellor
Adolf Hitler

The Reich-Minister for the Interior
Frick

The Reich-Minister for Foreign Affairs
Freiherr von Neurath

The Reich-Minister for Finances
Count Schwerin von Krosigk

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2001-PS 12 November 1945

I, Fred Niebergall, 2nd Lt. Inf. 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2001-PS

Fred Niebergall
2nd Lt.Inf.
0-1335567

H1235-0245

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2099-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

1941 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 295

Fuehrer Decree Relating to the Chief of
the Party Chancellory of 29 May 1941

Erlass des Fuehrers
Ueber die Stellung des Leiters der Partei-Kanzlei
Vom 29 Mai 1941

By order of May 12, 1941, I decree for the National Socialist German Labor Party that the hitherto existing office of Deputy Fuehrer would be designated from then on as Party Chancellory under my personal jurisdiction. In order to guarantee closest collaboration of the Party Chancellory with the Supreme Reich Authorities, I order in this connection:

The Chief of the Party Chancellory, Reich Leader Martin Bormann, has the powers of a Reich Minister; he is member of the Reich Government and the Ministerial Council for Reich Defense. Wherever in connection with laws, orders, decrees, ordnances, and other regulations the term "Deputy Fuehrer" is used, it will be replaced by "Chief of the Party Chancellory". The instructions necessary for the execution and supplementing of this decree will be given by the Reich Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellory in agreement with the Chief of the Party Chancellory.

Headquarters of the Fuehrer, 29 May 1941

The Fuehrer

ADOLF HITLER

The Reich Minister & Chief of the Reich Chancellory

Dr. Lammers

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO 2099-PS

2 November 1945

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf., O-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 2099-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt. Inf.
O-1335567

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2100-PS
Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel

REICHSGESETZBLATT

Part I

1942 Berlin 24 January 1942 No. 6 Page 35

Directive

About the application of the Fuehrer decree regarding the Position of the chief of the Party Chancellery, dated 16 January 1942.

Based on the Fuehrer decree about the position of the chief of the Party Chancellery, dated 29 May 1941, (RGB I, page 295) the following is decreed:

Par. 1

(1) The participation of the Party in legislation is handled exclusively through the chief of the Party Chancellery unless otherwise directed by the Fuehrer. Proposals and suggestions for legislation coming from the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations, may be submitted to the competent supreme Reich authorities only through the chief of the Party Chancellery.

(2) The same procedure regarding collaboration of the Party in personnel questions of civil sevants will be used exclusively through the chief of the Party Chancellery.

Par. 2

In legislative functions the position of the chief of the Party Chancellery will be that of a participating Reichs Minister in all cases. The supreme Reich authority will therefore include him in the preparations for Reich laws, for decrees and directives of the Fuehrer, for directives of the Counsels of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, as well as directives of the supreme Reich authorities to include executive directives and general directives. The same applies to his concurrence with laws and directives of the states and directives of the Reich deputies (Reichsstadthalter).

Par. 3

In fundamental and political questions, in particular those which serve to prepare, change or put into effect laws, decrees and directives, the channels between the supreme Reich authorities and the supreme authorities of the states which include several Gaue on the one hand, and the offices of the Party, its organizations and affiliated associations on the other hand, go through the chief of the Party Chancellery. Direct communication between the supreme Reich authorities and the supreme State autorities with other offices of the Party is not permissible in these cases. This applies to personnel matters regarding civil servants in as far as there are no special regulations.

Fuehrer Headquarters, 16 January 1942.

The Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery
Dr. Lammers
The Chief of the Party Chancellery
M. Bormann

H1235-0247

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 2100-PS

7 November 1945

I, EDGAR SQUARTER, 2nd Lt., Inf., O-1332102, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2100-PS.

EDGAR SQUARTER,
2nd Lt., Inf.,
O-1332102

H1235-0248

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2559-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

CONFIDENTIAL
HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH U.S. ARMY

APO 408

MILITARY COMMISSION)
:
ORDERS NO. 2)

23 June 1945

Before a Military Commission which convened at Ahrweiler, Germany, pursuant to Paragraph 1, Special Orders 108, 19 May 1945, as amended by Paragraph 2, Special Orders 133, 13 June 1945, Headquarters Fifteenth U. S. Army, was arraigned and tried:

Peter Back, a German civilian, resident of Preist, Regierungsbezirk Trier, Germany.

CHARGE: Violation of the Laws and Usages of War.

Specification: In that Peter Back, a German civilian and not a lawful belligerent, did, at or near Preist, Germany, on or about 15 August 1944 violate the laws and usages of war by willfully, deliberately and feloniously killing an American airman, name and rank unknown, a member of the Allied Forces, who had parachuted to earth at said time and place in hostile territory and was then without any means of defense.

PLEAS

To the Specification of the Charge: NOT GUILTY
To the Charge: NOT GUILTY

FINDINGS

Of the Specification of the Charge: GUILTY
Of the Charge: GUILTY

SENTENCE

To be hanged by the neck until dead.
The sentence was adjudged on 16 June 1945.

The sentence is approved and confirmed under authority granted by Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group, in Circular Number 14, Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group, dated 2 October 1944, as amended, and the sentence will be duly executed, but the execution of the sentence to be hanged by the neck until dead is hereby stayed pending further orders.

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL GEROW:

O. C. MOOD,
Colonel, GSC,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
/s/ R. B. Patterson
R. B. PATTERSON,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

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2 - Asst JAG, European T of Opns, APO 887, U.S.Army
3 - JA, 12th Army Gp, APO 655, U.S.Army.

I certify that the above is a
true and correct copy:
/s/ Thomas R. Sealy
THOMAS R. SEALY,
Major, AC

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2560-PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD U S ARMY AND EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT
APO 403

MILITARY COMMISSION)
:
ORDER NUMBER 5)

18 October 1945

Before a military commission which convened at Freising, Germany, on 15 July 1945, pursuant to paragraph 11, Special Orders No. 190, this headquarters, 11 July 1945, was arraigned and tried:

Wilhelm Hafner, a German national.

Charge: Violation of the Laws and Usages of War.

Specification: In that on or about 12 December 1944, Albert Bury, also known as Alfred Bury, a German National, then the police chief of Langenselbold, Kreis Hanau, Germany, and Wilhelm Hafner, Karl Henkel, and Wilhelm Plitt, all German Nationals, then policemen of Langenselbold, Kreis Hanau, Germany, and Johann Freidrich Wilhelm Loser, a German National, then Landrat of Kreis Hanau, Germany, and Georg Heinrich Kalte, a German National, then Oberleutnant of Police of Kreis Hanau, Germany, did at Langenselbold, Kreis Hanau, Germany, wrongfully and unlawfully kill Technical Sergeant Donald L. Hein, ASN 33563157, a member of the Armed forces of the United States of America, the said Albert Bury having wrongfully and unlawfully delivered the said Donald L. Hein, who had come into his, Albert Bury's, custody as a prisoner of war, and was then and there unarmed and defenseless and was not under sentence of death for any offence committed by the said Donald L. Hein, to said Wilhelm Hafner, Karl Henkel, and Wilhelm Plitt, with directions that the said Wilhelm Hafner, Karl Henkel, and Wilhelm Plitt, should shoot the said Donald L. Hein, and pursuant thereto the said Wilhelm Hafner, Karl Henkel and Wilhelm Plitt, having conducted the said Donald L. Hein to a secluded spot at or near Langenselbold, Kreis Hanau, Germany, where the said Wilhelm Hafner in the presence of the said Karl Henkel and Wilhelm Plitt did wrongfully and unlawfully shoot the said Donald L. Hein with a pistol, causing the death of said Donald L. Hein, the said Karl Henkel and Wilhelm Plitt then and there wrongfully and unlawfully standing by and failing to prevent the aforesaid unlawful act of the said Wilhelm Hafner, all of the foregoing having been done pursuant to the wrongful and unlawful orders of the said Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Loser and the said Georg Heinrich Kalte that each and every enemy flier who landed within the territory of their jurisdiction was to be shot immediately, or words to that effect.

PLEAS

To the Specification of the Charge: Not Guilty
To the Charge: Not Guilty

FINDINGS

Of the Specification of the Charge: Guilty
Of the Charge: Guilty

SENTENCE

To be hanged by the neck until dead.

The sentence was adjudged on 15 July 1945.

H1235-0249

COPY OF DOCUMENT NO. 2560-PS
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

(Mil. Commission Order No. 5, Hq Third US Army & Eastern Mil. Dist., 18 Oct 45, Continued)

The action of the convening authority is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

In the foregoing case of Wilhelm Hafner, a German National, the sentence is approved. The record of trial is forwarded for confirmation to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater.

s/ G. S. Patton, Jr.
t/ G. S. PATTON, JR.,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding."

The action of the confirming authority is as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER

12 October 1945

In the foregoing case of WILHELM HAFNER, a German national, the sentence is confirmed. The Commanding General Eastern Military District, will issue appropriate orders promulgating the sentence as confirmed, and will carry the sentence into execution at a time and place to be determined by him.

s/ Dwight D. Eisenhower
t/ DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Commanding General, U S Forces
European Theater"

BY COMMAND OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL TRUSCOTT:

DON E. CARLETON,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

(SEAL)
HEADQUARTERS
THIRD US ARMY
OFFICIAL

L. L. MANLY,
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Adjutant General

H1235-0250

HEADQUARTERS
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
APO 403

COPY OF DOCUMENT 2561-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Military Commission)
:
Orders Number 3)

(M.C.O. 3)

4 October 1945.

Before a military commission which convened at Munich, Germany, pursuant to paragraph 4 Special Orders No. 215, this headquarters, 5 August 1945, were arraigned and tried :

Heinrich Daubert, Anna Margarete Solomon, Margot Zeeck, and Peter Schindel.

CHARGE: Violation of the laws and usages of War.

Specification: In that Heinrich Deubert, a GERMAN National, Anna Margarete SOLOMON, a GERMAN National, Margot ZEECK, a GERMAN National, and Peter SCHINDEL, a GERMAN National, did, at GROSS-GERAU, Kreis GROSS GERAU, Germany, on or about 29 August 1944, wrongfully and unlawfully beat and strike two (2) ALLIED airmen whose names, serial numbers, ranks, organizations, and nationalities are unknown, in and about the head, face and body with sticks, stones, shoes and other instruments.

P L E A S

(As to each accused).

To the Specification of the Charge : Not Guilty.
To the Charge: Not Guilty.

FINDINGS

Deubert:

Of the Specification of the Charge: Guilty, except the words "two (2) Allied airmen whose names, serial numbers, ranks, organizations, and nationalities are unknown, in and about the head, face, and body with sticks, stones, shoes and other instruments", substituting therefore the words "an Allied airman whose name, serial number, rank, organization and nationality is unknown in and about the head, face and body with a stick and his hand", of the excepted words, Not Guilty, of the substituted words Guilty,

Of the Charge: Guilty.

Schindel:

Of the Specification of the Charge: Guilty, except the words "two (2) Allied airmen whose names, serial numbers, ranks, organizations, and nationalities are unknown, in and about the head, face and body with sticks, stones, shoes, and other instruments", substituting therefor the words "an allied airman whose name, serial number, rank, organization and nationality are unknown in and about the head and face with his hand and other instrument", of the excepted words, Not Guilty, of the substituted words, Guilty.

Of the Charge: Guilty.

H1235-0251

RESTRICTED

COPY OF DOCUMENT 2561-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Solomon:

Of the Specification of the Charge: Guilty, except the words "two (2) Allied airmen whose names, serial numbers, ranks, organizations, and nationalities are unknown, in and about the head, face, and body with sticks, stones, shoes, and other instruments", substituting therefor the words "an allied airman whose name, serial number, rank, organization and nationality is unknown in and about the body with a stick", of the excepted words, Not Guilty, of the substituted words, Guilty.

Of the Charge: Guilty.

Zeeck:

Of the Specification of the Charge: Guilty, except the words "two (2) Allied airmen whose names, serial numbers, ranks, organizations, and nationalities are unknown, in and about the head, face, and body, with sticks, stones, shoes, and other instruments", substituting therefor the words "an allied airman whose name, serial number, rank, organization and nationality is unknown in and about the head and body with a shoe", of the excepted words, Not Guilty, of the substituted words, Guilty.

Of the Charge: Guilty.

SENTENCES

Deubert:

To be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for 15 years.

Schindel:

To be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for 1 year.

Solomon:

To be confined at hard labor at such places as the reviewing authority may direct for 2 years.

Zeeck:

To be confined at hard labor at such place as the reviewing authority may direct for one and one-half years.

The sentence was adjudged 15 August 1945.

Deubert:

The sentence is approved and will be duly executed. Zuchthaus und Sicherungsanstalt, Straubing is designated as the place of confinement.

H1235-0253

COPY OF DOCUMENT 2561-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Schindel:

The sentence is approved, but six months of the confinement at hard labor imposed are remitted. As thus modified, the sentence will be duly executed. Strafgefangis Bernau (Oberhay) is designated as the place of confinement.

Solomon:

The sentence is approved, but one year of the confinement at hard labor is remitted. As thus modified, the sentence will be duly executed. Fruengefangis Rotherfeld is designated as the place of confinement.

Zeeck:

The sentence is approved but six months of the confinement at hard labor imposed are remitted. As thus modified, the sentence will be duly executed. Frauengefangis Rotherfeld is designated as the place of confinement.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL PATTON:

PAUL D. HARKINS
Colonel, General Staff
Corps
Acting Chief of Staff.

SEAL

L. L. MANLY
Colonel, Adjutant General's Department,
Acting Adjutant General.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 2981-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Der Grossdeutsche Reichstag
IV. Wahlperiode

Edition of 1943

by E. KIENAST

Page 167

Borman (Munich) Martin, Secretary of the Fuehrer, Reichsleiter, Head of the Party Chancellory, Pullach near Munich, Sonnenwinkel, Sonnenweg 1, Mail Address: Munich 33, Fuehrerban and Berlin W8, Wilhelmstrasse 64 (Party Chancellory), 5 Service Command (Frankfurt, Oder).

Born on 17 June 1900 at Halberstadt. Protestant. Attended schools at Eisenach and Weimar. June 1918-1919 Gunner, then Agricultural Apprentice in Mecklenbung. August 1920-1926 Manager with General Power of Attorney of Mecklenbung Estate. Political Activity 1922-1923 Abschnittsleiter (Section Head) of the Organization Rossbach in Mecklenbung. July - December 1923 Imprisonment on Remand at Leipzig. March 1924 Sentenced to one year imprisonment by the Supreme Judicial Court for the Protection of the Republic; after discharge in the Front Bann of the Party until Party entry. 1927-1928 Gau Press Officer in Thuringia; since 1 April 1928 Bezirksleiter (District Leader) and Gau Geschefts Fuehrer (Gau Manager); 15 November 1928 on the staff of the Supreme SA Command until August 1930; following until July 1933 henceforth Manager of the "Hilfskasse" of the NSDAP arranged by him. Since July 1933 Reichsleiter of the NSDAP. 12.5.1941 Head of the Party Chancellory, has the Powers of a Reichsminister and belongs to the Reichs Cabinet and the Council of Ministers for the Reichs Defense. Secretary of the Fuehrer by decree of 2 April 1943. Member of the Reichstag since the 9 Election Period 1933.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 2981-PS

20 November 1945

I, HENRY EINSTEIN, B-316209, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 2981-PS.

HENRY EINSTEIN
B-316209

H1235-0254

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3018-PS
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER

Southern German Edition

20 October 1944, page 1

Order of the Fuehrer, Berlin, 18 October, I order:

1. There is to be formed in all the Gaus of the Greater German Reich the German Volkssturm consisting of all men, age 16 to 60 years, capable of bearing arms.

* * * *

8. The orders for the military execution are issued by the BdE Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler, the orders for the political and organizational execution are issued in my name by Reichsleiter Bormann.

* * * *

Adolf Hitler

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF
DOCUMENT NO. 3018-PS

21 November 1945

I, KARL E. LACHMANN, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3018-PS.

KARL E. LACHMANN

H1235-0255

H1235-0256

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3085-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Number 27 Berlin, 7 July 1943 8th (104th) Year.

Ministerial Gazette of the

Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior

Published by the Reich Ministry of the Interior

X X X X X X X X X X X X

(Page 1085 Line 1 to Line 14)

General. Tasks of the Police

Punishable acts by Jews.

Notice of the Reichsfuehrer of the SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reichministry of the Interior of 3 July, 1943.

-S-III A 5 b No. 22 IV/ 43-176-3

All punitive reports which are made as well as all punitive and investigation procedures instigated by the authorities against Jews are to be referred for further processing without delay to that State police (main) agency, (Staatspol.(Leit-)Stelle) located in the permanent or temporary residence of the Jew concerned. If the Jew is suspected of trying to escape or if the danger exists that the course of law may be prejudiced, he is to be arrested and to be turned over without delay to the state police (main) agency with the available documentary evidence.

To all police authorities. - MBliV. S. 1085.

X X X X X X X X X X X X

I, Audrey Flandreau, Civ., 046305, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3085-PS.

AUDREY FLANDREAU
Civ., 046305

H1235-0257

STAFF OF THE FÜHRER'S DEPUTY

Stab des Stellvertreters des Fuhrers



Translation of chart on page 151 of the book entitled "Organisationsbuch der NSDAP" (Organization Book of the NSDAP), 5th edition, Munich, 1938. Document 3201-PS.

Translator: ZUCKER, 28 Nov. 1945

I, Margot Boatwright, X 046273, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3201-PS.

(signed) Margot Boatwright
Margot Boatwright
X 046273

Presentation # A - SPD-OCC

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 3234-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Excerpt from:

"Das Archiv"
No. 76, July 1940
Edited by Alfred-Ingemar Berndt
Publisher, Otto Stollberg
Berlin

Page: 399

Personalities Bp. 21.7. 40

Promotions in the SS

As reported by the National Socialist Press Service(NSK) the Fuehrer promoted Major Generals in the SS(SS-Gruppenfuehrer) Reich Foreign Minister v. Ribbentrop, Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, and Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Lieut. Generals in the SS(SS-Obergruppenfuehrer). Brigadier Generals in the SS and Major General of the Police (SS-Brigadefuehrer Generalleutnant der Polizei) v. Pfeffer-Wildenbruch was promoted to Major General in the SS (SSOGruppenfuehrer).

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3234-PS

Dec. 8, 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt. (jg) U.S.N.R., 39 15 90 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Doc. No. 3234-PS.

WILLARD EVENS SKIDMORE
Lt.(jg) U.S.N.R.
39 15 90

H1235-0258

H1235-0259

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3235-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpt from the December 1942 Issue of "DAS ARCHIV", a semi-official documentary collection edited by Alfred-Ingemar Brandt, Director of Ministry (Ministerialdirektor) in the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, approved by the chairman of the Official Party Censorship Commission (Parteiamtliche Prüfungskommission), and published by Otto Stolberg Publishers, Berlin.

From p. 805 of the chapter "State" (Staat), "Internal Policy" (Innenpolitik), Sub-section "Miscellaneous":

Si 11 December 1942

Every Party Region (Parteigan) becomes a Reich Defense District (RV-Bezirk)

A working conference of the Reich Defense Commissars concerning the problems of the civilian organization of Reich Defense took place under the chairmanship of the Plenipotentiary-General for Reich Administration and Reich Minister of the Interior, Dr. Frick, and in the presence of the Head of the Party Chancellery, Bormann, and the Chief of the Armed Forces Supreme Command, Field Marshal Keitel.

As of 1 December 1942 all Gauleiters have also been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. In this connection the regional jurisdiction of the Reich Defense Commissars had to be brought in line with the Party Regions (Parteigau). Every Party Region (Parteigau) now also constitutes a Reich Defense District (RV-Bezirk).

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CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3235-PS

8 December 1945

I, ERWIN COOPER, B 210751, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. 3235-PS.

ERWIN COOPER
B 210751

H1235-0260

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3236-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

BORMANN Martin

Reichsleiter (Reich Leader), Chief of Staff Office of the Fuehrer's Deputy;

Munich - Pullach, Margaretenstrasse 11.

Voting District 5, (Frankfurt, Oder).

Born on 17 June 1900 in Halberstadt; protestant; attended school in Eisenach and Weimar. Artillery man from June 1918 to February 1919, subsequently apprentice of agriculture in Mecklenberg; from August 1920 until 1926 manager with plenary powers of an estate in Mecklenburg. Political activity: 1922/23 Section Chief of the organization Rossbach (Translaters note: illegal military unit) in Mecklenburg. July to December 1923 in imprisonment on remand at Leipzig; March 1924 sentenced to 1 year imprisonment by the State Court for the protection of the Republic; after his release he joined the Front Bann until he entered the Party; 1927/28 regional press chief of Thuringen; starting April 1st 1928 also district leader and regional manager. From 15 Nov. 1928 until August 1930 on the staff of the Supreme SA Command; subsequently until July 1923 leader of the NSDAP Emergency Fund, (Hilfskasse), organized by him. From July 1933 Chief of Staff Office of the Fuehrer's Deputy and Reich Leader of the NSDAP. Member of the Reichstag since the 9th election terms in 1933.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT 3236-PS

10th December 1945

CATLIN ANNEMARIE, AGO No. X 046172 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages and that I am above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3236-PS.

CATLIN ANNEMARIE
AGO No. X 046172.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3237-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Extracts
from

"Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Führers" (Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer), an official collection of Party Decrees from 1933 to 31 March 1937, published in book-form by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich in 1937.

(page 257 lines 1-4)

Circular Nr. 24/36

The Head of the Main Security Office (Chef fes Sicherheitshauptamtes) issued the order, of which copy is enclosed, to all subordinate offices on 8 December 1935.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

(page 257 lines 18-23)

The Deputy of the Fuhrer expects that Party Offices will now abandon all distrust of the SD and will support it wholeheartedly in solving the difficult tasks with which it has been entrusted in order to protect the Movement and our people.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

(page 258 lines 1-5)

Because the work of the Party, is primarily benefited by the work of the SD, it is unadmissible that its expansion be upset by prejudiced attacks when individuals fail. On the contrary, it must be wholeheartedly assisted.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

(page 258 lines 11-13)

M u n i c h, 14 February 1935

The Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Führer

(signed) M. B o r m a n n

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3237-PS

11 December 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3237-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg), USNR
391590.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3239-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts
from

"Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuhrers"
(Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer)

an official collection of Party Decrees from 1933 to 31 March 1937, published in book-form by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich, in 1937.

(Page 190 line 23 - page 191 line 3)

Decree Nr. 183/35

On the basis of the "Law Against Malicious Attacks on State and Party and for the Protection of the Party Uniform" of 20 December 1934 all those penal cases constituting an attack on the Party, its leaders or its institutions, were submitted by the Reich Minister of Justice to the Deputy of the Führer for joint decision from a political point of view.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

(page 191 line 24 - page 192 line 12)

.....

Should my office have decided in any particular penal case that the offender shall be punished by simple or severe reprimand of the Court, I will issue directives that in the future the names of these persons shall be communicated to the Gaus.

I request that you subsequently take the necessary steps to cause the Local Organizations (Ortsgruppen) to keep a special eye on these fellow Germans, and to attempt to influence them in the sense of National Socialism. On the other hand it is necessary to place under close control the activities of such persons who do not care for advice. In such cases it might become necessary to inform the Secret State Police (Gestapo).

M u n i c h, 3 September 1935

The Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Führer

(signed) M. B o r m a n n

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3239-PS

11 December 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3239-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg) USNR
391590.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF DOC.3240
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts

from

"Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Fuehrers"

an official collection of Party Decrees from 1933 to 31 March 1937, published in book-form by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich, in 1937.

"(Page 383 line 20-page 384 line 9)

Decree Nr. 5/37

SUBJECT: Refusal of financial assistance etc. to patients of Jewish physicians etc.

At my instigation the Reich and Prussian Minister of the Interior has issued the following circular decree, which I transmit to you herewith for your information:

" (1) Financial assistance (notstandshilfen), including payments on account, or relief payments (Unterstuetzungen) will no longer be paid to civil service employees (Beamte, Angehoerige) for expenses that have arisen because they employed the services of Jewish physicians, dentists, pharmacies, medical personnel, hospitals, sanatoria, lying-in hospitals, funeral parlors lawyers, etc. Exceptions will only be made in very exceptional individual cases (i.e. when imminent danger to life made the calling-in of a Jewish physician inevitable)."

(Page 385 lines 8-12)

In this connection I would like to remark that negotiations concerning further-reaching stipulations are already progressing.

Munich, 8 January 1937

The Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the

Fuehrer

(signed) L. Bormann

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3240-PS
---------- dec. 11,1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE, Lt.(jg)USNR,391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the German and English languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of document no 3240-PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt.(jg) USNR
391590

H1235-0264

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3242-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

NS YEARBOOK 1944
P. 181-182
(EXCERPTS)

THE REICH OFFICES OF THE N.S.D.A.P.
THE PARTY CHANCERY
REICHSLEITER MARTIN BORMANN

.....

Office for Internal Party Affairs
(Sachbearbeiter fuer innere Parteiangelegenheiten)

.....

Office for Constitutional Questions
(Sachbearbeiter fuer staatsrechtliche Fragen)

.....

Special Delegate attached to the Party Chancery
(Sonderbeauftragter bei der Partei-Kanzlei)

.....

Main Archives of the NSDAP
(Hauptarchiv der NSDAP)

.....

The Head of the Foreign Organization of the NSDAP
(Der Leiter der Auslands-Organisation)

.....

The Delegate of the NSDAP for all "Folkdom" Questions
(Der Beauftragte der NSDAP fuer alle Volkstumsfragen)

.....

The Delegate for the Reconstruction of the Reich
(Der Beauftragte fuer den Neubau des Reiches)

.....

The Delegate for all Questions of Technology and its Organizations
(Der Beauftragte fuer alle Fragen der Technik und ihre Organisationen)

.....

The Delegate for all Questions of Public Health
(Der Sachbearbeiter fuer alle Fragen der Volksgesundheit)

.....

The Head of the Race Policy Office of the NSDAP
(Der Leiter des Rassenpolitischen Amtes der NSDAP)

.....

The Head of the Office for Genealogy
(Der Leiter des Amtes fuer Sippenforschung)

.....

The Delegate for Questions of Financial and Tax Policy
(Der Beauftragte fuer Fragen der Finanz-und Steuerpolitik

.....

Reich Camp of the NSDAP, Bad Toelz
(Reichslager der NSDAP, Bad Toelz)

.....

Reich School of the NSDAP, Feldafing
(Reichsschule der NSDAP, Feldafing)

PARTY CHANCERY

The Party Chancery is the Office of the Fuehrer in his capacity as Head of the NSDAP. The Head of this Office, directly responsible to the Fuehrer, is Reichsleiter Martin Bormann. He centralizes for the Fuehrer the treatment of all basic planning and suggestions from the Party sphere. Through him, the directives established by Hitler himself or prepared on his behalf for the entire Party go to the respective offices for execution. The entire work which arises from the political leadership assignment of the Party and from its directive-relationship to the State, is centralized in the Party Chancery.

All internal Party planning, all questions of political leadership of vital interest to the Nation, the basic recommendations of the Reichsleiters, Gauleiters, and leaders of Formations (SS, SA, etc.) are examined by the Head of the Party Chancery on behalf of the Fuehrer and are brought in accord with over-all political requirements. The Party Chancery is responsible for carrying out the manifold tasks of the NSDAP in the direction of the people. The Party directs the various activities of the Party offices in the total war effort at hom and the Party work in the incorporated and occupied territories. The Party Chancery also has the responsibility of dealing with all questions of common concern to the Party and the

H1235-0266

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3242-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(CONT'd)

Wehrmacht.

Within the jurisdiction of the Party Chancery is also the centralized handling of all questions concerned with securing the unity of Party and State. Through the decree of the Fuehrer of 29 May 1941, the Head of the Party Chancery has the authority of a Reich Minister and is a member of the Reich Cabinet. He alons represents the Party in its relations with the Supreme Reich authorities. The following individual powers have been conferred on him *******:

1. The Head of the Party Chancery is to be consulted from the outset by the Supreme Reich Authorities about drafts of Reich laws, decrees, and executive orders of the Fuehrer, decrees of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich, as well as decrees of the Supreme Reich authorities, including ordnances and regulations issued thereunder. The same applies to approval of laws and decrees of the States (Laender) and of decrees of state governors (Reichsstatthalter). Through this procedure the Head of the Party Chancery imposes the view of the Party as guardian of the National Socialist philosophy. Recommendations and suggestions for legislation from the Party, its formations, and affiliated organizations, are transmitted to the appropriate Supreme Reich Authorities only through the Head of the Party Chancery.
2. The Head of the Party Chancery passes on the appointment and promotion of officials and Labor Service leaders, insofar as this perogative is not already exercised by the Gauleiter. This assures that State personnel policy is determined in accordance with the National Socialist philosophy.

3. In all other fundamental and political questions communications between the Supreme Reich Authorities and supreme authorities of the States (Laender on the one hand, and the Party on the other, pass through the Head of the Party Chancery exclusively. This assures that the Party, its formations, and affiliated organizations will take a uniform position in all fields of government activity.

4. The Head of the Party Chancery has various powers to secure the influence of the Party in the sphere of local self-government.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3242-PS

December 3, 1945

I, KARL LACHMANN, X-018991, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3242-PS.

KARL LACHMANN
Attorney
X-018991

H1235-0268

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3243-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Page 147

FOOD SUPPLY OF THE JEWS

V.I. 70/924
of the 23 Oct, 1942

The Reichs Minister for Food has made a new ruling on the food supply of the Jews at the instigation of the party-chancellery and has rescinded all previous regulations. The contents of the decree are substantivily the following:

Page 148

2. Allotment of Rations.

Starting with the 42nd allotment period (19 Oct,1942) Jews will not receive the following provisions anymore:

Meat, meatproducts (Fleischwaren) eggs, wheat-products (cake, white-bread, wheat-cookies, wheat-flour etc.) milk, fresh skimmed milk; likewise those foods which are not listed on the standard ration cards of the Reich but which are sold on local purchasing permits or through special decrees of the Food-Offices on free ration card coupons. Jewish children and youths over 10 years of age receive the bread-ration of the standard consumer (Normalverbraucher). Jewish children and youth over 6 years of age receive the fat-ration of the standard consumer no synthetic honey, no cocoa-powder, and likewise none of the additional marmelade to which children from 6-14 are entitled, Jewish children up to 6 years of age receive ½ liter of skimmed fresh milk daily.

Pages 148 - 149

3. Ruling for Invalids etc.

The regulations for sick people, frail persons, pregnant and nursing mothers and women in childbed do not apply in the case of Jews. The rulings of this decree also affect Jewish inmates of hospitals.

Page 150.

10. Food Gift Packages for Jews.

The Food-Offices (Ernaehrungsaemter) are deduct in full from the rations of the recipient all food gift packages sent to Jews from abroad. If it is a matter of products which are limited in purchase but are not allotted regularly (for example coffee-beans, cocao, tea, etc.) the whole shipment -or, in case of a belated report of the arrival, that part of the package which has not yet been used - is to be disposed of in favor of large-scale consumers as for example, military hospitals and to be charged to the latter's quota of supplies.

I, A. Flandreau, Civ. 046305, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3243-P.S.

A. FLANDREAU
Civ. 046305

H1235-0269

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3244-PS
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Decree's / Regulations / Notices
Volume II
Edited by the Party - Chancellery
Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Successor to Frz.Eher,
ltd., Munich

Pages 131 - 132

PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN EUROPE-

RUMORS ABOUT THE POSITION OF THE JEWS IN THE EAST.

V.I. 66/881
of the 9 Oct, 1942

In the course of the work on the final solution of the Jewish problem discussions about "very strict measures" against the Jews, especially in the Eastern territories, have lately been taking place within the population of the various areas of the Reich. Investigations showed that such discussions - mostly in a distorted and exaggerated form- were passed on by soldiers on leave from various units commited in the East, who had the opportunity to eye-witness these measures.

It is conceivable that not all "Blood Germans" are capable of demonstrating sufficient understanding for the necessity of such measures, especially not those parts of the population which do not have the opportunity of visualizing bolshevist atrocities on the basis of their own observations.

In order to be able to counter-act any formation of rumors in this connection, which frequently are of an intentional, prejudiced character, the following statements are issued for information about the present state of affairs:

For approx 2000 years, a so-far unsuccessful battle has been waged against Judaism. Only since 1933 have we started to find ways and means in order to enable a complete separation of Judaism from the German masses.

The work toward a solution which hes previously been accomplished can in the main be divided as follows:

1. The repulsion of Jews from the individual spheres of living of the German people. The laws issued by the lawmaker are hereby to be the basis, which guarantees that future generations will also be protected from a possible newoverflooding by the enemy.
2. The attempt to completely drive out the enemy from the area of the Reich. In view of the only very limited living space (Lebensraum) at the disposal of the German people it was hoped that this problem could be solved in the main by speeding up the Jewish emigration.

Since the outbreak of war in 1939 these possibilities of emigration decreased to an ever greater extent. On the other hand, in addition to the living space (Lebensraum) of the German people, their economic space (Wirtschaftsraum) grew steadily, so that in view of the large numbers of Jews residing in these territories a complete repulsion of the Jews by emigration is no longer possible.

Since even our next generation will not be so close to this problem and will no longer see it clearly enough on the basis of past experiences and since this matter which has now started rolling demands clearing up, the whole problem must still be solved by the present generation.

H1235-0270

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3244-PS
(CONTINUED)

A complete removal or withdrawal of the millions of Jews residing in the European economic space (Wirtschaftsraum) is therefore an urgent need (commandment) in the fight for the security of existence of the German people.

Starting with the territory of the Reich and proceeding to the remaining European countries included in the final solution, the Jews are currently being deported to large camps which have already been established or which are to be established in the East, where they will either be used for work or else transported still farther to the East. The old Jews as well as Jews with high military decorations (Kriegsauszeichnungen) (Iron Cross 1st Class, (E.K.I) Golden Medal for Valor (Goldene Tapferkeitsmedaille), etc.) are currently being resettled in the city of Theresienstadt which is located in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

It lies in the very nature of the matter that these problems which in part are very difficult, can be solved only with ruthless severity in the interest of the final security of our people.

I, A. Flandreau, Civ. 046305, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 3244 -P.S.

A. FLANDREAU
Civ. 046305

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3246-PS
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

Translation of Excerpts
from

"Anordnungen des Stellvertreters des Führers"
(Decrees of the Deputy of the Führer)

an official collection of Party Decrees from 1933 to 31 March 1937, published in book-form by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich, in 1937.

(page 235 lines 14-16)

Decree Nr. 2/36

TO: The Commissioners of the Party Directorate (An die Beauftragten der Parteileitung!).

SUBJECT: Ecclesiastical questions.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

(page 235 lines 22-25)

.....

If parish priests or other subordinate Roman Catholic leaders adopt an attitude of hostility towards State or Party, it shall be reported to the Secret State Police (Gestapo) through official channels.

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(page 236 lines 11-13)

.....

M u n i c h, 7 January 1936

The Chief of Staff to the Deputy of the Führer

(signed) M. B o r m a n n

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 3246-PS

11 December 1945.

I, WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE, Lt (jg), USNR, 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. 3246-PS.

WILLARD EVANS SKIDMORE
Lt (jg), USNR
391590.

English Document No.3249 PS

Affidavit of FRANZ BLAHA

Dachau, Germany
24 November, 1945

I, FRANZ BLAHA, being duly sworn, depose and state as follows:-

1. I studied medicine in Prague, Vienna, Strassburg and Paris and received my diploma in 1920. From 1920 to 1926 I was a clinical assistant. In 1926 I became chief physician of the Iglau Hospital in Moravia, Czechoslovakia. I held this position until 1939 when the Germans entered Czechoslovakia and I was seized as a hostage and held a prisoner for cooperating with the Czech government. I was sent as a prisoner to the Dachau Concentration Camp in April 1941 and remained there until the liberation of the camp in April 1945. Until July 1941 I worked in a Punishment Company. After that I was sent to the hospital and subjected to the experiments in typhoid being conducted by Dr. Muermelstadt. After that I was to be made the subject of an experimental operation and only succeeded in avoiding this by admitting that I was a physician. If this had been known before I would have suffered because intellectuals were treated very harshly in the Punishment Company. In October 1941 I was sent to work in the herb plantation and later in the laboratory for processing herbs. In June 1942 I was taken into the hospital as a surgeon. Shortly afterwards I was directed to conduct a stomach operation on 20 healthy prisoners. Because I would not do this I was put in the autopsy room where I stayed until April 1945. While there I performed approximately 7,000 autopsies. In all 12,000 autopsies were performed under my direction.

2. From mid 1941 to the end of 1942 some 500 operations on healthy prisoners were performed. These were for the instruction of the SS medical students and doctors and included operations on the stomach, gall bladder, spleen and throat.

H1235-0272

These were performed by students and doctors of only two years training although they were very dangerous and difficult. Ordinarily they would not have been done except by surgeons with at least four years surgical practice. Many prisoners died on the operating table and many others from later complications. I autopsied all of these bodies. The doctors who supervised these operations were Lang, Muermelstadt, Wolter, Ramsauer and Mahr. Standartenfuehrer Dr. Lolling frequently witnessed these operations.

3. During my time at Dachau I was familiar with the many kinds of medical experiments carried on there with human victims. These persons were never volunteers but were forced to submit to such acts. Malaria experiments on about 1,200 people were conducted by Dr. Klaus Schilling between 1941 and 1945. Schilling was personally asked by Himmler to conduct these experiments. The victims were either bitten by mosquitoes or given injections of malaria sporozoits taken from mosquitoes. Different kinds of treatment were applied including quinine, pyrifer, neosalvarsan, antipyrin, pyramidon and a drug called 2516 Bohring. I autopsied bodies of people who died from these malaria experiments. 30 to 40 died from the malaria itself. 300 to 400 died later from diseases which were fatal because of the physical condition resulting from the malaria attacks. In addition there were deaths resulting from poisoning due to over-doses of neosalvarsan and pyramidon. Dr. Schilling was present at the time of my autopsies on the bodies of his patients.

4. In 1942 and 1943 experiments on human beings were conducted by Dr. Sigismund Rascher to determine the effects of changing air pressure. As many as 25 persons were put at one time into a specially constructed van in which pressure could be increased or decreased as required. The purpose was to find out the effects of high altitude and of rapid descents by parachutists. I have seen the people lying unconscious on

H1235-0273

H1235-0274

the floor of the van through a window in the van. Most of the prisoners used died from these experiments from internal hemorrhages of the lungs or brain. The rest coughed blood when taken out. It was my job to take the bodies out and to send the internal organs to Munich for study as soon as they were found to be dead. About 400 to 500 prisoners were experimented on. Those not dead were sent to invalid blocks and liquidated shortly afterwards. Only a few escaped.

5. Rascher also conducted experiments on the effect of cold water on humans. This was done to find a way for reviving aviators who had fallen into the ocean. The subject was placed in icecold water and kept there until he was unconscious. Blood was taken from his neck and tested each time his body temperature dropped one degree. This drop was determined by a rectal thermometer. Urine was also periodically tested. Some men lasted as long as 24 to 30 hours. The lowest body temperature reached was 19 degrees C, but most men died at 25 degree C or 26 degree C. When the men were removed from the ice water attempts were made to revive them by artificial warmth from the sun, from hot water, from electro-therapy or by animal warmth. For this last experiment prostitutes were used and the body of the unconscious man was placed between the bodies of two women. Himmler was present at one such experiment. I could see him from one of the windows in the street between the blocks. I have personally been present at some of these cold water experiments when Rascher was absent and I have seen notes and diagrams on them in Rascher's laboratory. About 300 persons were used in these experiments. The majority died. Of those who lived many were mentally deranged. Those not killed were sent to invalid blocks and were killed just as with the victims of the air pressure experiments. I only know two who survived - a Jugoslav and a Pole, both of whom are mental cases.

6. Liver puncture experiments were performed by Dr. Brachtl on healthy people and on people who had diseases of the stomach and gall bladder. For this purpose a needle was jabbed into the liver of a person and a small piece of the liver was extracted. No anaesthetic was used. The experiment is very painful and often had serious results as the stomach or large blood vessels were often punctured resulting in hemorrhage. Many persons died of these tests for which Polish, Russian, Czech and German prisoners were employed. Altogether these experiments were conducted on about 175 people.

7. Phlegmone experiments were conducted by Dr. Schütz, Dr. Babor, Dr. Fleselhetter and Professor Lauer. 40 healthy men were used at a time of which 20 were given intra-muscular and 20 intravenious injections of pus from diseased persons. All treatment was forbidden for three days by which time serious inflammation and in many cases general blood poisoning had occurred. Then each group was divided again into groups of 10. Half were given chemical treatment with liquid and special pills every 10 minutes for 24 hours. The rest were treated with sulfanamide and surgery. In some cases all of the limbs were amputated. My autopsy also showed that the chemical treatment had been harmful and had even caused perforations of the stomach wall. For these experiments Polish, Czech and Dutch priests were ordinarily used. Pain was intense in such experiments. Most of the 600 to 800 persons who were used finally died. Most of the others became permanent invalids and were later killed.

8. In the fall of 1944 there were 60 to 80 persons who were subjected to salt water experiments. They were locked in a room and for five days were given nothing to eat but salt water. During this time their urine blood and exrement were tested. None of these prisoners died, possibly because they received smuggled food from other prisoners. Hungarians and Gypsies were used for these experiments.

H1235-0275

H1235-0276

9. It was common practice to remove the skin from dead prisoners. I was directed to do this on many occasions. Dr. Rascher and Dr. Holter in particular asked for this human skin from human backs and chests. It was chemically treated and placed in the sun to dry. After that it was cut into shapes for use as saddles, riding breeches, gloves, house slippers and ladies' handbags. Tattoed skin was especially valued by SS men. Russians, Poles and other inmates were used in this way, but it was forbidden to cut out the skin of a German. This skin had to be from healthy prisoners and free from defects. Sometimes we did not have enough bodies with good skin and Rascher would say, "All right, you will get the bodies." The next day we would receive 20 or 30 bodies of young people. They would have been shot in the neck or struck on the head so that the skin would be uninjured. Also we frequently got requests for the skulls or skeletons of prisoners. In those cases we boiled the skull or the body. Then the soft parts were removed and the bones were bleached and dried and reassembled. In the case of skulls it was important to have a good set of teeth. When we got an order for skulls from Oranienburg the SS men would say, "We will try to get you some with good teeth." So it was dangerous to have a good skin or good teeth.

10. Transports arrived frequently in Dachau from Studthof, Belsen, Auschwitz, Mauthausen and other camps. Many of these were 10 to 14 days on the way without water or food. On one transport which arrived in November 1942 I found evidence of cannibalism. The living persons had eaten the flesh from the dead bodies. Another transport arrived from Compiegne in France. Professor Limousin of Clermont Ferrand who was later my assistant told me that there had been 2,000 persons on this transport when it started. There was food available but no water. 800 died on the way and were thrown

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out. When it arrived after 12 days more than 500 persons were dead on the train. Of the remainder most died shortly after arrival. I investigated this transport because the International Red Cross complained and the SS men wanted a report that the deaths had been caused by fighting and rioting on the way. I dissected a number of bodies and found that they had died from suffocation and lack of water. It was mid summer and 120 people had been packed into each car.

11. In 1941 and 1942 we had in the camp what we called invalid transports. These were made up of people who were sick or for some reason incapable of working. We called them Himmelfahrt Commandos. About 100 or 120 were ordered each week to go to the shower baths. There four people gave injections of phenol evipan or benzine which soon caused death. After 1943 these invalids were sent to other camps for liquidation. I know that they were killed because I saw the records and they were marked with a cross and the date that they left which was the way that deaths were ordinarily recorded. This was shown on both the card index and the records in the town of Dachau. 1,000 to 3,000 went away every three months so there were about 5,000 sent to death in 1943 and the same in 1944. In April 1945 a Jewish transport was loaded at Dachau and was left standing on the railroad siding. The railroad was destroyed by bombing and they could not leave. So they were just left there to die from starvation. They were not allowed to get off. When the camp was liberated they were all dead.

12. Many executions by gas or shooting or injections took place right in the camp. The gas chamber was completed in 1944 and I was called by Dr. Rascher to examine the first victims. Of the 8 or 9 persons in the chamber there were three still alive and the remainder appeared to be dead. Their eyes were red and their faces were swollen. Many prisoners were later killed in this way. Afterwards they were removed to the

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crematorium where I had to examine their teeth for gold. Teeth containing gold were extracted. Many prisoners who were sick were killed by injections while in hospital. Some prisoners killed in the hospital came through to the autopsy room with no name or number on the tag which was usually tied to their big toe. Instead the tag said "Do not dissect". I autopsied some of these and found that they were perfectly healthy but had died from injections. Sometimes prisoners were killed only because they had dysentry or vomited and gave the nurses too much trouble. Mental patients were liquidated by being led to the gas chamber and injected there or shot. Shooting was a common method of execution. Prisoners could be shot just outside the crematorium and carried in. I have seen people pushed into the ovens while they were still breathing and making sounds although if they were too much alive they were usually hit on the head first.

16. The principal executions about which I know from having examined the victims or supervised such examinations are as follows:

In 1942 there were 5,000 to 6,000 Russians held in a separate camp inside Dachau. They were taken on foot to the Military Rifle Range near the camp in groups of 500 or 600 and shot. These groups left the camp about three times a week. At night they would bring them back in carts drawn by prisoners and we would examine them. - In February 1944 about 40 Russian students arrived from Moosburg. I knew a few of the boys in the hospital. I examined them after they were shot outside the crematory. - In September 1944 a group of 94 high ranking Russians were shot including two military doctors who had been working with me in the hospital. I examined their bodies. - In April 1945 a number of prominent people were shot who had been kept in the bunker. They included two French generals whose names I cannot remember. But I recognised them

from their uniform. I examined them after they were shot. - In 1944 and 1945 a number of women were killed by hanging, shooting and injections. I examined them and found that in certain cases they were pregnant. - In 1945 just before the camp was liberated all "Nacht und Nebel" prisoners were executed. These were prisoners who were forbidden to have any contact with the outside world. They were kept in a special inclosure and were allowed no mail. There were 30 or 40, some of whom were sick. These were carried to the crematory on stretchers. I examined them and found they had all been shot in the neck.

14. The rooms could not be cleaned because they were too crowded and there was no cleaning material. No baths were available for months at a time. Latrine facilities were completely inadequate. Medicine was almost non-existent. But I found after the camp was liberated that there was plenty of medicine in the SS hospital for all the camp if it had been given to us for use. New arrivals at the camp were lined up out of doors entirely naked for hours at a time. Sometimes they stood there from morning until night. It did not matter whether this was in the winter or in the summer. This occurred all through 1943, 1944 and the first quarter of 1945. I could see these formations from the window of the autopsy room. Many of the people who had to stand in the cold in this way became ill from pneumonia and died. I had several acquaintances who were killed in this manner during 1944 and 1945. In October 1944 a transport of Hungarians brought spotted fever into the camp and an epidemic began. I examined many of the corpses from this transport and reported the situation to Dr. Hintermayer but was forbidden on penalty of being shot to mention that there was an epidemic in the camp. No preventive measures were taken at all. New healthy arrivals were put into blocks where an epidemic was already present. Also infected persons were put

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into these blocks. So the 30th Block for instance died out completely three times. Only at Christmas when the epidemic spread into the SS camp was a quarantine established. Nevertheless transports continued to arrive. We had 200 to 300 new typhus cases a day and 100 deaths caused by typhus a day. In all we had 28,000 cases and 15,000 deaths. In addition to those that died from the disease my autopsies showed that many deaths were caused solely by malnutrition. Such deaths occurred in all the years from 1941 to 1945. They were mostly Italians, Russians and Frenchmen. These people were just starved to death. At the time of death they weighed 50 to 60 pounds. Autopsies showed that their internal organs had often shrunk to one third of their normal size.

15. Visits from prominent people were common at Dachau. Among those who came I remember Himmler who came three times to see air pressure and cold water experiments, Dr. Grawitz who was Reichsarzt SS, Wilhelm Frick who came once in 1943 and visited the malaria station and Rascher's experimental station and Walter Funk who also came in 1945 and made a general tour of the camp.

The facts stated above are true: this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion: after reading over the statement I have signed and executed the same at DACHAU/Germany this 24th day of November 1945.

s/ Dr. Blaha Frank *)
DR. BLAHA FRANK

*)
Note:
My first name is Franz.
My usual signature is as above.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of November 1945 at DACHAU/Germany.

s/ John B. Martin
JOHN B. MARTIN.

H1235-0281

I, SIGFRIED R..LLER, Civilian, do hereby certify that I am a qualified translator of the German language; that the attached translation is a true and correct translation of the above statement: this 25th day of November 1945 at D.CH.U/Germany.

SIGF..LD R..LLER.

Exhibit No 682
Filed Jan. 16, 1946

3355-PS

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT ~~3335-PS~~
OFFICE OF U S CHIEF OF COUNSEL

AFFIDAVIT

X I, ROBERT M.W. KEMPNER, an expert Consultant of the War Department appeared before the undersigned attesting officer and having been duly sworn stated as follows:

In my capacity as Superior Government Counseller and Chief Legal Adviser of the pre-Hitler Prussian Police Administration, I became officially acquainted with the criminal record of Martin Bormann, identical with the Defendant Martin Bormann now under indictment before the International Military Tribunal in Nuernberg, Germany.

The official criminal record of Martin Bormann countained the following entry:

BORMANN, MARTIN, sentenced on May 15,1924, by the State Tribunal for the Protection of the Republic, in Leipzig, Germany, to one year in prison, for having been an accomplice in the commission of a political murder.

ROBERT M. W. KEMPNER X

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th day of December 1945.

NORMANN A. STOLL
Captain, JAGD

H1235-0282

Exhibit USA 699

Filed Jan. 16, 1946

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-36
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

Berlin, 5 September 1942

The Minister

on the p r e m i s e s

In the enclosure I submit a memorandum dated 19 August 1942 containing the opinion of my collaborator Dr. Markull on the Bormann letter of 23 July.

I should be grateful if you would consider the memorandum as submitted to you personally and return it to me in person, in view of its serious character. The problem raised is so fundamental for our entire policy in the East that I felt obliged to submit it to you.

(signed) Leibbrandt

Draft
5 copies

1st dopy

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 19 August 1942

Concerning Bormann's letter

6 copies
1st copy

On 23 July 42 Party Director Bormann sent the Minister a letter which enumerates in 8 paragraphs the principles the Minister is to follow in administering the Occupied Areas in the East. Thereupon the Minister in a message to the Fuehrer dated 11 August 42 explained in detail to what extent these principles are already being put into practice or used as a basis of policy.

Any person reading this correspondence is struck first of all by the complete agreement of concepts. The Minister apparently was particularly concerned about two points: the first relates to the protection of German rule against the pressure of the Slav race, the second to the absolute necessity of simplifying the administration. These are indeed decisive problems of which more will have to be said. For the rest the Minister not only raises no objections against Bormann's principles or even his phraseology; on the contrary he uses them as a basis of his reply and endeavors to show that they are already being put into practice. When, however, Bormann's letter was read out by Captain Zimmermann in a conference of the Department Chiefs, grave concern was shown at once, both on account of the phraseology of the letter and the future conduct of our policy. In order to find out whether this concern is justified, it is best to start from a fiction which will show clearly what the situation is.

I.

Let us suppose Bormann's letter were issued to the Reich Commissioners as a ministerial decree. This supposition is by no means unrealistic since the Minister appears to hold identical views. Since the "Ostland" (Baltic area) presents a special case, and since the Ukraine is, or will become, probably the most important region politically, the following discussion will be based mainly on the conditions prevailing in that region.

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H1235-0284

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-36
OFFICE OF US CHIEF OF COUNSEL
(cont.)

1. The consequences of a ministerial decree of this kind will be judged best by its effect on those men whose duty it is to put it into practice. The supposed decree would, however, be particularly effective and would influence opinions to a particular degree for reasons which will be discussed below. Imagine the formulas of Bormann's letter translated into the language of a member of the German civil administration, and you will get roughly the following views.

"The Slavs are to work for us. In so far as we don't need them, they may die. Therefore dompulsory vaccination and German health services are superfluous. The fertility of the Slavs is undesirable. They may use contraceptives or practice abortion, the more the better. Education is dangerous. It is enough if they can count up to 100. At best an dducation which produces useful stooges for us is admissible. Every educated person is a future enemy. Religion we leave to them as a means of diversion. As for food they won't get any more than is necessary. We are the masters, we come first.

These sentences are by no means overstatements. On the contrary, they are covered word by word by the spirit and the text of Bormann's letter. Already at this point the question arises whether such a result is desirable in the interests of the Reich. It can hardly be doubted that these views would become known to the Ukrainian people. Similar opinions prevail even today. Those who are familiar with the conditions know that these views coincide, in part verbatim, with the so-called "Fascist viewpoint" as dinned into the masses by bolshevist propaganda. The political consequences are obvious.

2. But there is no real need to assume a fictious decree as was done in Paragraph 1. The above mantioned concepts of our role in the East already exist in practice.

The Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine has expounded his views of the Ukrainianpeople over which he rules in three successive speeches at the opening of the German House on 16 April 42, at the celebration of the Fuehrer's birthday, and at the inauguration of the Pary District. He declared on these and several other occasions that this people stood far below us and should be grateful to God that we allow them to stay alive. We had liberated them, in return they must know no other goal except to
riginal work for us. There could be no human companionship. A "soft" policy
page -2- of understanding was out of the question. District Commissioners who maintained good relations with the population were mistrusted by him ipso facto. He would on no account follow the Berlin policy.

Let me supplement these pronouncements briefly by a few phrases, which every visitor and every member of the local civil administration can confirm from his own observation. Taken from day-to-day experience they show particularly clearly howwell the soil is prepared for the Bormann letter.

"Strictly speaking, we are here among negroes" (meeting of the Cultural Department, April 1942)
"The population is just dirty and lazy" (this was the opinion in the Winter, in the spring the same people were of the opposite opinion)
"In my area, whoever shows signs of intelligence will be shot" (District Commissioner "Kreisleiter" Becher, Gaiszin)
"We must always endeavour to incite one group against the other" (often repeated especially by the Police)
"All we do is to take what we need, the rest can go to the dogs" (statement by economic officials)
"In all unpleasant matters the odium must fall on the Ukrainian department heads" (general administrative maxim)

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I may add that for instance "Kreisleiter" Knuth whom the "Gauleiter" still retains, in spite of the gravest accusations against his integrity in business matters, declared in conversation on the Kiev question, that Kiev ought to be depopulated through epidemics. Altogether it would be best if the superfluous part of the population starved to death. When shortly after Tiso's visit, the famous Lavra Monastery was blown up, in spite of being under SS Guard, the same circle thoroughly welcomed the vent, because they erroneously assumed that it would weaken the Ukrainian national spirit, where as actually the opposite happened.

3. There is, however, no uniformity of opinion in regard to these matters within the Ukraine. One might even say that this policy is advocated only by Koch's personal entourage and by the colleagues which he has chosen. On the other hand nearly all the Department Chiefs at the Kovno office declare more or less openly that they consider these opinions disastrous and detach themselves from them. It was because he sensed this hostility that the Reich Commissioner told his department chiefs some weeks ago in a conference that there were two groups among them, one frankly working against him, the other doing the same thing secretly.

Finally among the District Commissioners at least 80% oppose the views described above. In many conferences with the General Commissioners they emphasized that the population ought to be treated decently and with understanding, that its cultural gifts were surprisingly high, that its labor efficiency was considerable, that we however were about to throw away a precious stock of gratitude, affection, and confidence. Statements like the following are heard frequently:

"If this policy is continued, there will be a catastrophe." - "These sharp practices will attain nothing except to make the Ukrainians hate us". "Our position here is already lost", etc.

For the rest the only effect of the false concepts of the Master Race is to relax the discipline of our officials. Thus the report of the Kiev Commissioner General of March 42 reads:
"Regreattably enough there were also greater numbers of offences committed by Germans. It is to be hoped that the work of the law courts will soon succeed in eliminating those elements whose place is not in the occupied areas and in creating a situation where higher standards of general conduct are required from every German in the occupied countries."

4. The above mentioned policy of the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine is in obvious contrast not only to opinion of 80% of his District Commissioners and specialists, but also to the decrees of the Minister. In the decree of 22 November 41 it is expressly pointed out that the Ukrainians must not be considered, let alone treated as niggers. In the decree of 17 March 42 this order is reiteratedmore emphatically. The decree of 13 May 42 oppose the opinion that the Ukrainians are not a nation at all, and the false doctrine of the Master race. Yet in spite of efforts lasting for a whole year it was impossible to change the official spirit of the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine. The majority of the administration leaders place their hopes in the Minister. A ministerial decree conforming to the Bormann letter would be considered by them as evidence of a complete change of policy and would result in deep depression and loss of confidence.

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This contrast of opinion between Minister and Reich Commissioner has become known not only within the Civil Administration, but also in the Supreme Reich Administration. Many officials of other branches have visited the Ukraine as well as the "Ostland". Nearly all of them come home with the conviction that the Minister could not carry through his policy, and that, on the contrary the Reich Commissioners considered the Ministry completely superfluous in view of the position of Governor General Frank.

5. Perhaps one ought to inquire whether there is not in fact an agreement between the policy hitherto pursued and the Bormann letter in the sense that the decrees quoted above and the other instructions of the Ministry are to be understood merely as tactical moves, whereas in fact there is no divergence of opinion. The Minister's reply of 11 August might be considered to point in this direction.

   In answer to this it should be pointed out that the Minister knows very well that it is not possible to rearrange a continent of the size of Russia by means of political tactics and by wearing the mask of a liberator, but only by applying a statesmanlike conception appropriate to the political conditions and to the dignity of the Reich. The frequently reiterated demands for a differentiated treatment of the Eastern nations are based on the conviction that these nations, after having been liberated from Bolshevism must, as a matter of course, be given their national and cultural rights. Unless this is presupposed, they could never be expected to forswear Russian nationalism.

   Another reason why the Minister's policy cannot be interpreted merely as a tactical manoeuvre is the inconsistency which this would imply. For in that case the word "liberation" ought never to have been mentioned. No theater should be allowed to stay open, no trade school, no Ukrainian university institute should be allowed to function. No Ukrainian artists, doctors, judges should be brought to Germany to attend course as is happening now.

6. Therefore the situation is this: Although Bormann's letter originates from Field Headquarters, it cannot be issued as a ministerial decree since such a decree would disavow the entire policy hitherto pronounced by the Minister. If his policy were founded upon a far reaching conception, this conception would simply be smashed. If his policy merely pursued a certain tactical line, this too would fail since Koch's opposition has rejected and sabotaged these tactics from the beginning. In this connection it is necessary to point once more to the obvious similarity between the opinions professed by Koch and the instructions given in the Bormann letter. Leaving aside the question whether this similarity is accidental, in any case the result is taht Koch's opinion has prevailed over that of the Minister. Judging by previous experience, it cannot be assumed that Bormann's letter will remain for long unknown to the Reich Commissioners, at least in regard to its general tendency. Thus the question arises whether this development is to be allow ed to take its course, and whether the matter can be allowed to rest where the report to the Fuehrer of 11 August 1942 left it. Only the Minister himself can decide upon this question. Even so the following considerations are useful: ever since the Ministry was set up on the principle of concentration and unity of leadership, it lost more and more power in striking contrast to that principle. The question of the relationship with the Police, so important in practice, was settled to the disadvantage of the civil administration. Unified leadership in the hands of the District Commissioners was thus dissolved. The higher SS and Police leaders refuse to pay the usual respect to the General Commissioners such as reporting, etc. All technical

questions are decided upon by Speer. Agricultural questions are dealt with by a department of the Ministry of Food and by the Office for the Four Year Plan; the same applies to Forestry and Trade. Authority in racial questions is assumed more and more by the Commissioner for the Consolidation of German Nationhood. Nor is there any unity among the authorities in questions of propaganda. It is not surprising in view of this development that the Supreme Reich Administration continue their attacks and try to pry loose one prerogative after the other. Nor isit surprising under these circumstances that in the Berlin Offices it is openly rumored that the Ministry is to be changed into a mere staff organization.This is not the place to enter further into these matters. They may rather serve as a background against which the ncessity of a clarification of basic policies stands out all the more sharptly. The Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories enjoys particular prestige with the public because of the personality at its head. This is not the prestige of an able tactician, or of a reckless tyrant, but the public have rightly confidence in clear-cut spiritual solutions. In the same way the prestige enjoyed by the Ministry from the other Reich Authorities rests specifically on this foundation. The considerations set out above lead perforce to the conclusion that the existence of Bormann's letter constitutes an attack against this foundation. The political line therefore is doubly threatened by the organizational difficulties mentioned above.

II.

What has been said so far shows how necessary it is that the situation be clarified; how and when this is to be done, is for the Minister to decide. In his letter of 11 August 1942 he has left open for himself the possibility of a special audience with the Fuehrer. There are, however, several more points which need clarification.

1. Without wishing to criticize in any way the statements of Party Director Bormann it is yet necessary to point out that the working of his letter does not always bring out clearly the importance of the issue at stake. A phrase like "brisk trade in contraceptives" hadbetter not be brought into connection with the name of the Fuehrer. In the same way abrupt phrases like: "vaccination of the non-German population is out of the question", "under no circumstances higher education", "the population must not rise to a higher standard", under no circumstances German Health Sefvices" would hardly seem to be entirely in keeping with the importance of the historical problems involved. Compared with the diginity of the conception of the German State phrases like these would seem altogether inadmissable as instructionsfor the German policy in the East.

2. As has been mentioned above, the Reich Commissioner Koch leads an especially strong agitation against the so-called "soft" policy.Any
Original action founded on understanding and on a politically commendable respect
page -5- for the justified susceptibilities of foreign nationhood is at once denounced from their quarters as weakness and slackening of the "master consciousness". But this attitude leads to the same inconsistencies which were discussed above in Part I, Paragraph 5, in connection with the Question of tactics. In the "Voelkischer Beobachter" of 20 August 1942 Koch proudly speaks of the Ukrainians having been furthered in their cultural and intellectual efforts. This shows that even if one starts from his viewpoint, it is impossible to disregard entirely foreign nationhood. The unfortunate "master" complex, however, surrounds even sensible measures with those clouds of mental reservations and tactical insincerity which were characteristic of Czarist policy in regard to non-Russian nations. For the rest, it is entirely incomprehensible why there should be any fear lest we might breed "by any of our measures a master -feeling" in Slav nations. (Bormann letter, Point 5) Surely it goes

without saying that nobody thinks of subjecting even the most russified person of German blood to Ukrainian or Esthonian judicature or police. Nobody knows the German nation better than the Fuehrer. He knows only too well that the German sometimes tends to be all too decent and careless. But he also knows that judging by past experience all the worst instincts are usually aroused by appeals to the master spirit as propagated from Rovno. Certain incidents in the Government General ("Kreishauptmann" von Hirschfeld, Cpt. von Sahla) ought to serve as warning examples. It should be emphatically stressed that the German claim to leadership is a matter of course, and that a continuous, mistrustfull overstressing of that claim is only liable to cause breakdowns in personal and political relations.

3. A further important point which needs clarification is consituted by the numerous historical errors on which these various authorities base their opinions. (this paragraph and the following (4) contain historical proof that there is a Ukrainian nation and that it is wrong to speak of a "uniform Slav rabble".

III.

The statements set out above may appear very sharp. They are, however, dictated by concern and duty. (This paragraph contains proposals of policy. Germany ought to rule for the benefit of Europe and not on the principle that the occupied countries are to be exploited for the benefit of Germany alone. The nations in the East should be ruled, but not oppressed. "One can lead only those whom one respects." Proposals for simplification and unification of administration) The letter ends:

These demands of political philosophy are being realised in a grandiose manner by our Japanese ally in his newly occupied southern districts. The general rules for the administration of Greater Asia which were published a short time ago ("Foreign Policy", July 1942) contain a classic formula for a Reich policy of this kind. The dangers inherent in the character of the Japanese nation such as arrogance, misuse of power, lack of respect for foreign nationhood are exorcised by an open challenge by the highest official authority, an act of frankness which gives the impression of supreme self-reliance. The political opinion thus expressed is strikingly similar to the Minister's own concept. The fate of the Reich will depend on whether or not this concept can be realised.

(signed) Dr. M

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT R-36

November 23, 1945

I WALTER ROTHSCHILD, 1st Lt. AUS, ASN-0886354 hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document R-36.

WALTER ROTHSCHILD
1st Lt. AUS
ASN-0886354.

H1235-0288

EXTRACT TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-139
OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0289

DOCUMENT A.

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY

The Führer's Deputy
Chief of Staff

Munich 33, 12 July 1940
Braunes Haus
III/Dr.Kl.-Pu.
2610/0/103

The Reichsführer SS
Partymember Heinrich Himmler
Berlin, S.W.11.

Prinz Albrechtstr. 8

Subject matter: Introduction of the Civil Code in the new Eastern territories.

Dear Heinrich,

I am enclosing a copy of my letter of this day to the Reich Minister of Justice for your information.

I have asked my officials who are dealing with this matter to arrange for a preliminary conference in which the Gauleiters concerned, the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Race and Culture, the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service and the Racial Policy Department should convene before the conference which will be called by the Reich Minister of Justice.

Heil Hitler!

Yours

(M. Bormann)

DOCUMENT B.

National Socialist German Workers' Party
Berlin-Wilhelmstr. 64

Munich-Braunes Haus

Copy

The Fuhrer's Deputy

12 July 1940
III/Dr.Kl.-Pu.
2610/0/103

The Reich Minister of Justice
Berlin W.8
Wilhelmstr. 65

Subject matter: Introduction of provisions of civil law in the annexed Eastern territories.

I refer to the several conferences of our experts and confirm that I question the wisdom of introducing the German civil law in the form you propose in the annexed Eastern territories. As I learned from my officials you share my view that many provisions of German civil law ought not to be applied to Poles and Polish legal relationships. I refer in particular to the provisions of family law, the law of

succession, of real estate, of clubs and associations.

p.2) The clause suggested by your experts at the conference of reporters which has meanwhile been held: "Poles may not invoke provisions made solely for the protection of German Race and culture" is much too narrow. It is not sufficient to prevent an undesirable equalisation between Poles and German nationals.

Such a clause is questionable also because it puts upon the judge the legislative decision as to how to form political situations. Experience has shown that most of the judges are not able in their judgments to assist in the correct formation of political situations.

I have been told that the German courts apply German civil law, though it is not yet introduced in the Eastern territories, and treat the Poles in a way which should be reserved for German nationals only.

It is presumed that the endeavors to introduce German civil law in the Eastern territories will be increased.

I should like, in this respect, to refer to the experience which we had with the introduction of German criminal law in the Eastern territories.

It is therefore to be feared that judgments by German courts applying German civil law to Poles and Polish legal relationships will cause unrest among German nationals. In some cases the execution of judgments may even have to be prevented by police measures.

Such undermining of state authority is in my opinion absolutely inadvisable, particularly in territories with a large Polish population.

It appears to me necessary therefore that each and every legal provision which is to be introduced in the Eastern territories shall be examined separately as to how far its application to Poles may be advisable. Provisions whose results may be questionable should, as far as possible, not be introduced in the Eastern territories. Only those which are absolutely necessary for the safeguarding of justice should be introduced at the moment.

I would also consider it advisable not to order the introduction of civil law by way of Reich legislation but by decrees of the Reichstatthalters. The Polish minority law will be given its final shape only in stages, in accordance with experiences gained from time to time. When introducing German law in the Eastern territories I should therefore consider it advisable from the beginning to take into consideration the possibility of easy amendments and alterations.

I suggest a further conference of reporters be arranged for the examination of these questions to which, in addition to the Public Custodian East, (Haupttreuhandstelle), the experts of the Reichstatthalters, the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Race and Culture and the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service should be invited.

Heil Hitler!
The Deputy
signed M. Bormann
(M. Bormann)

H1235-0290

EXTRACT OF TRANSLATION OF DOC.R-139
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

H1235-0291

DOCUMENT C

Note

OI/28r/13.2.40 B

6.8.40

Subject: Application of Civil Law in the annexed Eastern territories.

(translator's note:

pp 1-2 refer to a preliminary conference held on the 2.8.1940 at Hess's Staff which is of no further interest).

Page 2--bottom of page: "there followed a conference in the Ministry of Justice at 10.30 a.m. in which about 40 persons took part, including:

Ministerial director Volkmar, in Ministry of Justice as Chairman.

Fechner, Judge in a Court of Appeal, as reporter.

President Hesse, for the land registry - departments of the Ministry of Justice.

p.3 Roxroth, Judge in a Court of Appeal.

Mabfeller, Councillor to the Ministry Department for Family Law.

Many other officials from the Ministry of Justice.

The presidents of the Courts of Appeal of Posen and Danzig.

Ministerial Director Klopfer.

Dr. Encke, Hess's Staff.

A representative of the Reich Minister for Economy.

A representative of the Reich Minister for the Interior.

Dr. Gramse, Councillor to the government for the Four Year Plan.

Lawyer Schubert, HTO (abbreviation for Haupttreuhandstelle Ost-
Lawyer Pfennig, HTO (Public Custodian East).
SS Obersturmfuhrer Dr. Bover and two other representatives of the Reich Security Main Department, (RSHA).
"
Lawyer Gotz

Lawyer Wirsich

Mr. Volkmar pointed out the lack of clarity, the variations and the territorial and substantive division of the legislation at present in force. For all practical purposes, German law was already applied in the Eastern territories so that the bill amounts only to legalizing the existing state of affairs. He then dealt with the objections of the Fuhrer's deputy. According to his view a special code for Poles could not be created at present because the political principles for the treatment of Poles were not yet clear and the preliminary work might require years. The Poles were already, for all prac-

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tical purposes, excluded from legal commerce and intercourse by measures of public law. Even the present bill relates only to the position of the Poles according to civil law and would not affect the restrictions of their legal position based on public law. If a Pole, despite the prohibitions
p.4. of the public law had, with the consent of the competent authority, acquired a piece of land, he could mortgage this land in accordance with the provisions of the civil code. The public law has precedence over the private law and the bill does not affect that. Finally, Mr. Volkmar referred to the fundamental clauses suggested of which two drafts are submitted.

(a) Poles may not invoke provisions made solely for the protection of German Race and Culture.

(b) If the application of the law would lead to consequences which are undesirable from a racial point of view then the law is to be applied only judiciously.

He would prefer (a) because (b) would endanger the rule of law and would burden the judge with responsibility for racial questions.

Klopfer stated that Reich Minister Hess, the Reichsführer SS and the four Gauleiters concerned unanimously rejected the bill. The treatment of the Poles would be dealt with by the Fuhrer at the end of the week. The antiquated conception of territoriality in law must be overcome. A state's essential element is in human beings. The personal status, as had been partly the case in the legislation for Jews, should be brought to the fore, especially as the Reich territory is being extended and foreign nationals are being included also in the West. The Reich Minister of Justice had already introduced the German criminal law prematurely. Many complaints from the Eastern territories had already been made to Hess's Staff about impossible sentences. Similar grievances would also be caused in the present case. The judges would be the ones to suffer and the police would have to counter the measures of the court to a greater extent than in the pre-war Reich territory.

He predicts undesirable results not only in the spheres of family law, the law of succession and associations, but for example, also in the sphere of the law relating to labour and service contracts. In this respect the Ministry of Labor had raised objections. All contractual relations based on loyalty are impossible between Germans and Poles. Having regard to the different conditions in the various "Gaue" one should delegate the legislation to the Reichsstatthalters, in order to facilitate an amendment of the law. It would be best to leave things just as they were.

Volkmar spoke against partial application of the civil code by the Reichstatthalters. He emphasized that he would regard it as a return to old times if Reich law was again replaced by state law.

Klopfer replied that in Rome at the time of its peak a special law (jus civile) was in force for its citizens, another minor law for the colonials and no law for the slaves.

The president of the court of appeal in Posen, Mr. Frobos, stated surprisingly that his Gauleiter and he himself were agreed that there were no objections against the bill concerning the application of the Civil Code. It would only legalize the instruction which he, in agreement with Greiser, had given when taking over his office i.e. simply to apply German law at short notice. Delay of the application strengthened the hopes of the Poles for a revision of the frontiers, because the present condition looked too much like a temporary situation and suggested indecision. He had instructed his judges that Poles were never equal to the Germans and that the principle of equality of men before the law was finished. A judge would be dismissed if, for example, he would give judgment for a Pole against a regional authority. He thinks that the general clause (a) would be insufficient and he would prefer the draft (b). In his opinion there was no sphere of law that was not political, not even the land-registry, the non-contentious jurisdiction, or the youth law. The Eastern territories were colonial territory, the Poles correspond to the colored people.

(Translator's note:
p. 6) Statements follow by the president of the court of appeal of Danzig, by Pfennig, by representatives of the

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Minister of the Interior and of the Minister of Economics, in support of Volkmar's theseis).
"Ministerialdirektor Volkmar declared thereupon that apparently all authorities - and what he considered particularly essential - the practicians from the Eastern territories, asked for introduction of the law, while it was reserved for the Deputy of the Führer to oppose these wishes of all agencies connected with the reconstruction of the Eastern territories.

Then SS Obersturmfuhrer Dr. Beyer and lawyer Götz asked for permission to speak. SS Obersturmfuhrer Beyer (p.7) stated that the Reichsführer SS was also definitely opposed to the bill in its present form. The bill was based on out-of-date conceptions because it was based on the principle of equality before the law which was absolutely inapplicable to Poles.

Lawyer Götz supported Dr. Beyer's and Ministerialdirector Klopfer's statements. He pointed to the contradiction that the presidents of the courts of appeal, on the one hand, approved the present legal position, the Minister of Justice, on the other hand, gave as reason for the urgency of the bill the difficulties and inconveniences arising out of the present position. Since the Fuhrer, as Klopfer had mentioned, would within a few days make a general decision about the position and treatment of the Poles, a postponement of the introduction of legislation for several months seemed appropriate or there should be a careful examination as to what individual legal sections could be introduced without any doubts.

The following discussion of the several subjects showed that nearly all subjects are doubtful, even the law of procedure. Then followed a longthy discussion as to whether a Pole could bring an action against a German and whether Poles could be witnesses. Klopfer suggested that a special arbitration department could be created for claims of Poles against Germans to prevent Poles and Germans from standing on an equal footing before the judge.

The proposal of a partial application of the German code was withdrawn as objections were made in respect of nearly all legal sections. It was furthermore discussed whether it was possible to introduce the German law for Germans only and to leave the lawless position for Poles as it was. If this (p.8) personal status were introduced, the question of the treatment of legal relations between Germans and Poles would cause difficulties. The representatives of t he Reich Security Main Department seemed to prefer the opinion that legal relations between Germans and Poles should not be determined by legal methods but according to the concept of racial superiority (authoritarian relationship). Klopfer mentioned with regard to this that Poles who are sent as workers into the Reich should not be able to bring an action in the Labor Courts against their employers.

The Ministry of Justice is trying to compromise by proposing a new wording of the general clause, which was set out by Mr. Volkmar as follows:

"The law to be introduced is on principle to be applied only to German nationals, to non-German nationals only insofar as it does not lead to consequences which are undesirable from the point of view of racial policy." This general clause should, if necessary, precede (perhaps in the form of a preamble) and be emphasized as the dominating principle of the whole introduction of the German law. The exact draft will be

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sent to all present.

Mr. Klopfer was very satisfied with the result of the conference and thanked Messrs. Götz and Beyer for their intervention.

signed: Götz (?)

DOCUMENT D. (Pencil Note:) III/109?
2610/6/103

21 August 1940

To
The Reich Minister
and Chief of the Reich Chancery

Dr. H. H. Lammers

Berlin W.8

Vossstrasse 6

Registered letter
Dispatched on
Aug. 21st 1940
(initial)

Re: Introduction of Civil Law into the incorporated Eastern territories.

The draft of an ordinance, submitted by the Reich Minister of Justice, provides for the introduction into the incorporated Eastern territories of Civil Law, Commercial law, and the provisions for the administration of civil law which are in force in Germany proper. The Reich Minister of Justice considers it urgently necessary to issue the ordinance, since the present legal situation in the realm of the administration of civil justice in the incorporated Eastern Territories has led to frequent difficulties. As a rule the German Courts were not in a position to ascertain and apply the law which they ought to apply according to section 7, Decree of the Fuehrer concerning the Organization and Administration of Eastern Territories of 8.10.39.

initials

initials

IIIA for co-signature
M.B. 17/8

Therefore they were already basing their decisions as a rule on German law. There was considerable uncertainty as to the law applicable, and this particularly hampered economic reconstruction in the incorporated Eastern territories.

The Reich Minister of Justice is of the opinion that Civil law must be introduced for every person resident within the Eastern Territories without regard to race, since it could not yet be ascertained, in what respect the Poles ought to be subjected to special ruling. He thinks it would be sufficient to authorize the Judge by a general proviso, to disregard the application of German law, in cases where the application of German law to persons of non-German race would lead either to unreasonable hardships or to consequences undesirable from the point of view of racial policy. In such cases German law should be made to correspond to the particular situation. For the rest, the Reich Minister of Justice is of the opinion that the question whether the Poles should be subject to a special law was a matter of public law which did not touch civil law.

I wish to object strongly against the ruling proposed by the Reich Minister of Justice. That kind of mind, which solves even the problem of the introduction of law solely according to territories and areas affected, but without considering the persons inhabiting them, is composed of ideologies which are no longer justified at the present time. Only Germans should be allowed to invoke German law, especially where they are obliged to live in a community with men of completely different racial qualities. This is why I do not consider it feasible to grant the persons inhabiting the Eastern areas equal status with the Germans in Germany proper by introducing German law. With regard to Poles we shall have to invent, not only for public law, but also for civil law,

(page 2)

21st August 1940
To the Reich Minister
and Chief of Reich Chancery
Dr. H. H. Lammers
Berlin W.8. Vossstr.6

a personal status accurately defining their legal situation. This status must follow them, even when they leave their residence, e.g. in order to be employed as workers in Germany.

It is impossible to allow Poles residing in the Eastern Territories to enjoy the benefits of German Civil Law, especially the benefits of the law of association, real property law, family law, law of inheritance, commercial law. I consider it inadmissible that a Pole should have the right to sue a German before a German Court, to testify against a German in a law-suit, and even, as the case may be, to enforce a judgment against him through the good offices of a bailiff. There are numerous other spheres of the civil law, which cannot even be ascertained at this early moment, in which the Poles will have to be subjected to separate treatment.

It is for these reasons that I consider it, in principle, inadvisable to introduce equality of law between Germans and Poles.

Nor are these scruples dispelled by the fact that the draft contains a general proviso, according to which the Judge is authorized to deviate from German law when the application of the German laws to Poles would lead to hardship or to racially and politically undesirable consequences. Even if the proviso were drafted in such a way as to permit elastic interpretation, it would not be certain that all these laws which are unsuitable for Poles will never be applied to them. The main objection is that in this way the Judge would be burdened with the responsibility for a political decision which ought to be for the legislator exclusively. The interpretation which the Courts would put on the general proviso would practically speaking develop a special law for the Poles; it seems only too probable that the final decision of the legislator might be prejudiced thereby. Even if introduction of such a general proviso might be called the easiest method for balancing the difficulties which are to be expected if the German civil law is introduced en bloc in the East, I am still unable to agree to it for reasons of policy.

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I do not think there will be difficulties if we refrain from introducing the civil law by legislation. The legal conditions, as they are presently application of German law to Germans, modified application of it to Poles - do not operate to the prejudice of the racial Germans residing in the Eastern areas. There exists indeed some uncertainty as to the law; but it operates exclusively to the prejudice of the Poles, whereas it rather benefits the racial Germans. The Germans cannot suffer disadvantages since the Judge applies German law with regard to them; they may even have advantages since the Judge is entitled, as the case may be, to deviate in their favor from the provisions of German law. He would no longer be able to do so, if the entire civil law were introduced without differentiating between Germans and Poles.

On the other hand I recognize the necessity for introducing various legal regulations-especially of a formal character- for the benefit of the Germans. But since the situation is different in every district, I do not think it advisable to introduce them by Reich legislation. We rather ought to authorize the Reich Governors and Provincial Presidents to introduce them by an ordinance and to decide on their own responsibility what rules are to be introduced and what date.

(page 3)

Since we were not able to come to an agreement with the Reich Minister of Justice, and since it is a question of great political significance to decide whether the law to be introduced is to provide equality between Germans and Poles, I should be grateful if you would submit this question as soon as possible to the Führer for his decision.

Heil Hitler!
By order
(signed) M. Bormann

(Pencil:) resubmit at once to IIIC

DOCUMENT E.

September 2nd 1940
III/09-Ku

1) To the
Reich Minister and Chief of
Reich Chancery

Dr. H. H. Lammers

Dispatch 2.9.40
Ku

Berlin W.8

Vossstr. 6.

Re: Introduction of German civil law into the Incorporated Eastern Territories.

By letter of 21.8. I asked you to apply for the Fuehrer's decision on the question whether with regard to the Incorporated Eastern Territories the same civil law ought to be introduced for Poles and Germans equally. In the meantime I received a letter dated 14.8.40 from the Reich Minister for Justice, copy of which is enclosed and which you presumably have received as well.

H1235-0297

Even by the statements in this letter my doubts cannot be dispelled against the treatment intended in this matter. In particular, I am supplementing my letter of 21.8 as follows:

The Reich Minister for Justice confirms that no special difficulties have resulted from the present legal situation, but this was solely the result of direct personal and administrative instructions given to the Courts, a method of procedure which could not be maintained for an indefinite length of time. On this point, I am rather of the opinion, that for the time being we cannot desist from the possibility of influencing the Courts in the Eastern Territories. If this draft became law, we should lose the possibility of directing the jurisdiction by administrative instructions to the courts; on the contrary it would be exclusively for the Courts to decide the exceptions from the application of German law to Poles. This is where I see a great danger for the further establishment of a special law for the Poles. Moreover I consider it inadvisable if we, merely in order to provide a "legal basis" for jurisdiction, create a ruling whereby the Poles receive in the first place and on principle equal rights with the Germans, whereas we are planning at the same time for legislative measures depriving them of the same rights. It does not matter on what kind of basis the Courts administer justice, but what matters is solely that we provide for judgments which are in every respect appropriate to the special conditions prevailing in the Eastern Territories. No special proof is needed, I think, for the fact that such a result can rather be expected if we leave the conditions as they are, than if we introduce rules of a general nature by which the Judge would be bound. True, the
P.2 Judge would be entitled by the general proviso, to deviate to a certain extent, in individual cases, from applying German law to Poles. Apart from the fact that in this way the judge would be burdened with a decision which rests with the legislator alone, he would no longer be in a position, after the introduction of German law, to refuse generally the right of the Poles to bring an action or to testify in a lawsuit, or to prevent an execution of sentence of a Pole against a German, to refuse the entry of real estate rights of a Pole into the land register, etc. Thus it is not correct to say that with regard to the non-German minorities the legal situation would remain the same as it has developed so far, even if the Ordinance were issued.

The fact that certain rules will have to be developed without delay, in the interest of economic reconstruction in the Eastern Territories, in no way justifies an arrangement such as is intended by the Reich Minister of Justice. The difficulties which make the issue of such rules a necessity, could be abolished equally well if the Reich Governors or the Provincial Presidents issued new rules of law. On the other hand, I should have no objections against introducing German civil law into the Eastern Territories provided it were only applicable to the racial Germans there. I do not expect that special difficulties would arise from such an arrangement. In any case the economical reconstruction, in which only German racials would be allowed to participate, would be favored thereby.

There is, I think, no particular necessity to enlighten the peoples in question on the legal situation at present in force by proclamation of the ordinance proposed by the Reich Minister of Justice. There will hardly be any doubt that, in any case, racial Germans are subject to German law, that there is a law in force for them which does not make their legal situation worse than that of the Germans in Germany. If

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EXTRACT OF TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-139
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

there should be any doubts, they could easily be lifted by publishing an announcement in the papers that German law is applicable to the legal relations of the racial Germans residing in the Eastern Territories. If there remains any uncertainty, it applies solely to the legal situation of the non-German races. Such uncertainty would continue with regard to the general proviso; for the rest, I see no cogent reason for abolishing it by general introduction of German civil law in the face of all the objections which I raised above.

I agree with the Reich Minister of Justice that the Poles must not receive a status which the political leadership does not want them to have, and that from the beginning the legislation must take into consideration the special conditions in the incorporated Eastern Territories. But the draft does not conform to these principles. I very much doubt that a Judge will ever be able to decide whether or not the application of German law "would prejudice the incorporation of the Eastern territories into Germany". As the Reich Minister of Justice himself emphasizes, the will of the political leadership must be the only deciding factor; this will must be communicated to the Judge; he is neither able nor competent to establish it.

It does not matter whether the rules concerning the status of the non-German races in the realm of administration of civil justice are part of civil or of public law, and whether therefore they belong to the competence of the Reich Ministry of Justice or not. If they belong to public law - which I very much doubt - they will have to be issued by the competent Ministry at the same time as the rules concerning civil law.

Neither is the problem solved by the ordinances concerning the administration and seizure of property formerly belonging to Poles, or by the rules concerning the Main Trustee Office East, nor by the decree concerning the reconstruction of economy in the Incorporated Eastern Territories, or by the decree concerning the administration of property belonging to nationals of the former Polish state. I consider it absurd, to give an example, first to force the German Judge to enter judgment for a Pole, and subsequently to nullify this judgment at once by confiscation or similar acts. Moreover there will not always be reasons for confiscation.

Nor is it always possible to counter the attempts of Poles to take out executions against a German by applying the law concerning the abuse of execution. This law is not applicable if what is intended is to prevent the execution of a judgment issued by a German Court immediately after it has been issued. In case the law should be applicable in such case, one might be justified in asking why then a judgment must be entered at all, if it is immediately to be nullified by the same court. Obviously it would be more advisable to issue rules from the beginning as to whether a claim may be adjudicated at all.

To the statements of the Reich Minister for Justice concerning the formation of special arbitration authorities I reply briefly, that in my opinion it would make a great difference, whether a Pole is entitled to sue a German, or whether an arbitration authority is interposed which would have to make preliminary enquires and which would have to carry out the necessary legal steps, as the case may be. I cannot see how the Courts could be in a position to prevent Polish residents from abusing their right to apply to the Courts.

H1235-0299

The Reich Minister of Justice has received a copy of this letter and of my letter of 21.8.1940.

Heil Hitler!

(initials)
By order (initials)
(signed) M. Bormann (initials)

1 Enclosure

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT R-139

1 December 1945

I, ENID M. STANDRING, P.O. W.R.N.S. 52012, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true extract of translation of Document No. R-139.

ENID M. STANDRING
P. O. W.R.N.S. 52012

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H-1235

Bormann

Martin

J J Bormann